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AVANCES TEORICOS Y EXPERIMENTALES SOBRE NORMAS, CREENCIAS, JUEGOS Y CIBERSEGURIDAD

ECO2017-82449-P

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Año convocatoria 2017
Plan Estatal 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE MADRID

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 2
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

Self-serving recall is not a sufficient cause of optimism: An experiment

  • Caballero, Adrián
  • López Pérez, Raúl
A recent experimental literature has documented that people are (sometimes) asymmetric updaters: Good news are over-weighted, relative to bad news. We contribute to this literature with a novel experimental test of a potential mechanism of asymmetric updating, that is, that people recall better the positive than the negative evidence. In our design, this account predicts inflated posteriors regarding some future financial prize. Contrary to that, the average subject (slightly) underestimates the mode of the posterior beliefs about that payoff prospect. Although subjects tend to exhibit selfserving recall (SSR) in that they remember better the positive realizations of a signal in a memory task, this has little effect on their estimates and the extent and direction of the bias. A difficulty to recall accurately, we conclude, is not a sufficient cause for a positivity bias., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

An experimental test of some economic theories of optimism

  • Caballero, Adrián
  • López Pérez, Raúl
Economic theories of optimism provide different rationales for the phenomenon of motivated reasoning, and a recent empirical literature has tested some of them, with mixed results. We contribute to this literature with a novel experimental test of two mechanisms, according to which optimism is respectively predicted when (1) the potential material losses due to the bias are relatively small or (2) the cognitive costs of the bias are small enough. In our design, these two accounts predict inflated expectations regarding some future payoff. Contrary to that, the average subject tends to (slightly) underestimate that financial prospect. Although a minority of the subjects overestimate systematically, the size of their errors is rather reduced, and they hardly differ in their personal characteristics from the rest of the subjects. In fact, optimism in our experiment is correlated with the sample observed, in that it is more likely when a subject observes relatively few good signals. This is again at odds with (1) and (2). These mechanisms, we conclude, do not appear to fully capture under which circumstances people fail into a positivity bias. Yet (1) seems to be empirically less relevant, in that we observe a similarly limited level of bias irrespectively of its monetary cost., Peer reviewed