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DISEÑO DE INSTITUTIONES ECONOMICAS EN UNA ECONOMIA GLOBAL

BES-2017-080192

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Funding agency name Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Funding agency acronym AEI
Program Programa Estatal de Promoción del Talento y su Empleabilidad en I+D+i
Subprogram Subprograma Estatal de Formación
Call Contratos Predoctorales
Call year 2017
State Plan 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 3
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Docta Complutense
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Stackelberg social equilibrium in water markets

  • Houba, Harold
  • Tomori, Françeska
Market power in water markets can be modeled as simultaneous quantity competition on a river structure and analyzed by applying social equilibrium. In an example of a duopoly water market, we argue that the lack of backward induction logic implies that the upstream supplier foregoes profitable strategic manipulation of water to the downstream supplier. To incorporate backward induction, we propose the Stackelberg social equilibrium concept. We prove the existence of Stackelberg social equilibrium in duopoly water markets with an upstream–downstream river structure and derive it in the example of a duopoly market.
Docta Complutense
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Regulatory commitment versus non-commitment: electric vehicle adoption under subsidies and emission standards

  • Theilen, Bernd
  • Tomori, Françeska
We compare two regulatory structures in the application of emission standards and a subsidy scheme in the automobile market. The regulator can either commit to an emission standard or is not able to commit. Firms compete á la Cournot and produce fuel-powered and electric vehicles. The emissions of fuel-powered vehicles can be abated by means of investing in emission-reducing innovation. Our results indicate that under commitment there are less emissions, higher subsidies and a major adoption of electric vehicles. By contrast, non-commitment yields more fuel-powered vehicles, more vehicles in total and higher consumer surplus. Electric vehicle producers obtain higher profits under commitment, whereas fuel-powered vehicle producers might be better off under both regulatory structures. Social welfare is higher under non-commitment as long as environmental damages are regarded severe. Otherwise, commitment is socially preferable. This result provides an explanation for observed differences in the duration of environmental standards between the US, the EU and China.
Docta Complutense
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Market power in California's water market

  • Tomori, Françeska
  • Ansink, Erik
  • Houba, Harold
  • Hagerty, Nick
  • Bos, Charles
We estimate market power in California's surface water market. Market power may distort the potential welfare gains from water marketing. We use a Nash-Cournot model and derive a closed-form solution for the extent of market power in a water market setting. We then use this solution to estimate market power in a newly assembled dataset on California's water economy. We show that, under the assumptions of the Nash-Cournot model, market power in this thin market is limited.