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DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Otros (Other)

Optimal crowdfunding design

  • Ellman, Matthew
  • Hurkens, Sjaak
First draft: October 2014 This version: October 2016, Trabajo presentado en el EEA-ESEM: (31 Annual Congress of the European Economic Association & 69th European Meeting of the Econometric Society) celebrado en Genova del 22 al 26 de agosto de 2016.--Trabajo presentado en los Research Seminars de la Universidad de Bologna celebrado el 8 de marzo de 2016, We characterize optimal reward-based crowdfunding where production is contingent on an aggregate funding threshold. Crowdfunding adapts project implementation to demand (market-testing) and its multiple prices enhance rent-extraction via pivotality, even for large crowds, indeed arbitrarily large if tastes are correlated. Adaptation raises welfare. Rent-extraction can enhance adaptation, but sometimes distorts production and lowers welfare. Threshold commitment, central to AllOr-Nothing platforms, raises profits but can lower consumer welfare. Platforms sometimes promote not-for-profits to raise success rates. When new buyers arrive ex-post, crowdfunding's market-test complements traditional nance and optimizes subsequent pricing. Crowdfunding is a general optimal mechanism in our baseline., Financial support from the Net Institute, http://www.Netinst.org, the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (ECO2014-59959, Ellman, and ECO2012-37065, Hurkens) and Generalitat de Catalunya (2014 SGR 510) is gratefully acknowledged., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Otros (Other)

Targeted advertising and costly consumer search

  • Burguet, Roberto
  • Petrikaité, Vaiva
Trabajo presentado en el 87th SEA (Southern Economic Association) Annual Meeting, celebrada en Tampa, Florida, del 17 al 19 de noviembre de 2017, We study a model of advertising targeting based on information about the consumer’s likely ranking of products. With horizontally differentiated goods and costly search, ads then convey to consumers a noisy, positive signal of their unknown willingness to pay for the firms’ products. That implies a higher expected willingness to pay for a yet not sampled firm, which increases the incentives to search, but also a lower expected differentiation of the products that the consumers learn about, which reduces the incentives to search. The first effect is more important for lower search costs, and the second for larger number of products. Also, the equilibrium intensity of advertising will affect the precision of consumers’ information. Larger marginal cost of advertising results in larger endogenous segmentation and larger prices., The authors acknowledge the financial support of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563), grants No. ECO2014-59959-P and No. ECO2015-74328-JIN (AEI/FEDER/UE), and 2016 FBBVA grant “Innovación e Información en la Economía Digital”., Peer reviewed