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DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Preference shock and party consistency

  • Aragonés, Enriqueta
Trabajo presentado en el 41 Simposio de la Asociación Española de Economía, celebrado en Bilbao, del 14 al 17 de diciembre de 2016, I develop a two party electoral competition model in order to analyze the effects of an exogenous preference shock on the strategic policy choice of parties. I find that on the one hand, if the preference shock affects the issue that is currently most salient, then both parties strategically shift their policy choices in the direction of the shock, however the shifts are asymmetric: the policy shift of the party that is most favored by the preference shock is smaller. On the other hand, if the preference shock affects an issue that was not the most salient before and becomes salient because of the shock itself, then both parties strategically shift their policy choices towards the ideal point of the median voter of that issue. And again, the parties policy shift is asymmetric: the reaction of the party that is most favored by the preference shock is smaller. Finally, I show that the effects of a large policy shift that some parties perform when they are optimally reacting to a voters’ preference shocks may break the party’s internal equilibrium among its different factions, implying that exogenous preference shocks may cause important chanegs in a pary system, Aragones acknowledges financial support by the Generalitat de Catalunya Grant number 2014 SGR 1064, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness ECO2015-67171-P and the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics through SEV-2015-0563., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Fraud tolerance in optimal crowdfunding

  • Hurkens, Sjaak
  • Ellman, Matthew
Trabajo presentado en el 46th Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics, celebrado en Barcelona (España), del 30 de agosto al 1 de septiembre, Reward-based crowdfunding enables credit-constrained entrepreneurs to raise money to develop and create innovative products. Crowdfunders' low monitoring incentives open the door to fraud. In practice, fraud is surprisingly rare. Strausz (2017) claims that crowdfunding implements the optimal ex post individually rational mechanism design outcome in an environment with entrepreneurial moral hazard and private cost information. However, ex post individual rationality precludes all crowdfunding unless fraud can be prevented with certainty. Actual crowdfunding tolerates some fraud. We show this (i) generates strictly higher prots and welfare, but (ii) cannot implement the optimal ex interim individually rational outcome, We gratefully acknowledge financial support from 2016 FBBVA grant Innovación e Información en la Economía Digital, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness via the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and grants ECO2017-88129-P (Ellman) and ECO2015-67171-P (Hurkens) and the Generalitat de Catalunya via the grant 2017-SGR-1136