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Optimal crowdfunding design
First draft: October 2014
This version: October 2016, Trabajo presentado en el EEA-ESEM: (31 Annual Congress of the European Economic Association & 69th European Meeting of the Econometric Society) celebrado en Genova del 22 al 26 de agosto de 2016.--Trabajo presentado en los Research Seminars de la Universidad de Bologna celebrado el 8 de marzo de 2016, We characterize optimal reward-based crowdfunding where production is contingent on an aggregate funding threshold. Crowdfunding adapts project implementation to demand (market-testing) and its multiple prices enhance rent-extraction
via pivotality, even for large crowds, indeed arbitrarily large if tastes are correlated.
Adaptation raises welfare. Rent-extraction can enhance adaptation, but sometimes
distorts production and lowers welfare. Threshold commitment, central to AllOr-Nothing platforms, raises profits but can lower consumer welfare. Platforms
sometimes promote not-for-profits to raise success rates. When new buyers arrive
ex-post, crowdfunding's market-test complements traditional nance and optimizes
subsequent pricing. Crowdfunding is a general optimal mechanism in our baseline., Financial support from the Net Institute, http://www.Netinst.org, the
Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (ECO2014-59959, Ellman, and ECO2012-37065, Hurkens)
and Generalitat de Catalunya (2014 SGR 510) is gratefully acknowledged., Peer reviewed