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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Designing an environmental tax on carbon emissions to meet EU targets, a proposal for the Spanish economy

  • Beltran, L. Dary
  • Cardenete Flores, Manuel Alejandro
  • Sancho Pifarré, Ferran|||0000-0002-6200-116X
In response to increased awareness of climate change, environmental sustainability has become a policy objective in Europe. Despite a decrease in greenhouse gas emissions, the European Commission deems current progress insufficient. Discussions on implementing environmental policies persist, with environmental taxation emerging as one of the most controversial yet potentially effective economic instruments for reducing emissions. However, the extent of its impact on the economy remains under debate, as improvements in welfare and environmental quality hinge on various economic, political, and public preference factors. Therefore, we analyse the economic impact of introducing an environmental tax to achieve emission reduction targets in Spain, while also testing two systems for recycling tax revenues. This allows us to assess the potential for a second dividend. We select Spain as the unit of analysis due to its minimal utilisation of environmental taxes, as it ranks among the European countries that are least active in combating climate change using taxation.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Elasticity identities, examples and counterexamples

  • Sancho Pifarré, Ferran|||0000-0002-6200-116X
In this note, we examine the general validity of long-established identities relating to price elasticities of demand and elasticities of substitution, which have traditionally been assumed to hold. The central finding is that under non-homothetic preferences, these fundamental identities cease to hold, thereby rendering any derived calculations based on them unreliable. Additionally, for scenarios where these identities remain valid, we present their extension to the n-good case.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Identifying strong voter support, Condorcet and Smith revisited

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Bossert, Walter
The conditions of strong Condorcet winner consistency and strong Condorcet loser consistency are, in essence, universally accepted as attractive criteria to evaluate the performance of social choice functions. However, there are many situations in which these conditions are silent because such winners and losers may not exist. Hence, weakening these desiderata in order to extend the domain of profiles where they apply is an appealing task. Yet, the often-proposed and accepted weak counterparts of these properties suffer from the shortcoming that a weak Condorcet winner can be a weak Condorcet loser at the same time. We propose new notions of Condorcet-type winners and losers that are between these two extremes: they share the intuitive appeal of strong Condorcet winner consistency and strong Condorcet loser consistency and avoid the contradictory recommendations that would derive from the double identification of candidates as being weak Condorcet winners and losers at the same time. We provide a thorough examination of the extent to which some important reference properties are satisfied by social choice functions that are consistent with our new proposals. In addition, we revisit the concept of Smith sets (Smith, 1973) and examine a possible modification. As is the case for our intermediate Condorcet winners and losers, these notions are intended to generalize Condorcet's ideas. Using our reference properties again, we discuss the social choice functions that are consistent with the selection of candidates from these sets. By contrasting the consequences of using the suggestions inspired by Smith with those that are implied by the intermediate Condorcet consistency conditions that we propose, we hope to shed new light on the possibilities of extending Condorcet's principles to a larger set of circumstances.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

The taxing challenges of the state, unveiling the role of fiscal & administrative capacity in development

  • Braccioli, Federica
  • Muñoz-Sobrado, Esteban
  • Piolatto, Amedeo|||0000-0002-3571-8069
  • Zerbini, Antoine
During the past two decades, several factors have challenged the stability of national states, adding tensions to the connection between the state and the individual. This paper reviews the literature on state capacity. First, it introduces the origin of the literature and presents the well-established positive correlation between state capacity and economic development. Second, it touches upon fiscal and administrative capacity and conflict. It concludes with a provocative reflection on digital nomads to push the research frontier in analysing the connection between the state and the individual.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

On the endogenous order of play in sequential games

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Gerber, Anke|||0000-0001-6069-9296
We formalize, under the name of games of addition, the strategic interaction between agents that can play non-simultaneously by adding payoff relevant actions to those that any other players or themselves have already taken previously, but may also agree unanimously to stop adding them and collect the payoffs associated with the truncated sequence of moves. Our formalization differs from that of extensive form games in that the order of the agents' moves is not predetermined but emerges endogenously when applying an adapted version of a solution concept proposed by Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (2004). We provide results regarding the properties of solutions to games of addition, and we also compare their corresponding equilibria with those we would obtain if using extensive form games and subgame perfection as alternative tools of analysis.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

False-name-proof and strategy-proof voting rules under separable preferences

  • Fioravanti, Federico
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We consider the problem of a society that uses a voting rule to select a subset from a given set of objects (candidates, binary issues or alike). We assume that voters' preferences over subsets of objects are separable: Adding an object to a set leads to a better set if and only if the object is good (as a singleton set, the object is better than the empty set). A voting rule is strategy-proof if no voter benefits by not revealing its preferences truthfully and it is false-name-proof if no voter gains by submitting several votes under other identities. We characterize all voting rules that verify false-name-proofness, strategy-proofness, unanimity, anonymity, and neutrality as either the class of voting by quota one (all voters can be decisive for all objects) or the class of voting by full quota (all voters can veto all objects).
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Platform design and rent extraction

  • Piolatto, Amedeo|||0000-0002-3571-8069
  • Schuett, Florian
We study the design of online platforms that aggregate information and facilitate transactions. Leading players in the industry (e.g., the Booking Group) hold two types of platforms in their portfolio: revealing platforms that disclose the identity of transaction partners (like Booking.com) and anonymous platforms that do not (like Hotwire.com). Anonymous platforms offer discounts but lead to inefficient matching between consumers and firms. We develop a model in which horizontally differentiated firms sell to heterogeneous consumers both directly and via a platform that enlarges the pool of consumers they can attract. The platform charges firms for transactions it intermediates and can choose to offer an anonymous sales channel in addition to a revealing one. We show that offering both sales channels is profitable not only because it allows the platform to implement price discrimination, as suggested by the literature on opaque selling, but also because it improves rent extraction. The anonymous channel breaks the link between the price on the revealing channel and the firms' outside option; moreover, it can reduce double marginalisation. The welfare impact of the anonymous channel is ambiguous: while it sometimes leads to market expansion, it also causes inefficiently high transport costs.