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OBJETOS ABSTRACTOS: PROPUESTAS A FAVOR Y EN CONTRA. UNA SOLUCION NEO-CARNAPIANA.

FFI2017-82534-P

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Funding agency name Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Funding agency acronym AEI
Program Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprogram Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Call Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Call year 2017
State Plan 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSIDADE DE SANTIAGO DE COMPOSTELA

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 2
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Hilary Putnam on the philosophy of logic and mathematics

  • Sagüillo Fernández Vega, José Miguel
This paper focuses on Putnam’s conception of logical truth as grounded in his picture of mathematical practice and ontology. Putnam’s 1971 book Philosophy of Logic came one year later than Quine’s homonymous volume. In the first section, I compare these two Philosophies of Logic which exemplify realist-nominalist viewpoints in a most conspicuous way. The next section examines Putnam’s views on modality, moving from the modal qualification of his intuitive conception to his official generalized non-modal second-order set-theoretic concept of logical truth. In the third section, I emphasize how Putnam´s “mathematics as modal logic” departs from Quine’s “reluctant Platonism”. I also suggest a complementary view of Platonism and modalism showing them perhaps interchangeable but underlying different stages of research processes that make up a rich and dynamic mathematical practice. The final, more speculative section, argues for the pervasive platonistic conception enhancing the aims of inquiry in the practice of the working mathematician.
Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publication Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Putnam and contemporary fictionalism

  • Martínez Vidal, Concha
In his "Indispensability arguments in mathematics", Putnam rejects having argued in the terms of the argument known in the literature as "the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument". He considers that mathematics contribution to physics does not have to be interpreted in platonist terms but in his favorite modal variety (Putnam 1975; Putnam 2012). The purpose of this paper is to consider Putnam's acknowledged argument and philosophical position against contemporary so called in the literature 'fictionalist' views about applied mathematics. The conclusion will be that the account of the applicability of mathematics that stems from Putnam's acknowledged argument can be assimilated in many aspects to so-called 'fictionalist' views about applied mathematics.