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EL VALOR DE LA INFORMACION: ESTRATEGIAS OPTIMAS Y CONTROL ESTOCASTICO

MTM2017-85618-P

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Año convocatoria 2017
Plan Estatal 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID

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e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Insider information and its relation with the arbitrage condition and the utility maximization problem

  • D'Auria, Bernardo
  • Salmerón Garrido, José Antonio
Correction: Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering, 20(5), 8305-8307. https://doi.org/10.3934/mbe.2023362 We prove that Theorem 4.16 in [1] is false by constructing a strategy that generates (FLVR) H(G). However, we success to prove that the no arbitrage property still holds when the agent only plays with strategies belonging to the admissible set called buy-and-hold., Within the well-known framework of financial portfolio optimization, we analyze the existing relationships between the condition of arbitrage and the utility maximization in presence of insider information. We assume that, since the initial time, the information flow is altered by adding the knowledge of an additional random variable including future information. In this context we study the utility maximization problem under the logarithmic and the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utilities, with and without the restriction of no temporary-bankruptcy.In particular, we show that the value of the insider information may be bounded while the arbitrage condition holds and we prove that the insider information does not always imply arbitrage for the insider by providing an explicit example., This research was partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness grants MTM2017-85618-P (via FEDER funds), MTM2015-72907-EXP and FPU18/01101. We thank the referees for the insightful comments that helped to improve the presentation of this work.