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ANALISIS GEOMETRICO Y NUMERICO DE SISTEMAS DINAMICOS Y APLICACIONES A LA FISICA MATEMATICA

MTM2016-76072-P

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Año convocatoria 2016
Plan Estatal 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario AGENCIA ESTATAL CONSEJO SUPERIOR DE INVESTIGACIONES CIENTIFICAS (CSIC)

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DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On the probability of the Condorcet Jury theorem or the miracle of aggregation

  • Romaniega Sancho, Álvaro
The Condorcet Jury Theorem or the Miracle of Aggregation are frequently invoked to ensure the competence of some aggregate decision-making processes. In this article we explore the probability of the thesis predicted by the theorem (if there are enough voters, majority rule is a competent decision procedure) in different settings. We use tools from measure theory to conclude that it will happen almost surely or almost never, depending on the probability measure. In particular, it will fail almost surely for measures estimating the prior probability. To update this prior either more evidence in favor of competence would be needed (so that a large likelihood term compensates a small prior term in Bayes' Theorem) or a modification of the decision rule. The former includes the case of (rational) agents reversing their vote if its probability of voting the right option is less than 1/2. Following the latter, we investigate how to obtain an almost sure competent information aggregation mechanism for almost any evidence on voter competence (including the less favorable ones). To do so, we substitute simple majority rule by weighted majority rule based on some stochastic weights correlated with epistemic rationality such that every voter is guaranteed a minimal weight equal to one. We also explore how to obtain these weights in a real setting., The author would like to thank C. Romaniega for valuable comments which help to improve the manuscript and an anonymous referee for the valuable suggestions. The author is supported by the grant MTM2016-76072-P (MICINN, Spain). This work is supported in part by the ICMAT–Severo Ochoa, Spain grant CEX2019- 000904-S. The author is also a postgraduate fellow of the City Council of Madrid at the Residencia de Estudiantes (2020–2022).