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ECONOMIA EXPERIMENTAL, MERCADOS BILATERALES Y BIENESTAR SUBJETIVO

ECO2014-59302-P

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Nombre agencia financiadora Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Acrónimo agencia financiadora MINECO
Programa Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Año convocatoria 2014
Plan Estatal 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Unidad de gestión Secretaría de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades
Centro beneficiario AGENCIA ESTATAL CONSEJO SUPERIOR DE INVESTIGACIONES CIENTIFICAS (CSIC)
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 4
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Centralized vs. decentralized management: an experimental study

  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Cooper, David J.
Trabajo presentado en el Micro Seminars EUR organizado por el Tinbergen Institute y celebrado en Rotterdam el 1 de abril de 2016, We introduce a new game to the experimental literature and use it to study how behavioral phenomena affect the tradeoffs between centralized and decentralized management. Our game models an organization with two divisions and one central manager. Each division must choose or be assigned a product. Ignoring asymmetric information, the underlying game is an asymmetric coordination game related to the Battle of the Sexes. In equilibrium, the divisions coordinate on identical products. Each division prefers an equilibrium where the selected products are closest to its local tastes while central management prefers the efficient equilibrium, determined by a randomly state of the world, which maximizes total payoffs. The state of the world is known to the divisions, but the central manager only learns about it through messages from the divisions who have incentives to lie. Contrary to the theory, overall performance is higher under centralization, where the central manager assigns products to divisions after receiving messages from the divisions, than under decentralization where the divisions choose their own products. Underlying this, mis-coordination is common under decentralization and divisions fail to use their information when they do coordinate. Mis-coordination is non-existent under centralization and there is a high degree of truth-telling by divisions as well. Performance under centralization is depressed by persistent sub-optimal use of information by central managers., The authors thank the NSF (SES-0214310), the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness (Grant: ECO2014-59302-P) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2014 SGR 510)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Centralized vs. decentralized management: an experimental study

  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Cooper, David J.
Trabajo presentado en el GSBE-ETBC Seminar Fall 2016, organizado por la Maastricht University el 15 de septiembre de 2016, We study the tradeoffs between centralized and decentralized management using a new experimental game, the decentralization game. This game models an organization with two divisions and one central manager. Each division must choose or be assigned a product type. Both divisions benefit from coordinating their product types, but each prefers to coordinate on products that are close to its local tastes. The central manager aims to maximize the sum of division payoffs. Which product type achieves this goal varies with taste shocks that are known to the divisions but not the central manager. Under centralization, the central manager assigns products to divisions after receiving the divisions’ messages about the state of the world (i.e., the taste shock); under decentralization, the divisions choose their own products. Contrary to the theory, overall performance is higher under centralization than under decentralization. Communication between divisions and suggestions from central managers modestly improves performance under decentralization. Nonetheless, centralization remains the best-performing organizational form., The authors thank the National Science Foundation (SES-0214310), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Grant: ECO2014-59302-P) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2014 SGR 510)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Market interactiona and efficient cooperation

  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Riedl, Arno
Trabajo presentado en el 42 Simposio de la Asociación Española de Economía celebrado en Barcelona los días 14, 15 y 16 de diciembre de 2017, We experimentally study the effects of different types of market experience on the efficiency levels attained in a subsequent social dilemma. Our motivation stems from the existence of contrasting views on the potential spillover effects of participation in markets on non-market activities requiring cooperation. In our set-up, market interaction takes place in a continuous double auction involving a short and a long side of the market. This feature represents the very unequal opportunities that exist in some markets. Our focus is on the comparison of the efficiency levels attained in a subsequent social dilemma by pairs of individuals who were on the short side of the market, market-winners, with that of individuals who were on the long side, market-losers. We study both the cases where interaction in the social dilemma is with others from the same market, Market-Partners, and where it is with others from another market, Market-Strangers. We compare the efficiency of cooperation with and without market experience controlling for earnings, allowing us to identify the causal effects of market interaction. The results show that the experience of market interaction has a negative effect on cooperation efficiency in Market-Partners. This holds for both market-losers and market-winners pairs. By contrast, for Market-Strangers we find the positive effect that market-winner pairs tend to achieve higher cooperation efficiency than in the absence of previous market interaction., The authors thank the Spanish Ministerio de Economia y Competitividad (Grant: ECO2014-59302-P), the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2014 SGR 510), the Antoni Serra Ramoneda Research Chair (UAB-Catalunya Caixa) for financial support., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Market interaction and efficient cooperation

  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Riedl, Arno
Trabajo presentado en los KTI International seminar series organizados por el Centre for Economic and Regional Studies de la Hungarian Academy of Sciences, durante el 15 de junio de 2017, We experimentally study the effects of different types of market experience on the efficiency levels attained in a subsequent social dilemma. Our motivation stems from the existence of contrasting views on the potential spillover effects of participation in markets on non-market activities requiring cooperation. In our set-up, market interaction takes place in a continuous double auction involving a short and a long side of the market. This feature represents the very unequal opportunities that exist in some markets. Our focus is on the comparison of the efficiency levels attained in a subsequent social dilemma by pairs of individuals who were on the short side of the market, market-winners, with that of individuals who were on the long side, market-losers. We study both the cases where interaction in the social dilemma is with others from the same market, Market-Partners, and where it is with others from another market, Market-Strangers. We compare the efficiency of cooperation with and without market experience controlling for earnings, allowing us to identify the causal effects of market interaction. The results show that the experience of market interaction has a negative effect on cooperation efficiency in Market-Partners. This holds for both market-losers and market-winners pairs. By contrast, for Market-Strangers we find the positive effect that market-winner pairs tend to achieve higher cooperation efficiency than in the absence of previous market interaction., The authors thank the Spanish Ministerio de Economia y Competitividad (Grant: ECO2014-59302-P), the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2014 SGR 510), the Antoni Serra Ramoneda Research Chair (UAB-Catalunya Caixa) for financial support., Peer reviewed