VALOR, ESTRATEGIA FINANCIERA Y GOBIERNO CORPORATIVO
ECO2017-85356-P
•
Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos I+D
Año convocatoria 2017
Unidad de gestión Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013-2016
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE MADRID
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100011033
Publicaciones
Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 2
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)
Political directors and corporate social responsibility: Are political ideology and regional identity relevant?
Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Burgos (RIUBU)
- Andrés, Pablo de
- García Rodríguez, Íñigo
- Romero Merino, María Elena
- Santamaría Mariscal, Marcos
This study analyzes the infuence of directors with political connections on corpo‑
rate social responsibility (CSR). Using a sample of Spanish savings banks (cajas)
during the period 2004–2013, we analyze the infuence of political directors on the
CSR of these entities, focusing on their ideology and regional identity. Our results
indicate that the higher the proportion of directors with political ties on the board,
the greater the allocation of resources to CSR activities. In addition to this positive
efect of board politicization, we fnd that political directors’ liberal ideology posi‑
tively afects CSR, both directly and in moderating the relationship between political
directors and CSR. Our results also validate that political directors’ regional iden‑
tity boosts the positive efect they have on CSR. Finally, we encounter various dif‑
ferences depending on the nature of the projects funded through CSR. Therefore,
our study demonstrates the importance of delving into the characteristics of political
directors to elucidate their efects on corporate policies., Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature. This study was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Grant ECO201785356), the UAM - Comunidad de Madrid (SI3-PJI-2021-00276) and it benefted from the Professorship Excellence Program in accordance with the multi-year agreement signed by the Government of Madrid and the Autonomous University of Madrid (Line #3).
rate social responsibility (CSR). Using a sample of Spanish savings banks (cajas)
during the period 2004–2013, we analyze the infuence of political directors on the
CSR of these entities, focusing on their ideology and regional identity. Our results
indicate that the higher the proportion of directors with political ties on the board,
the greater the allocation of resources to CSR activities. In addition to this positive
efect of board politicization, we fnd that political directors’ liberal ideology posi‑
tively afects CSR, both directly and in moderating the relationship between political
directors and CSR. Our results also validate that political directors’ regional iden‑
tity boosts the positive efect they have on CSR. Finally, we encounter various dif‑
ferences depending on the nature of the projects funded through CSR. Therefore,
our study demonstrates the importance of delving into the characteristics of political
directors to elucidate their efects on corporate policies., Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature. This study was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Grant ECO201785356), the UAM - Comunidad de Madrid (SI3-PJI-2021-00276) and it benefted from the Professorship Excellence Program in accordance with the multi-year agreement signed by the Government of Madrid and the Autonomous University of Madrid (Line #3).
Stakeholder governance and private benefits: The case of politicians in Spanish cajas
Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Burgos (RIUBU)
- Andrés, Pablo de
- García Rodríguez, Íñigo
- Romero Merino, María Elena
- Santamaría Mariscal, Marcos
Our research focuses on the private benefits of politicians as board directors of Spanish savings banks (cajas). We
use hand-collected data on the political affiliation and personal loans of 1,578 directors to investigate whether
political directors used private benefits through excessive personal loans, loans granted to their political parties,
or the institutions they represented. Our results show that a higher proportion of political directors on a board is
associated with larger personal loans and with better terms than those granted to non-political directors.
Furthermore, this higher proportion is also linked to larger loans granted to the public administrations that the
political directors represented on the cajas’ governing board. Finally, we also find in-group favouritism based on
the social identity theory and directors’ party identification. Therefore, political directors make greater use of
private benefits when allocated to their political party and its members., This study was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Grant ECO2017-85356), the UAM - Comunidad de Madrid Research Project for Young Researchers (SI3-PJI-2021-00276) and it benefited from the Professorship Excellence Program in accordance with the multi-year agreement signed by the Government of Madrid and the Autonomous University of Madrid (Line #3). The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful suggestions received from the four anonymous reviewers and the Associate Editor, Constantinos N. Leonidou. The authors also thank the comments received from B. Arrunada, ˜ G. Natividad, A. Martín-Oliver, V. Salas-Fumas ´ and N. Suarez, ´ and the participants at the Wolpertinger Conference held in Santander and at the SANFI Workshop held in Palermo.
use hand-collected data on the political affiliation and personal loans of 1,578 directors to investigate whether
political directors used private benefits through excessive personal loans, loans granted to their political parties,
or the institutions they represented. Our results show that a higher proportion of political directors on a board is
associated with larger personal loans and with better terms than those granted to non-political directors.
Furthermore, this higher proportion is also linked to larger loans granted to the public administrations that the
political directors represented on the cajas’ governing board. Finally, we also find in-group favouritism based on
the social identity theory and directors’ party identification. Therefore, political directors make greater use of
private benefits when allocated to their political party and its members., This study was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Grant ECO2017-85356), the UAM - Comunidad de Madrid Research Project for Young Researchers (SI3-PJI-2021-00276) and it benefited from the Professorship Excellence Program in accordance with the multi-year agreement signed by the Government of Madrid and the Autonomous University of Madrid (Line #3). The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful suggestions received from the four anonymous reviewers and the Associate Editor, Constantinos N. Leonidou. The authors also thank the comments received from B. Arrunada, ˜ G. Natividad, A. Martín-Oliver, V. Salas-Fumas ´ and N. Suarez, ´ and the participants at the Wolpertinger Conference held in Santander and at the SANFI Workshop held in Palermo.