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EMISIONES DE CARBONO, USO DE RECURSOS Y SOSTENIBILIDAD: ANALISIS CUANTITATIVOS E IMPLICACIONES DE POLITICA

PID2020-119152GB-I00

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Funding agency name Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Funding agency acronym AEI
Program Programa Estatal de I+D+i Orientado a los Retos de la Sociedad
Call Proyectos de I+D+i (Generación de Conocimiento y Retos Investigación)
Call year 2020
State Plan 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 7
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The unanimity rule under a two-agent fixed sequential order voting

  • Bannikova, Marina
  • Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel|||0000-0003-0202-4623
This paper studies how the cost of delay and voting order affect agents' decisions in a unanimity voting mechanism. Specifically, we consider two-voter conclaves with commonly known preferences over two alternatives, the cost of delay, and the following novelty: each voter has a subjective deadline-a moment in time when he/she prefers immediate agreement on any alternative, rather than future agreement on his/her most-preferred alternative. Our key finding shows that patience is not necessarily a main attribute of strategic advantage. When the first voter is the same at every stage, this voter will obtain his/her preferred alternative, even if he/she is the least patient one. However, this first movement advantage disappears when agents alternate as the first voter of each stage: in this case, the most patient voter always wins.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publication Otros (Other)

Resource allocations with guaranteed awards in claims problems

  • Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel
  • Peris, Josep E.
  • Solís-Baltodano, María-José
  • Peris, Josep E.|||/items/d36139fb-19ca-47a4-88e2-9503dd0ac04b
The notion of lower bound on awards has been introduced in the literature to analyze the establishment of guarantees that ensure a minimum award to each agent involved in situations of conflicting claims, such as the rationing of a resource or the distribution of the assets of a bankrupt firm. Indeed, this concept has a core role in many approaches related to the problem of fair allocation (Thomson in Math Soc Sci 74:41–59, 2015) and a range of such lower bounds have been proposed: the minimal right (Curiel et al. in Z Oper Res 31:A143–A159, 1987), the fair bound (Moulin in Handb Soc Choice Welf 1:289–357, 2002), securement (Moreno-Ternero and Villar in Math Soc Sci 47(2):245–257, 2004) and the min bound (Dominguez in mimeo, 2006). In this context, the key contribution of the current paper is to show that there is a correspondence between lower bounds and rules; i.e., associated to each particular lower bound, we find a specific way of distributing the resources. In doing so, we provide new characterizations for two well known rules, the constrained equal awards and Ibn Ezra’s rules. A dual analysis, by using upper bounds on awards will provide characterizations of the dual of the previously mentioned rules: the constrained equal losses rule and the dual of Ibn Ezra’s rule.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publication Otros (Other)

Cooperative TU-games: Dominance, stable sets, and the core revisited

  • Subiza, Begoña
  • Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel
  • Peris, Josep E.
  • Peris, Josep E.|||/items/d36139fb-19ca-47a4-88e2-9503dd0ac04b
  • Subiza, Begoña|||/items/e80ed45e-23a3-4e72-a9ed-91725e80e9f5
Stable sets are introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) as “the solution” of a cooperative game. Later on, Gillies (1953) defines the core of the game. Both notions can be established in terms of dominance. It is well known that the core may be an empty set, whereas stable sets may fail to exist, or may produce different proposals. We provide a new dominance relation so that the stable set obtained when applying this notion (the δ-stable set) always exists, it is unique, and it coincides with the core of the cooperative game, whenever the core is not empty. We apply this concept to some particular classes of TU-games having typically an empty core: voting (majority) games, minimum cost spanning trees games with revenue, controlled capacitated networks, or m-sequencing games.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publication Otros (Other)

Non-emptiness of the core of mcst games with revenues

  • Subiza, Begoña
  • Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel
  • Peris, Josep E.
  • Subiza, Begoña|||/items/e80ed45e-23a3-4e72-a9ed-91725e80e9f5
  • Peris, Josep E.|||/items/d36139fb-19ca-47a4-88e2-9503dd0ac04b
The minimum cost spanning tree (mest) problem analyzes how to efficiently connect geographically dispersed agents to a common source. Estévez-Fernández and Reijnierse (2014) study mest problems involving revenues, in which the agents benefit from being connected to the source. A key feature of their framework is that only certain coalitions, called effective coalitions, make sense to form. Estévez-Fernández and Reijnierse (2014) show that the core in cost–revenue mest games is typically empty. In this paper, we present a necessary condition that mest games with revenues need to fulfill to ensure the non-emptiness of the core: the existence of at least one agent with veto power, i.e., an agent whose participation is required in every effective coalition. Additionally, we extend the sufficient condition in Estévez-Fernández and Reijnierse (2014) for elementary cost mest problems.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publication Otros (Other)

Irreducible minimum cost spanning tree problems with revenues

  • Subiza, Begoña
  • Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel
  • Peris, Josep E.
  • Subiza, Begoña|||/items/e80ed45e-23a3-4e72-a9ed-91725e80e9f5
  • Peris, Josep E.|||/items/d36139fb-19ca-47a4-88e2-9503dd0ac04b
The current paper analyzes minimum cost spanning tree problems having irreducible costs while incorporating revenues. We prove that, in this context, the core of the associated cost-revenues game (the r-core) is non-empty. In particular, we find an stable allocation in the r-core, based on the CEL bankruptcy rule, that ensures fairness by distributing revenues only among agents that belong to every effective coalition. Therefore, our findings contribute to the literature by identifying structural conditions that guarantee stability in minimum cost spanning tree problems with revenues, overcoming previous results which showed that the r-core could be empty.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

How to distribute the European regional development funds through a combination of egalitarian allocations, the constrained equal losses min

  • Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel|||0000-0003-0202-4623
  • Salekpay, Foroogh|||0000-0001-5171-6111
  • Vilella, Cori|||0000-0001-5023-0929
As Solís-Baltodano et al. (2021) figure out, almost a third of the total European Union budget was set aside for the Cohesion Policy during the 2014-2020 period. The distribution of this budget is made through three main structural and investment funds, trying to promote convergence in the level of development of EU countries. Specifically, the current approach, by analysing this situation as a claims problem (O'Neill, 1982), finds the claims solution that performs better than the others by reducing inequality and promoting convergence to a greater degree (the Constrained Equal Losses rule). Nonetheless, when using this egalitarian division of losses, regions may not receive any funds. This paper defines a new way to distribute the limited resources of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). It proposes a compromise between the egalitarian approaches, i.e., a combination of the egalitarian division of the funds with an egalitarian division of the losses (what regions do not get). In doing so, the proposal applies the constrained equal losses solution while ensuring a minimum amount is allocated to each region (sustainable bound). Finally, the new solution is axiomatically analysed, and it is applied to the ERDF problem.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The constrained equal losses family of rules for claims problems

  • Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel|||0000-0003-0202-4623
  • Salekpay, Foroogh|||0000-0001-5171-6111
  • Vilella, Cori|||0000-0001-5023-0929
In this study, we introduce a family of rules for claims problems called the CEL-family. The family is defined by means of a parameter θ∈[0,1] as a notion of solidarity and contribution. It contains the constrained equal losses and the constrained equal awards rules. We perform an axiomatic analysis considering the main properties in the literature, for the sake of comparison. We apply the family to the distribution of the European Regional Development Funds to study how the rules in the family treat regions with relatively smaller claims compared to regions with relatively larger claims.