DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación
Tesis doctoral (DoctoralThesis)
The Council of the European Union and Rule of Law Enforcement: Institutional Logics and the use of the Enforcement Instruments, El Consejo de la Unión Europea y la Aplicación del Estado de Derecho: Lógicas Institucionales y el Uso de los Instrumentos de Aplicación
Research on the Rule of Law (RoL) crisis in the European Union (EU) has focused on member states’ non-compliance with fundamental values or the supranational dimension of enforcement. Yet, we do not know in a theoretically parsimonious way why the Council of the EU (Council) enforces the RoL. This thesis examines precisely the intergovernmental dimension of RoL enforcement. It argues that institutional dynamics, and their underlying logics, explain the Council’s RoL enforcement (in)action. The project explores in depth these logics, namely national governments’ differing preferences on RoL enforcement, the existence of a rotating presidency, and the interactions with other EU institutions. Empirically, the thesis provides extensive evidence and relies on a qualitative multi-method approach that combines qualitative content analysis, process-tracing and Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). Findings indicate that Council’s RoL (under)enforcement is related to the existence of divergent preferences among national governments, with an almost 50/50 split between those in favour and against over time. Structural (timing of accession) and semi-structural factors (democratic quality and financial position in the EU budget) are better predictors of governments’ preferences than ideological ones (ideology, partisanship and position on EU integration), which better explain extreme anti-enforcement positions. National governments are able to translate these preferences into Council’s action or inaction as regards RoL enforcement procedures (measured as conducting or not Art. 7 hearings) while in the rotating presidency, thanks to their privileged position in terms of agenda-shaping, contradicting assertions that they act as ‘honest brokers’ when occupying the chair. Council’s preferences for (under)enforcement affect the European Commission’s calculus in activating RoL enforcement procedures, and external shocks can fundamentally shape such preferences. The Commission becomes more assertive when it perceives political support or gains in the Council from doing so. The thesis’ findings contribute to the literature on the EU’s RoL crisis, enforcement and compliance, and have implications beyond the EU context., Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to the Ministry of Science and Universities for providing funding for the development of this thesis through Grant FPU20/01664, Chapter 1: Unravelling national governments’ positions on EU Rule of Law enforcement: structural, semi-structural and ideological factors (It is based on article https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2025.2451365); Chapter 2: The Powers of the Presidency of the Council of the EU to Shape the Rule of Law Enforcement Agenda: The Article 7 Case (It is based in the article https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13551); Chapter 3: Turning assertive? EU rule of law enforcement in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine (It is based in the article https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2268492), Peer reviewed
Proyecto:
MCIU FPU2020