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DISEÑO INSTITUCIONAL Y BUENAS PRACTICAS DE GOBIERNO: TEORIA, APLICACIONES Y SIMULACION

ECO2008-04756

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Nombre agencia financiadora Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora MICINN
Programa Programa Nacional de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental
Subprograma Subprograma de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental no Orientada
Convocatoria Proyectos I+D
Año convocatoria 2008
Plan Estatal 2008-2011 Plan Nacional de Investigación Científica, Desarrollo e Innovación Tecnológica
Unidad de gestión Subdirección General de Proyectos de Investigación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE BARCELONA
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100004837

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Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 3
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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

On the rule of k names

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Coelho, Danilo
The rule of k names can be described as follows: given a set of candidates for office, a committee chooses k members from this set by voting, and makes a list with their names. Then a single individual from outside the committee selects one of the listed names for the office. Different variants of this method have been used since the distant past and are still used today in many countries and for different types of choices. After documenting this widespread use by means of actual examples, we provide a game theoretical analysis. We concentrate on the plausible outcomes induced by the rule of k names when the agents involved act strategically. Our analysis shows how the parameter k, the screening rule and the nature of candidacies act as a means to balance the power of the committee with that of the chooser.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Top monotonicity, a common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Moreno, Bernardo|||0000-0003-0651-4427
When members of a voting body exhibit single peaked preferences, pair-wise majority voting equilibria (Condorcet winners) always exist. Moreover, they coincide with the median(s) of the voters' most preferred alternatives. This important fact is known as the median voter result. Variants of it also apply when single-peakedness fails, but preferences verify other domain restrictions, such as single-crossing, intermediateness or order restriction. Austen-Smith and Banks (1999) also proved that the result holds under single-peakedness, for a wide class of voting rules that includes the majority rule as a special case, and conveniently redefined versions of a median. We extend and unify previous results. We propose a new domain condition, called top monotonicity, which encompasses all previous domains restrictions, allows for new ones and preserves a version of the median voter result for a large class of voting rules. We also show that top monotonicity arises in interesting economic environments.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness, the case of single-dipped preferences

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Berga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904
  • Moreno, Bernardo|||0000-0003-0651-4427
We characterize the set of all individual and group strategy-proof rules on the domain of all single-dipped preferences on a line. For rules defined on this domain, and on several of its subdomains, we explore the implications of these strategy-proofness requirements on the maximum size of the rules' range. We show that when all single-dipped preferences are admissible, the range must contain two alternatives at most. But this bound changes as we consider different subclasses of single-dipped preferences: we provide examples of subdomains admitting strategy-proof rules with larger ranges. We establish exact bounds on the maximal size of strategy-proof functions on each of these domains, and prove that the relationship between the sizes of the subdomains and those of the ranges of strategy-proof functions on them need not be monotonic. Our results exhibit a sharp contrast between the structure of strategy-proof rules defined on subdomains of single-dipped preferences and those defined on subsets of single-peaked ones