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MICROECONOMIA EN LA ERA DIGITAL

ECO2017-88129-P

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Año convocatoria 2017
Plan Estatal 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario AGENCIA ESTATAL CONSEJO SUPERIOR DE INVESTIGACIONES CIENTIFICAS (CSIC)

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DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

Coalitional bargaining with consistent counterfactuals

  • Burguet, Roberto
  • Caminal, Ramón
Trabajo presentado en la 17th SAET Conference on Current Trends in Economics, celebrada en Faro, Portugal del 25 al 30 de junio de 2017.-- Trabajo presentado en el 41 Simposio de la Asociación Española de Economía, celebrado en Bilbao, del 14 al 17 de diciembre de 2016.-- Trabajo presentado en el EEA Esem (2017): (32ne Annual Congress of the European Economic Association & 70th European Meeting of the Econometric Society), celebrado en Lisboa del 21 al 25 de agosto de 2017, We propose a new solution concept for TU cooperative games in characteristic function form, the SCOOP, that builds on the symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS), adding to it a consistency requirement for negotiations inside every coalition. The SCOOP speciÖes the probability of success and the payo§s to each coalition. Players share the surplus of a coalition according to the NBS, with disagreement payo§s that are computed as the expectation of payo§s in other coalitions, using some common probability distribution, which in turn is derived from the prior distribution. The predicted outcome can be probabilistic or deterministic, but only an e¢ cient coalition can succeed with probability one. We discuss necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an e¢ cient solution. In either case, the SCOOP always exists, is generically unique for superadditive games, and easy to compute. Moreover, in the spirit of the Nash program, we propose a reasonable non-cooperative protocol whose stationary equilibrium identiÖes the SCOOP as the limit equilibrium outcome, We acknowledge the support of the Spanish Ministry of Finance, Industry, and Competitiveness (ECO2017-88129-P, and Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D, SEV-2015-0563) and Generalitat de Catalunya (2017-SGR1136)., Peer reviewed