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e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publicación Tesis doctoral (DoctoralThesis)

“And all the pieces matter...” Hybrid Testing Methods for Android App's Privacy Analysis

  • Feal Fajardo, Álvaro
Smartphones have become inherent to the every day life of billions of people worldwide, and they are used to perform activities such as gaming, interacting with our peers or working. While extremely useful, smartphone apps also have drawbacks, as they can affect the security and privacy of users. Android devices hold a lot of personal data from users, including their social circles (e.g., contacts), usage patterns (e.g., app usage and visited websites) and their physical location. Like in most software products, Android apps often include third-party code (Software Development Kits or SDKs) to include functionality in the app without the need to develop it in-house. Android apps and third-party components embedded in them are often interested in accessing such data, as the online ecosystem is dominated by data-driven business models and revenue streams like advertising. The research community has developed many methods and techniques for analyzing the privacy and security risks of mobile apps, mostly relying on two techniques: static code analysis and dynamic runtime analysis. Static analysis analyzes the code and other resources of an app to detect potential app behaviors. While this makes static analysis easier to scale, it has other drawbacks such as missing app behaviors when developers obfuscate the app’s code to avoid scrutiny. Furthermore, since static analysis only shows potential app behavior, this needs to be confirmed as it can also report false positives due to dead or legacy code. Dynamic analysis analyzes the apps at runtime to provide actual evidence of their behavior. However, these techniques are harder to scale as they need to be run on an instrumented device to collect runtime data. Similarly, there is a need to stimulate the app, simulating real inputs to examine as many code-paths as possible. While there are some automatic techniques to generate synthetic inputs, they have been shown to be insufficient. In this thesis, we explore the benefits of combining static and dynamic analysis techniques to complement each other and reduce their limitations. While most previous work has often relied on using these techniques in isolation, we combine their strengths in different and novel ways that allow us to further study different privacy issues on the Android ecosystem. Namely, we demonstrate the potential of combining these complementary methods to study three inter-related issues: • A regulatory analysis of parental control apps. We use a novel methodology that relies on easy-to-scale static analysis techniques to pin-point potential privacy issues and violations of current legislation by Android apps and their embedded SDKs. We rely on the results from our static analysis to inform the way in which we manually exercise the apps, maximizing our ability to obtain real evidence of these misbehaviors. We study 46 publicly available apps and find instances of data collection and sharing without consent and insecure network transmissions containing personal data. We also see that these apps fail to properly disclose these practices in their privacy policy. • A security analysis of the unauthorized access to permission-protected data without user consent. We use a novel technique that combines the strengths of static and dynamic analysis, by first comparing the data sent by applications at runtime with the permissions granted to each app in order to find instances of potential unauthorized access to permission protected data. Once we have discovered the apps that are accessing personal data without permission, we statically analyze their code in order to discover covert- and side-channels used by apps and SDKs to circumvent the permission system. This methodology allows us to discover apps using the MAC address as a surrogate for location data, two SDKs using the external storage as a covert-channel to share unique identifiers and an app using picture metadata to gain unauthorized access to location data. • A novel SDK detection methodology that relies on obtaining signals observed both in the app’s code and static resources and during its runtime behavior. Then, we rely on a tree structure together with a confidence based system to accurately detect SDK presence without the need of any a priory knowledge and with the ability to discern whether a given SDK is part of legacy or dead code. We prove that this novel methodology can discover third-party SDKs with more accuracy than state-of-the-art tools both on a set of purpose-built ground-truth apps and on a dataset of 5k publicly available apps. With these three case studies, we are able to highlight the benefits of combining static and dynamic analysis techniques for the study of the privacy and security guarantees and risks of Android apps and third-party SDKs. The use of these techniques in isolation would not have allowed us to deeply investigate these privacy issues, as we would lack the ability to provide real evidence of potential breaches of legislation, to pin-point the specific way in which apps are leveraging cover and side channels to break Android’s permission system or we would be unable to adapt to an ever-changing ecosystem of Android third-party companies., The works presented in this thesis were partially funded within the framework of the following projects and grants: • European Union’s Horizon 2020 Innovation Action program (Grant Agreement No. 786741, SMOOTH Project and Grant Agreement No. 101021377, TRUST AWARE Project). • Spanish Government ODIO NºPID2019-111429RB-C21/PID2019-111429RBC22. • The Spanish Data Protection Agency (AEPD) • AppCensus Inc., This work has been supported by IMDEA Networks Institute, Programa de Doctorado en Ingeniería Telemática por la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Presidente: Srdjan Matic.- Secretario: Guillermo Suárez-Tangil.- Vocal: Ben Stock
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Publicación Tesis doctoral (DoctoralThesis)

Understanding Interconnected Abuse in Consumer Smart Device Ecosystems

  • Girish, Aniketh
Modern consumer smart ecosystems—comprising of mobile and IoT devices, platforms, apps, third-party SDKs, and cloud services—enable pervasive automation and personalization by continuously exchanging data across software using internet and local network interfaces. While this interconnection enhances usability and functionality, it also introduces systemic privacy risks that are difficult to audit and regulate. These risks often stem from complex interactions across co-located programs, devices, and third-party infrastructure, which existing analysis tools and protection mechanisms such as sandboxing and permission mechanisms fail to capture because they are process-centric; i.e., they are focused on individual apps or devices and treat them as monolithic entities. As a result, they often miss privacy violations that exist beyond traditional program boundaries involving indirect flows, inter-app communication, and covert-channel inferences. This dissertation challenges the current process-centric view of privacy analysis and controls. It argues that this perspective is insufficient for capturing emerging privacy risks in modern smart ecosystems, where interactions across complex components enable unvetted channels and data leakage. By adopting a holistic, ecosystem-level perspective, this work demonstrates that privacy violations often arise from such interconnectedness. To support this argument, the dissertation applies novel multi-vantage empirical methods—including static and dynamic app analysis, network traffic inspection, input fuzzing, and controlled execution environments. By exposing these underexplored threats, this dissertation calls for a paradigm shift in how privacy is audited and controlled in smart ecosystems. It demonstrates that privacy should not be treated as a static property of individual apps or devices, but as a property inherent to dynamic interactions across apps, devices, SDKs, and cloud services. Through three empirical analyses, this dissertation demonstrates how these privacy risks manifest in real-world smart ecosystems, including smart home devices and mobile apps. First, insecure local network communication in smart homes expose sensitive data enabling cross-device tracking and household fingerprinting. Second, mobile apps embed wireless-scanning SDKs that covertly infer location and bridge identifiers to persistently track users and bypass platform restrictions to access geolocation data. Third, health and fitness apps retrieve sensitive user data from aggregator platforms via OAuth-authorized APIs that bypass Android’s permission system; once data is returned to the app, embedded third-party SDKs may gain indirect access, exposing health information without platform visibility or user awareness. These risks are not incidental, but structural—and are deeply rooted in platform design decisions, opaque third-party integrations, insufficient access controls, and enforcement mechanisms. Consequently, this dissertation provides groundbreaking empirical foundations for advancing platform accountability, informing regulatory oversight, and strengthening user-centric privacy protections in today’s interconnected digital environments. In response to the findings presented in this dissertation and our active responsible disclosure practices, major industry actors including Apple, Google, TP-Link, Philips, and over 20 other IoT vendors acknowledged these risks and have implemented privacy protections in their products. Notably, Philips overhauled its identifier scheme to prevent long-term device tracking, and Google introduced a dedicated local network permission in Android 16 to restrict unauthorized device discovery—changes that now benefit billions of Android users worldwide., This work has been supported by: • ODIO - The Open Digital Identity Observatory (Grant Agreement No. PID2019-111429RB-C22) • TRUSTaWARE - Enhancing Digital Security, Privacy and TRUST in softWARE (Grant Agreement No. 101021377) • CONTACT-CM (REACT) - Contact Tracing with 5G and Beyond Networks (Grant Agreement No. REACT-CONTACT-CM-23479) • PARASITE - Métodos y técnicas para caracterizar las amenazas a la cadena de suministro software (Grant Agreement No. PID2022-143304OB-I00)., This work has been supported by IMDEA Networks Institute, Programa de Doctorado en Ingeniería Telemática por la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Presidenta: Sandra Siby.- Secretario: Ángel Cuevas Rumín.- Vocal: Mathieu Cunche