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AVANCES EN LA ESTIMACION DE LOS MODELOS ECONOMICOS DE SERIES TEMPORALES

ECO2015-68136-P

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Funding agency name Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Funding agency acronym MINECO
Program Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprogram Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Call Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Call year 2015
State Plan 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Management unit Secretaría de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA CCT

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 6
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Burning money? Government lending in a credit crunch

  • Jiménez, Gabriel
  • Peydró, José-Luis
  • Repullo, Rafael
  • Saurina, Jesús
We analyze a small, new credit facility of a Spanish state-owned-bank during the crisis, using its continuous credit scoring system, firm-level scores, and credit register data. Compared to privately-owned banks, the state-owned bank faces worse applicants, softens (tightens) its credit supply to unobserved (observable) riskier firms, and has much higher defaults. In a regression discontinuity design, the supply of public credit causes: large positive real effects to financially-constrained firms (whose relationship banks reduced substantially credit supply); crowding-in of new private-bank credit; and positive spillovers to other firms. Private returns of the credit facility are negative, while social returns are positive., Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities, Grants No ECO2015-68136-P (Peydró) and ECO2014-59262-P (Repullo), and from the European Research Council, Grant No. 648398 (Peydró), is gratefully acknowledged.
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

The rise of shadow banking : evidence from capital regulation

  • Irani, Rustom M.
  • Iyer, Rajkamal
  • Meisenzahl, Ralf R.
  • Peydró, José-Luis
Updated February 27, 2020, We investigate the connections between bank capital regulation and the prevalence of lightly regulated nonbanks (shadow banks) in the U.S. corporate loan market. For identification, we exploit a supervisory credit register of syndicated loans, loan-time fixed-effects, and shocks to capital requirements arising from surprise features of the U.S. implementation of Basel III. We find that less-capitalized banks reduce loan retention and nonbanks step in, particularly among loans with higher capital requirements and at times when capital is scarce. This reallocation has important spillovers: loans funded by nonbanks with fragile liabilities experience greater sales and price volatility during the 2008 crisis., (updated Feb. 27, 2020) We investigate the connections between bank capital regulation and the prevalence of lightly regulated nonbanks (shadow banks) in the U.S. corporate loan market. For identification, we exploit a supervisory credit register of syndicated loans, loan-time fixed-effects, and shocks to capital requirements arising from surprise features of the U.S. implementation of Basel III. We find that less-capitalized banks reduce loan retention, particularly among loans with higher capital requirements and at times when capital is scarce, and nonbanks step in. This reallocation has important spillovers: during the 2008 crisis, loans funded by nonbanks with fragile liabilities are less likely to be rolled over and experience greater price volatility., Peydró acknowledges financial support from both the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness Feder EU (project ECO2015-68136-P) and the European Research Council Grant (project 648398).
Repositorio Digital de la UPF
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Hedger of last resort: evidence from Brazilian FX interventions, local credit, and global financial cycles

  • Gonzalez, Rodrigo Barbone
  • Khametshin, Dmitry
  • Peydró, José-Luis
  • Polo, Andrea, 1983-
We show that FX interventions attenuate global financial cycle (GFC)’s spillovers. We exploit GFC shocks and Brazilian central bank interventions in FX derivatives using three matched administrative registers: credit, foreign credit to banks, and employer-employee. After U.S. Taper Tantrum (followed by Emerging Markets FX turbulence), Brazilian banks with more foreign debt cut credit supply, thereby reducing firm-level employment. A subsequent large policy intervention supplying derivatives against FX risks—hedger of last resort—halves the negative effects. A 2008-2015 panel exploiting GFC shocks and FX interventions confirms these results and the hedging channel. However, the policy entails fiscal and moral hazard costs., José-Luis Peydró gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities, Grant No ECO2015-68136-P, and from the European Research Council, Grant No. 648398.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Hedger of last resort: evidence from Brazilian FX interventions, local credit, and global financial cycles

  • Gonzalez, Rodrigo Barbone
  • Khametshin, Dmitry
  • Peydró, José-Luis
  • Polo, Andrea, 1983-
We show that FX interventions attenuate global financial cycle (GFC)’s spillovers. We exploit GFC shocks and Brazilian central bank interventions in FX derivatives using three matched administrative registers: credit, foreign credit to banks, and employer-employee. After U.S. Taper Tantrum (followed by Emerging Markets FX turbulence), Brazilian banks with more foreign debt cut credit supply, thereby reducing firm-level employment. A subsequent large policy intervention supplying derivatives against FX risks—hedger of last resort—halves the negative effects. A 2008-2015 panel exploiting GFC shocks and FX interventions confirms these results and the hedging channel. However, the policy entails fiscal and moral hazard costs., José-Luis Peydró gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities, Grant No ECO2015-68136-P, and from the European Research Council, Grant No. 648398.
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

The rise of shadow banking : evidence from capital regulation

  • Irani, Rustom M.
  • Iyer, Rajkamal
  • Meisenzahl, Ralf R.
  • Peydró, José-Luis
Updated February 27, 2020, We investigate the connections between bank capital regulation and the prevalence of lightly regulated nonbanks (shadow banks) in the U.S. corporate loan market. For identification, we exploit a supervisory credit register of syndicated loans, loan-time fixed-effects, and shocks to capital requirements arising from surprise features of the U.S. implementation of Basel III. We find that less-capitalized banks reduce loan retention and nonbanks step in, particularly among loans with higher capital requirements and at times when capital is scarce. This reallocation has important spillovers: loans funded by nonbanks with fragile liabilities experience greater sales and price volatility during the 2008 crisis., (updated Feb. 27, 2020) We investigate the connections between bank capital regulation and the prevalence of lightly regulated nonbanks (shadow banks) in the U.S. corporate loan market. For identification, we exploit a supervisory credit register of syndicated loans, loan-time fixed-effects, and shocks to capital requirements arising from surprise features of the U.S. implementation of Basel III. We find that less-capitalized banks reduce loan retention, particularly among loans with higher capital requirements and at times when capital is scarce, and nonbanks step in. This reallocation has important spillovers: during the 2008 crisis, loans funded by nonbanks with fragile liabilities are less likely to be rolled over and experience greater price volatility., Peydró acknowledges financial support from both the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness Feder EU (project ECO2015-68136-P) and the European Research Council Grant (project 648398).
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Burning money? Government lending in a credit crunch

  • Jiménez, Gabriel
  • Peydró, José-Luis
  • Repullo, Rafael
  • Saurina, Jesús
We analyze a small, new credit facility of a Spanish state-owned-bank during the crisis, using its continuous credit scoring system, firm-level scores, and credit register data. Compared to privately-owned banks, the state-owned bank faces worse applicants, softens (tightens) its credit supply to unobserved (observable) riskier firms, and has much higher defaults. In a regression discontinuity design, the supply of public credit causes: large positive real effects to financially-constrained firms (whose relationship banks reduced substantially credit supply); crowding-in of new private-bank credit; and positive spillovers to other firms. Private returns of the credit facility are negative, while social returns are positive., Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities, Grants No ECO2015-68136-P (Peydró) and ECO2014-59262-P (Repullo), and from the European Research Council, Grant No. 648398 (Peydró), is gratefully acknowledged.