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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Sequential coalition formation through bilateral agreements in a cournot setting

  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
  • Porteiro Fresco, Nicolás
We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any subgame perfect equilibrium of the game is the grand coalition, provided the initial number of firms is high enough and they are sufficiently patient.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Winners and losers from the gradual formation of trading blocs

  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
  • Xue, Licun
Although global free trade is efficient, each country's benefit from free trade depends on the path that leads to the global free trade agreement. Using a dynamic model of trading bloc formation, we show that when global free trade is reached gradually the countries that are initially excluded gain less than the rest and may be even made worse off by the final free trade agreement than they were in the initial state of no trading blocs.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Negotiation advantages of professional associations in health care

  • Barros, Pedro Pita|||0000-0002-0881-4928
  • Martínez Giralt, Xavier|||0000-0002-5185-8395
In several instances, third-party payers negotiate prices of health care services with providers. We show that a third-party payer may prefer to deal with a professional association than with the sub-set constituted by the more efficient providers, and then apply the same price to all providers. The reason for this is the increase in the bargaining position of providers. The more efficient providers are also the ones with higher profits in the event of negotiation failure. This allows them to extract a higher surplus from the third-party payer.