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ANALISIS Y TECNICAS DE MEJORA DE LA ROBUSTEZ Y SEGURIDAD DE CIRCUITOS NANOMETRICOS EN PRESENCIA DE ATAQUES, DEFECTOS, VARIABILIDAD Y AGING

TEC2013-41209-P

•
Nombre agencia financiadora Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Acrónimo agencia financiadora MINECO
Programa Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Año convocatoria 2013
Plan Estatal 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Unidad de gestión Secretaría de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSITAT POLITECNICA DE CATALUNYA
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329

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Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 6
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The low area probing detector as a countermeasure against invasive attacks

  • Weiner, Michael
  • Manich Bou, Salvador|||0000-0001-5265-1209
  • Rodríguez Montañés, Rosa|||0000-0001-6231-0862
  • Sigl, Georg
© 20xx IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting /republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works, Microprobing allows intercepting data from on-chip wires as well as injecting faults into data or control lines. This makes it a commonly used attack technique against security-related semiconductors, such as smart card controllers. We present the low area probing detector (LAPD) as an efficient approach to detect microprobing. It compares delay differences between symmetric lines such as bus lines to detect timing asymmetries introduced by the capacitive load of a probe. Compared with state-of-the-art microprobing countermeasures from industry, such as shields or bus encryption, the area overhead is minimal and no delays are introduced; in contrast to probing detection schemes from academia, such as the probe attempt detector, no analog circuitry is needed. We show the Monte Carlo simulation results of mismatch variations as well as process, voltage, and temperature corners on a 65-nm technology and present a simple reliability optimization. Eventually, we show that the detection of state-of-the-art commercial microprobes is possible even under extreme conditions and the margin with respect to false positives is sufficient., Peer Reviewed
UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Unpredictable bits generation based on RRAM parallel configuration

  • Arumi Delgado, Daniel|||0000-0002-6638-7485
  • Gómez Pau, Álvaro|||0000-0002-7774-1662
  • Manich Bou, Salvador|||0000-0001-5265-1209
  • Rodríguez Montañés, Rosa|||0000-0001-6231-0862
  • Bargalló, Mireia
  • Campabadal, Francesca
In this letter a cell with the parallel combination of two TiN/Ti/HfO2/W resistive random access memory (RRAM) devices is studied for the generation of unpredictable bits. Measurements confirm that a simultaneous parallel SET operation in which one of the two RRAMs switches to the low resistance state (LRS) is an unpredictable process showing random properties for different sets of cells. Furthermore, given a device pair, the same device switches during subsequent write operations. The proposed cell is also analyzed under different current compliances and pulse widths with the same persistent behavior being observed. The features of the proposed cell, which provide data obfuscation without compromising reliability, pave the way for its application in Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) for hardware security purposes., Peer Reviewed
UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Defending cache memory against cold-boot attacks boosted by power or EM radiation analysis

  • Neagu, Madalin
  • Manich Bou, Salvador|||0000-0001-5265-1209
Some algorithms running with compromised data select cache memory as a type of secure memory where data is confined and not transferred to main memory. However, cold-boot attacks that target cache memories exploit the data remanence. Thus, a sudden power shutdown may not delete data entirely, giving the opportunity to steal data. The biggest challenge for any technique aiming to secure the cache memory is performance penalty. Techniques based on data scrambling have demonstrated that security can be improved with a limited reduction in performance. However, they still cannot resist side-channel attacks like power or electromagnetic analysis. This paper presents a review of known attacks on memories and countermeasures proposed so far and an improved scrambling technique named random masking interleaved scrambling technique (RM-ISTe). This method is designed to protect the cache memory against cold-boot attacks, even if these are boosted by side-channel techniques like power or electromagnetic analysis.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Defending cache memory against cold-boot attacks boosted by power or EM radiation analysis

  • Neagu, Madalin
  • Manich Bou, Salvador
Some algorithms running with compromised data select cache memory as a type of secure memory where data is confined and not transferred to main memory. However, cold-boot attacks that target cache memories exploit the data remanence. Thus, a sudden power shutdown may not delete data entirely, giving the opportunity to steal data. The biggest challenge for any technique aiming to secure the cache memory is performance penalty. Techniques based on data scrambling have demonstrated that security can be improved with a limited reduction in performance. However, they still cannot resist side-channel attacks like power or electromagnetic analysis. This paper presents a review of known attacks on memories and countermeasures proposed so far and an improved scrambling technique named random masking interleaved scrambling technique (RM-ISTe). This method is designed to protect the cache memory against cold-boot attacks, even if these are boosted by side-channel techniques like power or electromagnetic analysis., Postprint (author's final draft)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Unpredictable bits generation based on RRAM parallel configuration

  • Arumi Delgado, Daniel
  • Gómez Pau, Álvaro
  • Manich Bou, Salvador
  • Rodríguez Montañés, Rosa
  • Bargalló, Mireia
  • Campabadal, Francesca
In this letter a cell with the parallel combination of two TiN/Ti/HfO2/W resistive random access memory (RRAM) devices is studied for the generation of unpredictable bits. Measurements confirm that a simultaneous parallel SET operation in which one of the two RRAMs switches to the low resistance state (LRS) is an unpredictable process showing random properties for different sets of cells. Furthermore, given a device pair, the same device switches during subsequent write operations. The proposed cell is also analyzed under different current compliances and pulse widths with the same persistent behavior being observed. The features of the proposed cell, which provide data obfuscation without compromising reliability, pave the way for its application in Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) for hardware security purposes., Peer Reviewed, Postprint (author's final draft)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The low area probing detector as a countermeasure against invasive attacks

  • Weiner, Michael
  • Manich Bou, Salvador
  • Rodríguez Montañés, Rosa
  • Sigl, Georg
© 20xx IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting /republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works, Microprobing allows intercepting data from on-chip wires as well as injecting faults into data or control lines. This makes it a commonly used attack technique against security-related semiconductors, such as smart card controllers. We present the low area probing detector (LAPD) as an efficient approach to detect microprobing. It compares delay differences between symmetric lines such as bus lines to detect timing asymmetries introduced by the capacitive load of a probe. Compared with state-of-the-art microprobing countermeasures from industry, such as shields or bus encryption, the area overhead is minimal and no delays are introduced; in contrast to probing detection schemes from academia, such as the probe attempt detector, no analog circuitry is needed. We show the Monte Carlo simulation results of mismatch variations as well as process, voltage, and temperature corners on a 65-nm technology and present a simple reliability optimization. Eventually, we show that the detection of state-of-the-art commercial microprobes is possible even under extreme conditions and the margin with respect to false positives is sufficient., Peer Reviewed, Postprint (author's final draft)