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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

A theorem on preference aggregation

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
I present a general theorem on preference aggregation. This theorem implies, as corollaries, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, Wilson's extension of Arrow's to non-Paretian aggregation rules, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem and Sen's result on the Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal. The theorem shows that these classical results are not only similar, but actually share a common root. The theorem expresses a simple but deep fact that transcends each of its particular applications: it expresses the tension between decentralizing the choice of aggregate into partial choices based on preferences over pairs of alternatives, and the need for some coordination in these decisions, so as to avoid contradictory recommendations.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Preference for flexibility and the opportunities of choice

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Grodal, Birgit
A decision-maker exhibits preference for flexibility if he always prefers any set of alternatives to its subsets, even when two of them contain the same best element. Desire for flexibility can be explained as the consequence of the agent's uncertainty along a two-stage process, where he must first preselect a subset of alternatives from which to make a final choice later on. We investigate conditions on the rankings of subsets that are compatible with the following assumptions: (1) the agent is endowed with a VN-M utility function on alternatives, (2) the agent attaches a subjective probability to the survival of each subset of alternatives, and (3) the agent will make a best choice out of any set which becomes available, and ranks sets ex-ante in terms of the expected utility of the best surviving alternatives within them.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Locating public facilities by majority, stability, consistency and group formation

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Beviá Baeza, María del Carmen|||0000-0002-1877-7921
We consider the following allocation problem: A fixed number of public facilities must be located on a line. Society is composed of N agents, who must be allocated to one and only one of these facilities. Agents have single peaked preferences over the possible location of the facilities they are assigned to, and do not care about the location of the rest of facilities. There is no congestion. We show that there exist social choice correspondences that choose locations and assign agents to them in such a way that: (1) these decisions are Condorcet winners whenever one exists, (2) the majority of the users of each facility supports the choice of its location, and (3) no agent wishes to become a user of another facility, even if that could induce a change of its present location by majority voting.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Cost uncertainty and taxpayer compliance

  • Caballé, Jordi|||0000-0003-0253-5634
  • Panadés Martí, Judith|||0000-0001-8678-1204
The existence of a private cost borne by audited taxpayers affects the tax enforcement policy. This is so because tax auditors will face now two sources of uncertainty, namely, the typical one associated with taxpayers' income and that associated with the taxpayers' idiosyncratic attitude towards tax compliance. Moreover, the inspection policy can be exposed to some randomness from the taxpayers' viewpoint due to the uncertainty about the audit cost borne by the tax authority. In this paper we provide an unified framework to analyze the effects of all these sources of uncertainty in a model of tax compliance with strategic interaction between auditors and taxpayers. We show that more variance in the distribution of the taxpayers' private cost of evading raises both tax compliance and the ex-ante welfare of taxpayers. The effects of the uncertainty about the audit cost faced by the tax authority are generally ambiguous. We also discuss the implications of our model for the regressive (or progressive) bias of the effective tax system.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Aspirations, habit formation, and bequest motive

  • Alonso Carrera, Jaime|||0000-0001-8525-7769
  • Caballé, Jordi|||0000-0003-0253-5634
  • Raurich, Xavier|||0000-0002-5210-1909
We analyze how the presence of endogenous preferences affects the altruistic bequest motive from parents to children. We will show that the existence of habits raises the threshold value of the intergenerational discount factor above which altruistic bequests are positive, while aspiration formation could push this value down. Therefore, the dynamic inefficiency of the economy with no altruism is not sufficient to prevent the bequest motive from being operative under aspiration formation. We also discuss the implications of public debt when the bequest motive is inoperative and preferences exhibit habit and aspiration formation.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Welfare implications of the interaction between habits and consumption externalities

  • Alonso Carrera, Jaime|||0000-0001-8525-7769
  • Caballé, Jordi|||0000-0003-0253-5634
  • Raurich, Xavier|||0000-0002-5210-1909
We analyze the welfare properties of the equilibrium path of a growth model where both habits and consumption externalities affect the utility of consumers. Our analysis highlights the crucial role played by complementarities between externalities and habits in order to generate an inefficient dynamic equilibrium. In particular, we show that the competitive equilibrium is inefficient when consumption externalities and habit-adjusted consumption are not perfect substitutes.