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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Food losses and waste, a needed assessment for future policies

  • Campoy-Muñoz, Pilar|||0000-0003-4163-3907
  • Cardenete Flores, Manuel Alejandro
  • Delgado, María del Carmen|||0000-0002-9343-665X
  • Sancho Pifarré, Ferran|||0000-0002-6200-116X
About one third of food produced for human consumption is lost or wasted. For this reason, food losses and waste has become a key priority within worldwide policy circles. This is a major global issue that not only threatens the viability of a sustainable food system but also generates negative externalities in environmental terms. The avoidance of this forbidding wastage would have a positive economic impact on national economies in terms of resource savings. In this paper we look beyond this somewhat traditional resource savings angle and we shift the focus to explore the distributional consequences of food losses and waste reduction using a resource constrained modeling perspective. The impact due to the behavioral shift of each household is therefore explained by two factors. One is the amount of resources saved when the behavioral shift takes place, whereas the other one has to do with the position of households in the food supply chain. By considering the whole supply chain, instead of the common approach based only in reducing waste by consumers, we enrich the empirical knowledge of this issue and improve the quantification of its economic impact. We examine data for three EU countries that present different economic structures (Germany, Spain and Poland) so as to have a broader and more robust viewpoint of the potential results. We find that distributional effects are different for consumers and producers and also across countries. Our results could be useful for policymakers since they indicate that policies should not be driven merely by the size waste but rather on its position within the food supply chain.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Foundations of pseudomarkets, walrasian equilibria for discrete resources

  • Miralles, Antonio|||0000-0001-8146-2140
  • Pycia, Marek
We study the assignment of discrete resources in a general model encompassing a wide range of applied environments, such as school choice, course allocation, and refugee resettlement. We allow single-unit and general multi-unit demands and any linear constraints. We prove the Second Welfare Theorem for these environments and a strong version of the First Welfare Theorem. In this way, we establish an equivalence between strong efficiency and decentralization through prices in discrete environments. Showing that all strongly efficient outcomes can be implemented through pseudomarkets, we provide a foundation for using pseudomarkets in market design.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Deciding on what to decide

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Gerber, Anke|||0000-0001-6069-9296
We study two-stage collective decision-making procedures where in the first stage, part of the voters decide what issues will be put in the agenda and in the second stage, the whole set of voters decides on the positions to be adopted regarding the issues that are in the agenda. Using a protocol-free equilibrium concept, we show that essentially any set of issues can be obtained as an equilibrium agenda under two salient classes of voting procedures. Moreover, the chair may manipulate a sequential voting rule such that certain issues do not get to the floor.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous

  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We study individually rational rules to be used toallot, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisiblegood that is freely available only in whole units. Arule is individually rational if, at each preferenceprofile, each agent finds that her allotment is at leastas good as any whole unit of the good. We study andcharacterize two individually rational and efficientfamilies of rules, whenever agents' preferences aresymmetric single-peaked on the set of possibleallotments. Rules in the two families are in additionenvy-free, but they differ on whether envy-freeness isconsidered on losses or on awards. Our main resultstates that (a) the family of constrained equal lossesrules coincides with the class of all individuallyrational and efficient rules that satisfy justified envy-freeness on losses and (b) the family of constrainedequal awards rules coincides with the class of all in-dividually rational and efficient rules that satisfyenvy-freeness on awards.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness

  • Bonifacio, Agustín G.
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. We characterize the class of all such rules on that domain and show that they are deeply related to the supremum of the underlying semilattice structure.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness

  • Arribillaga, R. Pablo|||0000-0002-0521-0301
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We characterize the set of all obviously strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. Since obvious strategy-proofness implies strategy-proofness, and the set of strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on this domain coincides with the class of generalized median voter schemes, we focus on this class. We identify a condition on generalized median voter schemes for which the following characterization holds. A generalized median voter scheme is obviously strategy-proof if and only if it satisfies the increasing intersection property. Our proof is constructive; for each generalized median voter scheme that satisfies the increasing intersection property we define an extensive game form that implements it in obviously dominant strategies.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

An Armington-Leontief model

  • Sancho Pifarré, Ferran|||0000-0002-6200-116X
We develop a novel linear equilibrium model with an Armington flavor. We provide (1) proof of the solvability of the model and of the existence and non-negativity of the equilibrium solution and of the newly derived multiplier matrix; we also show (2) that the standard Leontief multiplier matrix arises as a special case of this new model and (3) that this model allows the computation of multiplier effects with no external output bias, which is particularly relevant for applied economic analysis.