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Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publicación Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

The Implementation of the Landing Obligation in Small-Scale Fisheries of Southern European Union Countries

  • Villasante Larramendi, Carlos Sebastián
  • Antelo Suárez, Manel
  • Christou, Maria
  • Fauconnet, Laurence
  • Frangoudes, Katia
  • Maynou, Francesc
  • Morato, Telmo
  • Pita, Cristina
  • Pita, Pablo
  • Stergiou, Konstantinos I.
  • Teixeira, Celia
  • Tserpes, George
  • Vassilopoulou, Vassiliki
In the European Union, discards represent a major source of undocumented mortality, contributing to the overfishing of European fish stocks. However, little attention has been given by the scientific community to discards in the European Union’s small-scale fisheries (SSF). This is mainly due to the fact that discards are mostly generated by industrial fisheries, while SSFs were generally thought to have lower discard rates than industrial fisheries. A Landing Obligation (LO) is being introduced in European waters with the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) (Article 15, EU regulation 1380/2013) to limit/reduce discarding. However, management recommendations are required to support its implementation. The reality and challenges to enforce the LO in SSF are analyzed in this chapter, gathering information from different small-scale fisheries and fishers from the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea who were asked about their perceptions toward the LO. The objectives of this chapter are to (a) identify the reasons for discarding and (b) investigate the multiple ecological, economic, social, and institutional drivers which act as a barrier toward the implementation of the LO in SSF. Given the high importance of SSF in the southern countries of Europe, different case studies of SSF from France, Greece, Portugal, and Spain coasts are used to illustrate the reasons for discarding, the impacts of the LO on SSF, and the barriers for its implementation
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

The Implementation of the Landing Obligation in Small-Scale Fisheries of Southern European Union Countries

  • Villasante, Sebastián
  • Antelo, Manel
  • Christou, Maria
  • Fauconnet, Laurence
  • Frangoudes, Katia
  • Maynou, Francesc
  • Morato, Telmo
  • Pita, Cristina
  • Pita, Pablo
  • Stergiou, K.I.
  • Teixeira, Celia
  • Tserpes, George
  • Vassilopoulou, Vassiliki
20 pages, 1 figure, 2 tables, In the European Union, discards represent a major source of undocumented mortality, contributing to the overfishing of European fish stocks. However, little attention has been given by the scientific community to discards in the European Union’s small-scale fisheries (SSF). This is mainly due to the fact that discards are mostly generated by industrial fisheries, while SSFs were generally thought to have lower discard rates than industrial fisheries. A Landing Obligation (LO) is being introduced in European waters with the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) (Article 15, EU regulation 1380/2013) to limit/reduce discarding. However, management recommendations are required to support its implementation. The reality and challenges to enforce the LO in SSF are analyzed in this chapter, gathering information from different small-scale fisheries and fishers from the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea who were asked about their perceptions toward the LO. The objectives of this chapter are to (a) identify the reasons for discarding and (b) investigate the multiple ecological, economic, social, and institutional drivers which act as a barrier toward the implementation of the LO in SSF. Given the high importance of SSF in the southern countries of Europe, different case studies of SSF from France, Greece, Portugal, and Spain coasts are used to illustrate the reasons for discarding, the impacts of the LO on SSF, and the barriers for its implementation, The authors acknowledge the financial support from the European COST Action “Ocean Governance for Sustainability – challenges, options and the role of science” and by the ICES Science Fund Project “Social Transformations of Marine Social-Ecological Systems”, and MINOUW (Grant Agreement 634495). C. Pita acknowledges FCT/MEC national funds and FEDER co-funding, within the PT2020 partnership Agreement and Compete 2020, for the financial support to CESAM (Grant no UID/AMB/50017/2013). C.M. Teixeira had the support of the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT) (Pest-OE/MAR/UI0199/2011); and C.M. Teixeira and C. Pita were supported by the Research Project “LESSisMORE – LESS discards and LESS fishing effort for BETTER efficiency on the small-scale fisheries” (Ref. “LISBOA-01-0145-FEDER-028179”), support by the FEDER Funds through the COMPETE 2020, by the PIDDAC through FCT/MCTES. TM thanks the support from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation project DiscardLess (Grant Agreement No 633680), the Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT) strategic project UID/MAR/04292/2013 granted to MARE. He is also supported by the Program Investigador FCT (IF/01194/2013/CP1199/CT0002), Peer Reviewed
Addi. Archivo Digital para la Docencia y la Investigación
Publicación Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

Payments for environmental services: Coasian transactions or something else?

  • Da Rocha, José María
  • Gutiérrez Huerta, María José
  • Trelles, Rafael
Capítulo 5 del libro "Contributions in natural resource economics – Festscrift to Anders Skonhoft" (J.O. Olaussen, editor). Fagbokforlaget, Bergen, Norway., Payments for environmental services (PES) are based on the beneficiary-pays r ather t han the polluter-pays principle. In this paper we argue that this is a key factor for identifying what ecosys-tems are amenable to PES. We build a general equilibrium framework to identify what ecosystems are amenable to PES as an efficient s olution. In economies where society has a higher level of environmental responsibility and produces a low level of alternative land services, income efficient transfers cannot be financed with voluntary p ayments. Therefore PES programs must be seen as environmental subsidies (to environmental services providers) and must be combined with a user fee (paid by environment users). We use Costa Rica’s Payments for Environmental Services pro-gram (PSA) to illustrate our findings. We find that the efficient payments for forest conservation are higher than the value reported by Pagiola (2008). Implementing an efficient s ystem would mean a 4.15-fold increase in payments for forest conservation., European Commission (MINOUW H2020-SFS-2014-2, number 634495), Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (ECO2016-78819-R), Xunta de Galicia (GRC 2015/014 and ECOBAS)