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Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Optimal policy with general signal extraction

  • Hauk, Esther
  • Lanteri, Andrea
  • Marcet, Albert
Most available results on optimal decisions under partial information are derived under “separation”. But this principle does not always hold. We derive a non-standard first order condition of optimality from first principles when signal extraction and optimal policy must be jointly determined. This allows us to solve a model of optimal fiscal policy where separation does not apply. Tax smoothing prevails in normal times, but taxes respond strongly in recessions. This non-linearity arises because signal extraction interacts differently with optimal policy depending on the value of the observed signals. Existing results based on the “separation principle” follow as special cases., Hauk acknowledges financial support from through CICYT project number ECO2015-67171-P (MINECO / FEDER) and from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities through project PGC2018-097898-B-100 MCIU/AEI/FEDER. Hauk and Marcet have received funding from the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement no. 612796, from the government of Catalonia (2017 SGR 1571) and from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (CEX2019-000915-S). Lanteri acknowledges support and hospitality from MOVE Barcelona and Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica-CSIC. Marcet acknowledges support from the Axa Foundation; the Excellence Program of Banco de España; and the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Unions Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007-2013 GA number 324048-(APMPAL) and Horizon2020 GA number 788547 (APMPAL-HET)
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Optimal crowdfunding design

  • Ellman, Matthew
  • Hurkens, Sjaak
This paper characterizes profit- and welfare-maximizing reward-based crowdfunding, defined by an aggregate funding threshold for production. We disentangle crowdfunding's selling and funding roles, locating its key benefit in its market test role of adapting production to demand. Multiple prices prove necessary for effective learning and adaptation, even with relatively large crowds. Mechanism design proves general optimality in our baseline and shows the value of limiting reward quantities. Funding is not fundamental and crowdfunding may even complement traditional finance. We characterize welfare consequences, model price dynamics and identify platform designs and regulations that enhance innovation and social benefits., Financial support from the 2016 FBBVA grant “Innovación e Información en la Economía Digital”, the Net Institute grant 14-21 (www.Netinst.org), the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563), Spanish ministerial grants (ECO2017-88129-P (MCIU/AEI/FEDER, UE), Ellman, and PGC2018-097898-B-100 (MCIU/AEI/FEDER, UE), Hurkens) and Generalitat de Catalunya (2017 SGR 1136) is gratefully acknowledged.
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Optimal policy with general signal extraction

  • Hauk, Esther
  • Lanteri, Andrea
  • Marcet, Albert
Most available results on optimal decisions under partial information are derived under “separation”. But this principle does not always hold. We derive a non-standard first order condition of optimality from first principles when signal extraction and optimal policy must be jointly determined. This allows us to solve a model of optimal fiscal policy where separation does not apply. Tax smoothing prevails in normal times, but taxes respond strongly in recessions. This non-linearity arises because signal extraction interacts differently with optimal policy depending on the value of the observed signals. Existing results based on the “separation principle” follow as special cases., Hauk acknowledges financial support from through CICYT project number ECO2015-67171-P (MINECO / FEDER) and from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities through project PGC2018-097898-B-100 MCIU/AEI/FEDER. Hauk and Marcet have received funding from the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement no. 612796, from the government of Catalonia (2017 SGR 1571) and from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (CEX2019-000915-S). Lanteri acknowledges support and hospitality from MOVE Barcelona and Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica-CSIC. Marcet acknowledges support from the Axa Foundation; the Excellence Program of Banco de España; and the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Unions Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007-2013 GA number 324048-(APMPAL) and Horizon2020 GA number 788547 (APMPAL-HET)., Peer reviewed
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Optimal policy with general signal extraction

  • Hauk, Esther
  • Lanteri, Andrea
  • Marcet, Albert
Most available results on optimal decisions under partial information are derived under “separation”. But this principle does not always hold. We derive a non-standard first order condition of optimality from first principles when signal extraction and optimal policy must be jointly determined. This allows us to solve a model of optimal fiscal policy where separation does not apply. Tax smoothing prevails in normal times, but taxes respond strongly in recessions. This non-linearity arises because signal extraction interacts differently with optimal policy depending on the value of the observed signals. Existing results based on the “separation principle” follow as special cases., Hauk acknowledges financial support from through CICYT project number ECO2015-67171-P (MINECO / FEDER) and from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities through project PGC2018-097898-B-100 MCIU/AEI/FEDER. Hauk and Marcet have received funding from the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement no. 612796, from the government of Catalonia (2017 SGR 1571) and from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (CEX2019-000915-S). Lanteri acknowledges support and hospitality from MOVE Barcelona and Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica-CSIC. Marcet acknowledges support from the Axa Foundation; the Excellence Program of Banco de España; and the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Unions Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007-2013 GA number 324048-(APMPAL) and Horizon2020 GA number 788547 (APMPAL-HET)
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Perception of corruption and public support for redistribution in Latin America

  • Hauk, Esther|||0000-0002-3089-9307
  • Oviedo León, Mónica Juliana
  • Ramos Morilla, Xavier|||0000-0003-1947-4057
This paper studies the relationship between people's beliefs about the quality of their institutions, as measured by corruption perceptions, and preferences for redistribution in Latin America. Our empirical study is guided by a theoretical model which introduces taxes into Foellmi and Oechslin's (2007) general equilibrium model of non-collusive corruption. In this model perceived corruption influences people's preferences for redistribution through two channels. On the one hand it undermines trust in government, which reduces people's support for redistribution. On the other hand, more corruption decreases own wealth relative to average wealth of below-average-wealth individuals leading to a higher demand for redistribution. Thus, the effect of perceived corruption on redistribution cannot be signed a priori. Our novel empirical findings for Latin America suggest that perceiving corruption in the public sector increases people's support for redistribution. Although the wealth channel dominates in the data, we also find evidence for the trust channel - from corruption to demand for redistribution via reduced trust.