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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A model-to-model analysis of Bertrand competition

  • Vilà, Xavier|||0000-0002-9122-5525
This paper studies a version of the classical Bertrand model in which consumers exhibit some strategic behavior when deciding from what seller they will buy. We use two related but different tools. Both consider a probabilistic learning (or evolutionary) mechanism, and in the two of them consumers' behavior influences the competition between the sellers. The results obtained show that, in general, developing some sort of loyalty is a good strategy for the buyers as it works in their best interest. First, we consider a learning procedure described by a deterministic dynamic system and, using strong simplifying assumptions, we can produce a description of the behavior of the process. Second, we use finite automata to represent the strategies played by the agents and an adaptive process based on genetic algorithms to simulate the stochastic process of learning. By doing so we can relax some of the strong assumptions used in the first approach and still obtain the same basic results. It is suggested that the limitations of the first approach (analytical) provide a good motivation for the second approach (Agent-Based). Indeed, although both approaches address the same problem, the use of Agent-Based computational techniques allows us to relax hypothesis and overcome the limitations of the analytical approach while obtaining the same basic results.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Bribe-proof rules in the division problem

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate one of its subgroups to misrepresent their preferences and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a weakly preferred share and all agents in the misrepresenting subgroup obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, and weakly replacement monotonic rules. This class is larger than the set of sequential allotment rules identified in Barberà, Jackson, and Neme (1997).
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Nicolò, Antonio|||0000-0001-5405-4889
We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property.