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RELACION ENTRE TEORIAS FILOSOFICAS DE LA CONSCIENCIA Y CIENCIAS COGNITIVAS: LA CONCIENCIA DE UNO MISMO Y LA EXPERIENCIA DEL TIEMPO

FFI2012-35153

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Funding agency name Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Funding agency acronym MINECO
Program Programa Nacional de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental
Subprogram Subprograma de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental no Orientada
Call Proyectos I+D
Call year 2012
State Plan 2008-2011 Plan Nacional de Investigación Científica, Desarrollo e Innovación Tecnológica
Management unit Secretaría de Estado de Investigación, Desarrollo e Innovación
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE BARCELONA

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 6
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Understanding and disagreement in belief ascription

  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
It seems uncontroversial that Dalton wrongly believed that atoms are indivisible. However, the correct analysis of Dalton’s belief and the way it relates to contemporary beliefs about atoms is, on closer inspection, far from straightforward. In this paper, I introduce four features that any candidate analysis is plausibly bound to respect. I argue that theories that individuate concepts at the level of understanding are doomed to fail in this endeavor. I formally sketch an alternative and suggest that cases such as the one presented provide support for the claim that the genuine source for concept individuation is public sharable thought., This research has been supported by the Secretary for Universities and Research of the Ministry of Economy and Knowledge of the Government of Catalonia, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (research projects [FFI2013-41415-P] and [FFI2012-35153]) and the consolidated research group GRECC [SGR2014-406].
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Partial understanding and concept possession: a Dilemma

  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
In the light of partial (mis)understanding, we examine the thesis that concepts are individuated in terms of possession conditions and show that adherents face a fatal dilemma: Either concept-individuating possession conditions include cases of partially (mis)understood concepts or not. If yes, possession conditions do not individuate concepts. If no, the thesis is too restricted and lacks a minimally satisfactory level of generalization., This research has received financial support from the Spanish Government, through the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (research projects FFI2009-08828/FISO and FFI2012-35153) and from the Catalan government, via the consolidated research group GRECC (SGR2009-1528).
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Disbelieving the normativity of content

  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
Adherents as well as detractors of the normativity of mental content agree that its assessment crucially depends on the assessment of a principle for believing what is true. In this paper, I present an alternative principle, which is based on possession conditions for pure thinking or mere entertaining. I argue that the alternative approach has not been sufficiently emphasised in the literature and has two important merits. First, it yields a direct analysis of the normativity of mental content, which is, furthermore, independent of arguably non-normative notions such as truth. Second, the approach suggests new and challenging lines of response to central non-normativist objections., This work has received financial support from the Spanish government, through the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (research projects FFI2009-08828/FISO and FFI2012-35153) and from the Catalan government, via the consolidated research group GRECC (SGR2009-1528).
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Understanding and disagreement in belief ascription

  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
It seems uncontroversial that Dalton wrongly believed that atoms are indivisible. However, the correct analysis of Dalton’s belief and the way it relates to contemporary beliefs about atoms is, on closer inspection, far from straightforward. In this paper, I introduce four features that any candidate analysis is plausibly bound to respect. I argue that theories that individuate concepts at the level of understanding are doomed to fail in this endeavor. I formally sketch an alternative and suggest that cases such as the one presented provide support for the claim that the genuine source for concept individuation is public sharable thought., This research has been supported by the Secretary for Universities and Research of the Ministry of Economy and Knowledge of the Government of Catalonia, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (research projects [FFI2013-41415-P] and [FFI2012-35153]) and the consolidated research group GRECC [SGR2014-406].
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Partial understanding and concept possession: a Dilemma

  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
In the light of partial (mis)understanding, we examine the thesis that concepts are individuated in terms of possession conditions and show that adherents face a fatal dilemma: Either concept-individuating possession conditions include cases of partially (mis)understood concepts or not. If yes, possession conditions do not individuate concepts. If no, the thesis is too restricted and lacks a minimally satisfactory level of generalization., This research has received financial support from the Spanish Government, through the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (research projects FFI2009-08828/FISO and FFI2012-35153) and from the Catalan government, via the consolidated research group GRECC (SGR2009-1528).
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Disbelieving the normativity of content

  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
Adherents as well as detractors of the normativity of mental content agree that its assessment crucially depends on the assessment of a principle for believing what is true. In this paper, I present an alternative principle, which is based on possession conditions for pure thinking or mere entertaining. I argue that the alternative approach has not been sufficiently emphasised in the literature and has two important merits. First, it yields a direct analysis of the normativity of mental content, which is, furthermore, independent of arguably non-normative notions such as truth. Second, the approach suggests new and challenging lines of response to central non-normativist objections., This work has received financial support from the Spanish government, through the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (research projects FFI2009-08828/FISO and FFI2012-35153) and from the Catalan government, via the consolidated research group GRECC (SGR2009-1528).