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MICROECONOMIA EN LA ERA DIGITAL

ECO2017-88129-P

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Funding agency name Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Funding agency acronym AEI
Program Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprogram Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Call Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Call year 2017
State Plan 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Beneficiary centre AGENCIA ESTATAL CONSEJO SUPERIOR DE INVESTIGACIONES CIENTIFICAS (CSIC)

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 5
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Otros (Other)

Coalitional bargaining with consistent counterfactuals

  • Burguet, Roberto
  • Caminal, Ramón
Trabajo presentado en la 17th SAET Conference on Current Trends in Economics, celebrada en Faro, Portugal del 25 al 30 de junio de 2017.-- Trabajo presentado en el 41 Simposio de la Asociación Española de Economía, celebrado en Bilbao, del 14 al 17 de diciembre de 2016.-- Trabajo presentado en el EEA Esem (2017): (32ne Annual Congress of the European Economic Association & 70th European Meeting of the Econometric Society), celebrado en Lisboa del 21 al 25 de agosto de 2017, We propose a new solution concept for TU cooperative games in characteristic function form, the SCOOP, that builds on the symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS), adding to it a consistency requirement for negotiations inside every coalition. The SCOOP speciÖes the probability of success and the payo§s to each coalition. Players share the surplus of a coalition according to the NBS, with disagreement payo§s that are computed as the expectation of payo§s in other coalitions, using some common probability distribution, which in turn is derived from the prior distribution. The predicted outcome can be probabilistic or deterministic, but only an e¢ cient coalition can succeed with probability one. We discuss necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an e¢ cient solution. In either case, the SCOOP always exists, is generically unique for superadditive games, and easy to compute. Moreover, in the spirit of the Nash program, we propose a reasonable non-cooperative protocol whose stationary equilibrium identiÖes the SCOOP as the limit equilibrium outcome, We acknowledge the support of the Spanish Ministry of Finance, Industry, and Competitiveness (ECO2017-88129-P, and Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D, SEV-2015-0563) and Generalitat de Catalunya (2017-SGR1136)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Fraud tolerance in optimal crowdfunding

  • Ellman, Matthew
  • Hurkens, Sjaak
Reward-based crowdfunding enables credit-constrained entrepreneurs to raise money to develop and create innovative products. Crowdfunders' low monitoring incentives open the door to fraud. In practice, fraud is surprisingly rare. Strausz (2017) proves that crowdfunding implements the optimal ex post individually ratio- nal mechanism design outcome in an environment with entrepreneurial moral hazard and private cost information. However, ex post individual rationality precludes all crowdfunding unless fraud can be prevented with certainty. Actual crowdfunding tolerates some fraud. We show this (i) generates strictly higher pro ts and welfare, but (ii) cannot implement the optimal ex interim individually rational outcome., We gratefully acknowledge financial support from 2016 FBBVA grant Innovación e Información en la Economía Digital, the Spanish Ministry via the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and grants ECO2017-88129-P (AEI/FEDER, UE) (Ellman) and ECO2015- 67171-P (MINECO) (Hurkens) and the Generalitat de Catalunya via the grant 2017-SGR-1136., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Optimal crowdfunding design

  • Ellman, Matthew
  • Hurkens, Sjaak
This paper characterizes profit- and welfare-maximizing reward-based crowdfunding, defined by an aggregate funding threshold for production. We disentangle crowdfunding's selling and funding roles, locating its key benefit in its market test role of adapting production to demand. Multiple prices prove necessary for effective learning and adaptation, even with relatively large crowds. Mechanism design proves general optimality in our baseline and shows the value of limiting reward quantities. Funding is not fundamental and crowdfunding may even complement traditional finance. We characterize welfare consequences, model price dynamics and identify platform designs and regulations that enhance innovation and social benefits., Financial support from the 2016 FBBVA grant “Innovación e Información en la Economía Digital”, the Net Institute grant 14-21 (www.Netinst.org), the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563), Spanish ministerial grants (ECO2017-88129-P (MCIU/AEI/FEDER, UE), Ellman, and PGC2018-097898-B-100 (MCIU/AEI/FEDER, UE), Hurkens) and Generalitat de Catalunya (2017 SGR 1136) is gratefully acknowledged.
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The dynamic provision of product diversity under duopoly

  • Caminal, Ramón
This paper builds a dynamic duopoly model to examine the provision of new varieties over time. Consumers experience temporary satiation, and hence higher consumption of the current variety lowers demand for future varieties. The equilibrium can be characterized by a combination of monopolistic pricing and nearly zero profits (competitive timing). In particular, if the cost of producing a new variety is not too low then firms tend to avoid head-to-head competition and set the short-run profit maximizing price. However, firms tend to introduce new varieties as soon as demand has grown sufficiently to cover costs. From a second best perspective, the equilibrium may exhibit excessive product diversity. However, if firms coordinate their frequency of new product introductions, then consumers are likely to be harmed. It is also shown that equilibrium prices are moderated by two factors. First, consumers’ option value of waiting reduces their willingness to pay. Second, competition reduces firms’ incentives to engage in intertemporal price discrimination., I also acknowledge the financial support of the Spanish Ministry of Finance, Industry, and Competitiveness (ECO2017-88129-P, and Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D, SEV-2015-0563) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (2017-SGR-1136).
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Fraud tolerance in optimal crowdfunding

  • Hurkens, Sjaak
  • Ellman, Matthew
Trabajo presentado en el 46th Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics, celebrado en Barcelona (España), del 30 de agosto al 1 de septiembre, Reward-based crowdfunding enables credit-constrained entrepreneurs to raise money to develop and create innovative products. Crowdfunders' low monitoring incentives open the door to fraud. In practice, fraud is surprisingly rare. Strausz (2017) claims that crowdfunding implements the optimal ex post individually rational mechanism design outcome in an environment with entrepreneurial moral hazard and private cost information. However, ex post individual rationality precludes all crowdfunding unless fraud can be prevented with certainty. Actual crowdfunding tolerates some fraud. We show this (i) generates strictly higher prots and welfare, but (ii) cannot implement the optimal ex interim individually rational outcome, We gratefully acknowledge financial support from 2016 FBBVA grant Innovación e Información en la Economía Digital, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness via the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and grants ECO2017-88129-P (Ellman) and ECO2015-67171-P (Hurkens) and the Generalitat de Catalunya via the grant 2017-SGR-1136