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Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 7
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Docta Complutense
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Arendt, free will, and action

  • Rae, Gavin
Although it is well-known that Hannah Arendt gives a privileged role to action, her comments on the relationship between action and will(ing) have caused much confusion in the literature: commentators are split on whether her analysis of willing in The Human Condition (from 1958) and the essay “What is Freedom?” (from 1960) contradict or are complemented by her later analysis in The Life of the Mind (from 1978). I defend the latter position, but in contrast to others who have affirmed the same argument but focus on other themes to show it, I actually set out to show that Arendt offers a remarkably consistent analysis of the relationship between action and will(ing) throughout her work. To do so, I adopt a somewhat counterintuitive hermeneutical strategy by starting with her late analysis of will(ing) in The Life of the Mind (from 1978) where she most explicitly distinguishes between the historically dominant form of will(ing) of the liberium arbitrium and what I call natal-will(ing), before reading that distinction back into her earlier analyses of freedom in “What is Freedom?” (published in 1960), and action in The Human Condition (published in 1958). This hermeneutical strategy is underpinned by the claim that the distinction between two forms of will(ing) made explicit in The Life of the Mind is implicit to those earlier works. This shows that Arendt’s critique of will(ing) in her earlier works is a critique of the free will tradition, not willing per se, while her affirmation of action in those texts, implies the affirmation of the other form of willing, tied to natality and the power to begin anew, that she subsequently explicitly identifies in The Life of the Mind.
Docta Complutense
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

From reason to madness and back: critiquing reason through the Derrida–Foucault debate

  • Rae, Gavin
There has recently been something of a resurgence of interest in the Derrida–Foucault debate, with this leading to a reassessment of its aims, content, and outcome. This article contributes to that endeavor by following Amy Allen's claim that the debate was not concerned with madness per se, but with a critique of reason. However, I depart from Allen's conclusion in two ways: First, Allen does not actually engage with the debate per se but sets out to offer arguments for why we should side with Foucault's approach. As such, second, Allen not only falls into the logic of binary opposition of winner and loser, but also returns us to and so restricts critique to the parameters of Foucault's thinking. In contrast, I argue that it is the disagreement itself that provides the ‘positive’ moment in the debate, insofar as it brings us to critique reason itself without necessarily restricting us to the parameters of either thinker. In short, the Derrida–Foucault debate continues to be of interest, not because of what it divulges about Foucault's History of Madness per se, but because the differences that are revealed between Derrida and Foucault stimulate a critique—understood in terms of a questioning of the conditions of possibility—of reason itself, including its composition and limit, as well as its relationship to its other, including the question of that other.
Docta Complutense
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

All power to the imagination: Sartre and Castoriadis, All power to the imagination: Sartre and Castoriadis

  • Rae, Gavin
Despite Jean-Paul Sartre and Cornelius Castoriadis placing the imagination centre stage in their respective conceptual theories, little work has been done to bring them into conversation on this issue or, indeed, any other. This is perhaps not surprising given Sartre’s early work on this topic has tended to be downplayed in favour of his affirmation of freedom, while Castoriadis not only denigrates Sartre’s thinking generally and his account of the imagination specifically but also posits their relationship as one of opposition. In contrast, this article brings them into conversation on the question of the imagination to call into question Castoriadis assessment of their relation. To do so, I outline Sartre’s position in The Imaginary, showing that Castoriadis assessment of Sartre’s notion is based on a problematic, if common, misunderstanding of Sartre’s notion of nothingness and its relationship to creativity. Having overcome the opposition that Castoriadis affirms between their respective positions, I argue that, while there certainly are differences between their positions, there are also important points of agreement and overlap between them, especially regarding the constitutive role that the imagination plays for consciousness, and the relationships between the imagination and freedom and the imagination and creativity, that point to a shared and original approach.
Docta Complutense
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The early Sartre and Arendt on action: exploring a neglected relationship

  • Rae, Gavin
The purpose of this paper is to engage with Jean-Paul Sartre's and Hannah Arendt's analyses of action. Although Arendt's analysis of action is well known and interest in Sartre's early analysis of action has recently grown, there has been little attempt to bring the two thinkers together on this topic. This is presumably because their respective positions appear to be antithetical and, indeed, Arendt's assessment of Sartre's philosophy was so critical. My guiding contention, however, is that the early Sartre and Arendt actually share a number of common positions regarding the question of action. By first outlining Sartre's analysis of action in Being and Nothingness, before turning to Arendt's discussions in The Human Condition and the essay “What is Freedom?” (from 1958 and 1960), I show that, although differences exist, their respective positions overlap on a number of important points, including a common critique of the free will tradition, both for its supposed dependence on arbitrariness and for reducing action to a mental activity, and their joint insistence that action entails a projection of the entire being of the individual that is grounded in a prior orientation (defined in terms of values for Sartre and a principle for Arendt).
Docta Complutense
Publication Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

From ontological difference to difference in itself: Heidegger and Deleuze

  • Rae, Gavin
The question of difference is one of, if not the, fundamental question(s) in twentieth-century continental philosophy. It is also a question to which both Heidegger and Deleuze respond, albeit in different ways. This chapter engages this overlap by taking up the difficult relationship between Heidegger and Deleuze to show some of the points of convergence and divergence between them. I focus primarily on Deleuze's assessment of Heidegger's early affirmation of the ontological difference, his claim that Heidegger offers a mistaken conception of univocity, and his conclusion that Heidegger's affirmation of the question of the meaning of being not only fails to properly think difference in and of itself but also, as a consequence, actually recuperates Heidegger into the Western metaphysical tradition that he aims to overcome. However, by engaging with Heidegger's thought and, indeed, offering potential Heideggerian responses to Deleuze's charges, I both complicate Deleuze's assessment and demonstrate the complexity of the issues engaged. Ultimately, I argue that although Deleuze continuously returns to Heidegger, Deleuze's relation to Heidegger is perhaps best understood in terms of something akin to a process of magnetic repulsion: although he is continually returned to different aspects of Heidegger's thought, every approximation gradually creates resistance that pushes Deleuze off in a different tangent from Heidegger without ever fully freeing Deleuze from Heidegger's orbit.
Docta Complutense
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Sartre on action: decentering the will, Inglés

  • Rae, Gavin
The Western philosophic tradition has tended to tie the question of action to that of freedom, with the relationship structured around the free will/determinism opposition. In contrast, I show that in Being and Nothingness, Sartre offers a stringent and radical critique of these approaches. I briefly outline the conceptual parameters of Sartre’s early ontology, before showing that he rejects the free will tradition because of its underlying conception of freedom and insistence that action is reflective and will-based. According to Sartre, consciousness is not a sum of parts, with one aspect (will) guiding the rest. Consciousness is a differentiated whole, divided between reflective and pre-reflective levels. Will is tied to the reflective level of consciousness and so cannot be said to be foundational given that reflectivity depends upon pre-reflectivity. Instead, it is an expressive effect of consciousness’s spontaneous, pre-reflective, projection of itself towards a particular end and value.
Docta Complutense
Publication Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

Embedded rupture: Castoriadis on creating the new

  • Rae, Gavin
This chapter shows that Cornelius Castoriadis offers a particularly innovative response to the question of the socialized individual’s capacity to create newness. To outline this, I first identify that Castoriadis decenters the individual from the foundational role often attributed to it through a two-stage processg in which the individual is conceived of as (1) an effect of what he calls the radical imaginary, itself expressive of Being’s chaotic becoming, and (2) arising from the complex interplay between two expressive dimensions of the radical imaginary: the social imaginary, which includes the ideas, narratives, norms, values and so on through which a collective is both created and defined, and the radical imagination, which designates the psyche’s capacity for creative, autonomous expression. Second, I then highlight that Castoriadis conceives of the subject in terms of a unified, albeit fluctuating, psychic monad that must be turned into a differentiated individual through a process of socialization, itself premised on both violence done to the psychic monad and the latter opening itself to its other. From this, I argue that, rather than annihilate the psychic monad, this process sublimates the psychic monad within the socialized individual, with the consequence that (1) it is necessary to find ways within each social imaginary for the psychic monad to express its radical autonomy, and (2) the individual is always able to “use” its chaotic psychic monadism originally and creatively. It is precisely because the sublimated primal unconscious continues to subtend the socialized psyche that the individual is always able to affect a fundamental and violent rupture from the social imaginary/social unconscious with this rupturing permitting the creation of genuine newness and, indeed, being its condition; that is, it is only because of this rupture that something can be considered to be genuinely creative and new.