This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge in The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy on 2022, available online: http://www.routledge.com/books/edit/10.4324/b23070/new-yearbook-phenomenology-phenomenological-philosophy-burt-hopkins-john-drummond?refId=7f94dece-00ca-429b-b597-23518383d79a&context=ubx, My exposition defends the view that the description of pain offered in
the Logical Investigations as belonging to the “feeling or affective sensations” is a
big discovery surrounded by initially unsurmountable theoretical problems. How
can it be understood that feelings are at the same time an intentionality founded
on objectifying acts and a non-intentional level of consciousness prior to any objectifcation? How can pains always demand and pull attention if the attentional
preference is supposed to be a feature found only in intentional acts? How can
painful occurrences, without any internal distinction, operate both as lived experiences and as appearing events, thus transcending the distinctio phenomenologica
between Erlebnis and Erscheinendes? My point of view is that only transcendental
phenomenology !nds the ways to cope with each one of these obscurities: the
duality in the understanding of feelings points to the intentionality of drives and
impulses and can be seen as a remote precedent for genetic phenomenology; the
centripetal pull on attention calls for the principle that the ego is the one who suffers, according to the Ich-leide structure !rst proposed in Ideen I; and the condition
of a self-appearing experience is characteristic of the spatialized bodily awareness.
So the methods and !ndings of transcendental phenomenology might be crucial
for the immanent clari!cation of the body in pain., This paper has been prepared in the Research Project “Fenomenología del cuerpo y análisis del dolor II”, FFI 2017-82272P (Ministry of Economy, Innovation and Competitiveness, Government of Spain)., Peer reviewed