Dataset.

Deliberative structures and their impact on voting under economic conflict [Dataset]

Digital.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
oai:digital.csic.es:10261/311580
Digital.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Gerhards, Leonie
  • Mechtenberg, Lydia
We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate how different deliberative structures of varying inclusiveness affect collective decisions in the presence of economic conflict. An electorate consists of two groups, one informed and one uninformed about an uncertain state of the economy. This state affects payoffs differently for the two groups. We study three deliberative structures that vary in how the uninformed are included in pre-vote communication. Compared with a setting without any communication, we find that communication in all three deliberation treatments leads to more frequent votes for the efficient policies. The most inclusive deliberative structure motivates more truthfulness, more trust, more cooperativeness (i.e. refraining from protest votes), and more votes for the efficient policies, than the least inclusive structure. However, comparison among the deliberation treatments reveals that the most inclusive deliberative structure is not the one that generates the highest degree of truthfulness. The dynamics of communication lead to a general deterioration of truth-telling and cooperativeness, reinforced by the use of disrespectful and uncooperative language., Peer reviewed
 
DOI: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/311580
Digital.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
oai:digital.csic.es:10261/311580

HANDLE: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/311580
Digital.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
oai:digital.csic.es:10261/311580
 
Ver en: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/311580
Digital.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
oai:digital.csic.es:10261/311580

Digital.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
oai:digital.csic.es:10261/175586
Artículo preliminar (workingPaper). 2018

DELIBERATIVE STRUCTURES AND THEIR IMPACT ON VOTING BEHAVIOR UNDER SOCIAL CONFLICT

Digital.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Gerhards, Leonie
  • Mechtenberg, Lydia
Trabajo presentado en el European Workshop on Experimental and Behavioral Economics (EWEBE), organizado por la Universidad de Bologna los días 26 y 27 de mayo de 2017 con el título: The impact of deliberative structures on voting behavio.--Trabajo presentado en los Bilkent Microeconomics Seminars organizados por la Bilkent University (Ankara, Turkey) el día 29 de noviembre de 2017, Inequalities in democracies are multi-faceted. They not only incorporate differences in economic opportunities, but also differences in access to information and social influence. In a lab experiment, we study the interaction of these inequalities to provide a better understanding of socio-political tensions in modern societies. We identify the tragedy of the elite, the dilemma that privileged access to information about a fundamental state that mediates political conflict creates lying incentives for the better informed. In our experiment, an electorate consists of two groups, one informed and one uninformed about an uncertain state of the world. Incentives depend on this state. Before voting the two groups can communicate. We study four different communication protocols which vary the access to communication channels of the two groups and are meant to represent societies with different degrees of openness. We hypothesize that the deliberative structures affect group identities, preferences, and voting. Our observed outcomes largely coincide with those predicted by our theoretical analysis., The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness through Grant: ECO2017-88130 and through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV2015-0563), the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2017 SGR 1136) and the Antoni Serra Ramoneda (UAB – Catalunya Caixa) Research Chair as well as from the Graduate School of the Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, Universit¨at Hamburg., Peer reviewed




Digital.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
oai:digital.csic.es:10261/175598
Publicaciones de conferencias: comunicaciones, ponencias, pósters, etc (conferenceObject). 2017

DELIBERATIVE STRUCTURES AND THEIR IMPACT ON VOTING BEHAVIOR UNDER SOCIAL CONFLICT

Digital.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
  • Brandts, Jordi
Trabajo presentado en los GATE External seminars organizados por el Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Economique de la Université Lumière-Lyon, el día 12 de junio de 2017, No




Digital.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
oai:digital.csic.es:10261/205358
Publicaciones de conferencias: comunicaciones, ponencias, pósters, etc (conferenceObject). 2020

DELIBERATIVE STRUCTURES AND THEIR IMPACT ON VOTING BEHAVIOR UNDER SOCIAL CONFLICT

Digital.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
  • Brandts, Jordi
Trabajo presentado en el International Symposium in Experimental Economics (ISEE), celebrado en Abu Dhabi (Emiratos Árabes Unidos), en marzo de 2019




Digital.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
oai:digital.csic.es:10261/254300
Publicaciones de conferencias: comunicaciones, ponencias, pósters, etc (conferenceObject). 2021

DELIBERATIVE STRUCTURES AND THEIR IMPACT ON VOTING BEHAVIOR UNDER SOCIAL CONFLICT

Digital.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
  • Brandts, Jordi
Trabajo presentado en el Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications, celebrado en Lisboa (Portugal), del 7 al 9 de noviembre de 2019




Digital.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
oai:digital.csic.es:10261/254303
Publicaciones de conferencias: comunicaciones, ponencias, pósters, etc (conferenceObject). 2021

DELIBERATIVE STRUCTURES AND THEIR IMPACT ON VOTING BEHAVIOR UNDER SOCIAL CONFLICT

Digital.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
  • Brandts, Jordi
Trabajo presentado en el Advanced seminar in Economics, celebrado en Lausana (Suiza), el 12 de junio de 2019, Inequalities in democracies not only involve economic differences, but also differences in access to information and social influence. We identify the tragedy of the informed: Privileged access to information about economic conditions can create lying incentives. In a laboratory experiment, we study an electorate that consists of two groups, one informed and one uninformed about an uncertain state of the economy. Incentives depend on this state. Before voting the two groups can communicate. In addition to a treatment without communication, we study three different deliberative structures that vary in how much the uninformed can partake, i.e., in inclusiveness. We hypothesize that these deliberative structures affect preferences and voting and that their efficiency-enhancing effect on voting outcomes increases with increasing inclusiveness. This predicted efficiency ranking is confirmed by the data, but the differences in total expected earnings are not statistically significant, despite significant differences in voting behavior. We find three reasons for this unpredicted flatness of the efficiency ranking: First, the uninformed do not anticipate how lying behavior of the informed varies with the deliberative structure. Second, compared to the other deliberative structures, fully inclusive deliberation better allows the uninformed to coordinate – not only alongside the informed, but also against them. Third, the back-and-forth of communication and votes leads to growing animosity between the informed and the uninformed and hence to a deterioration of economic consensus.




Digital.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
oai:digital.csic.es:10261/279411
Artículo científico (article). 2022

DELIBERATIVE STRUCTURES AND THEIR IMPACT ON VOTING UNDER ECONOMIC CONFLICT

Digital.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Gerhards, Leonie
  • Mechtenberg, Lydia
We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate how different deliberative structures of varying inclusiveness affect collective decisions in the presence of economic conflict. An electorate consists of two groups, one informed and one uninformed about an uncertain state of the economy. This state affects payoffs differently for the two groups. We study three deliberative structures that vary in how the uninformed are included in pre-vote communication. Compared with a setting without any communication, we find that communication in all three deliberation treatments leads to more frequent votes for the efficient policies. The most inclusive deliberative structure motivates more truthfulness, more trust, more cooperativeness (i.e. refraining from protest votes), and more votes for the efficient policies, than the least inclusive structure. However, comparison among the deliberation treatments reveals that the most inclusive deliberative structure is not the one that generates the highest degree of truthfulness. The dynamics of communication lead to a general deterioration of truth-telling and cooperativeness, reinforced by the use of disrespectful and uncooperative language., Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature., Peer reviewed




Digital.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
oai:digital.csic.es:10261/311580
Dataset. 2021

DELIBERATIVE STRUCTURES AND THEIR IMPACT ON VOTING UNDER ECONOMIC CONFLICT [DATASET]

Digital.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Gerhards, Leonie
  • Mechtenberg, Lydia
We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate how different deliberative structures of varying inclusiveness affect collective decisions in the presence of economic conflict. An electorate consists of two groups, one informed and one uninformed about an uncertain state of the economy. This state affects payoffs differently for the two groups. We study three deliberative structures that vary in how the uninformed are included in pre-vote communication. Compared with a setting without any communication, we find that communication in all three deliberation treatments leads to more frequent votes for the efficient policies. The most inclusive deliberative structure motivates more truthfulness, more trust, more cooperativeness (i.e. refraining from protest votes), and more votes for the efficient policies, than the least inclusive structure. However, comparison among the deliberation treatments reveals that the most inclusive deliberative structure is not the one that generates the highest degree of truthfulness. The dynamics of communication lead to a general deterioration of truth-telling and cooperativeness, reinforced by the use of disrespectful and uncooperative language., Peer reviewed




1106