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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The chi-compromise value for non-transferable utility games

  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We introduce a compromise value for non-transferable utility games: the Chi-compromise value. It is closely related to the Compromise value introduced by Borm, Keiding, McLean, Oortwijn, and Tijs (1992), to the MC-value introduced by Otten, Borm, Peleg, and Tijs (1998), and to the Ω-value introduced by Bergantiños, Casas- Méndez, and Vázquez-Brage (2000). The main difference being that the maximal aspiration a player may have in the game is his maximal (among all coalitions) marginal contribution. We show that it is well defined on the class of totally essential and non-level games. We propose an extensive-form game whose subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoffs coincide with the Chi-compromise value
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model

  • Martínez, Ruth
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
  • Oviedo, Jorge
For the many-to-one matching model with firms having substitutable and q-separable preferences we propose two very natural binary operations that together with the unanimous partial ordering of the workers endow the set of stable matchings with a lattice structure. We also exhibit examples in which, under this restricted domain of firms' preferences, the classical binary operations may not even be matching
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Maximal domain of preferences for the division problem

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, then the uniform allocation rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. We identify the maximal set of preferences, containing the set of single-peaked preferences, under which there exists at least one rule satisfying the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, and strong symmetry. In addition, we show that our characterization implies a slightly weaker version of Ching and Serizawa's (1998) result. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, D78, D63.