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DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Fraud tolerance in optimal crowdfunding

  • Ellman, Matthew
  • Hurkens, Sjaak
Reward-based crowdfunding enables credit-constrained entrepreneurs to raise money to develop and create innovative products. Crowdfunders' low monitoring incentives open the door to fraud. In practice, fraud is surprisingly rare. Strausz (2017) proves that crowdfunding implements the optimal ex post individually ratio- nal mechanism design outcome in an environment with entrepreneurial moral hazard and private cost information. However, ex post individual rationality precludes all crowdfunding unless fraud can be prevented with certainty. Actual crowdfunding tolerates some fraud. We show this (i) generates strictly higher pro ts and welfare, but (ii) cannot implement the optimal ex interim individually rational outcome., We gratefully acknowledge financial support from 2016 FBBVA grant Innovación e Información en la Economía Digital, the Spanish Ministry via the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and grants ECO2017-88129-P (AEI/FEDER, UE) (Ellman) and ECO2015- 67171-P (MINECO) (Hurkens) and the Generalitat de Catalunya via the grant 2017-SGR-1136., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Distributional Concerns in Managers’ Compensation Schemes for Heterogeneous Workers: Experimental Evidence

  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Ortiz, José M.
  • Solà, Carles
We present results from three-player experiments aimed at studying distributional concerns in how owner-managers compensate themselves and workers of different productivities and effort costs, as well as their relations to various equity principles. We are also interested in how owner-managers decisions’ are affected by pay secrecy. We use a game in which workers first exert effort and owner-managers then decide on bonuses for themselves and workers. Our design includes four treatments: (1) different productivities of workers with complete information; (2) different productivities of workers with pay secrecy among workers; (3) different effort cost of workers with complete information; and (4) different effort cost of workers with pay secrecy among workers. The equity principles we focus on are ‘production-equity’, higher production leads to higher wage, and ‘effort-cost equity’, higher effort-cost leads to higher wage. Across all treatments about 50% of all manager choices are compatible both with ‘production equity’ and with ‘effort- cost equity’, about 20% only with production equity and about 15% only with effort-cost equity. Overall, the effect of effort-cost equity is significantly stronger than that of production-equity. Pay secrecy does not significantly affect compensation differences among workers., The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Grant: ECO2017-88130), the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV2015-0563) the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2017 SGR 1136).and the Antoni Serra Ramoneda (UAB – Catalunya Caixa) Research Chair, Peer reviewed