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ELECCION SOCIAL, REDES Y BIENESTAR: TEORIA Y APLICACIONES

PID2020-116771GB-I00

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Funding agency name Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Funding agency acronym AEI
Program Programa Estatal de I+D+i Orientado a los Retos de la Sociedad
Call Proyectos de I+D+i (Generación de Conocimiento y Retos Investigación)
Call year 2020
State Plan 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE BARCELONA

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 17
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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Designing an environmental tax on carbon emissions to meet EU targets, a proposal for the Spanish economy

  • Beltran, L. Dary
  • Cardenete Flores, Manuel Alejandro
  • Sancho Pifarré, Ferran|||0000-0002-6200-116X
In response to increased awareness of climate change, environmental sustainability has become a policy objective in Europe. Despite a decrease in greenhouse gas emissions, the European Commission deems current progress insufficient. Discussions on implementing environmental policies persist, with environmental taxation emerging as one of the most controversial yet potentially effective economic instruments for reducing emissions. However, the extent of its impact on the economy remains under debate, as improvements in welfare and environmental quality hinge on various economic, political, and public preference factors. Therefore, we analyse the economic impact of introducing an environmental tax to achieve emission reduction targets in Spain, while also testing two systems for recycling tax revenues. This allows us to assess the potential for a second dividend. We select Spain as the unit of analysis due to its minimal utilisation of environmental taxes, as it ranks among the European countries that are least active in combating climate change using taxation.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Incentive contracts and peer effects in the workplace

  • Claveria-Mayol, Marc
  • Milán Solé, Pau|||0000-0003-2879-5792
  • Oviedo-Dávila, Nicolás
We analyze how firms should design wage contracts when workers collaborate in teams and effort costs depend on colleagues through a peer network. Performancebased compensation generates incentives that cascade through the organization, which firms target to boost profits. We analyze optimal incentive design if firms can-and can't-fully discriminate across workers, and when the production technology is separable or complementary across divisions. When workers' effort is substitutable, the most central workers-those who influence most colleagues directly and indirectly-receive the steepest incentives only when output risk is sufficiently large; otherwise firms prioritize workers that are closer to those they influence. We derive a sufficient network statistic that measures the surplus loss when firms must compensate workers of varying centrality equally. Finally, when production technology exhibits complementarity across teams, stronger incentives are assigned to workers who influence colleagues in small teams that receive little influence from others. We apply our findings to organizational design questions, such as optimal firm structure and workforce investments.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Intermediate condorcet winners and losers

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Bossert, Walter
The conditions of strong Condorcet winner consistency and strong Condorcet loser consistency are, in essence, universally accepted as attractive criteria to evaluate the performance of social choice functions. However, there are many situations in which these conditions are silent because such winners and losers may not exist. Hence, weakening these desiderata in order to extend the domain of profiles where they apply is an appealing task. Yet, the often-proposed and accepted weak counterparts of these properties suffer from the shortcoming that a weak Condorcet winner can be a weak Condorcet loser at the same time, thus leading to contradictory recommendations regarding their use as normative criteria. After presenting evidence that this anomaly is pervasive, even in the presence of substantial and important domain restrictions, we propose new notions of Condorcet-type winners and losers that are between these two extremes: they share the intuitive appeal of strong Condorcet winner consistency and strong Condorcet loser consistency and avoid the contradictory recommendations that would derive from the double identification of candidates as being weak Condorcet winners and losers at the same time. We prove that abiding to the new principles is compatible with various additional attractive normative criteria. Finally, we propose a class of social choice functions that are consistent with the recommendations of our new proposals and can be extended to the universal domain through the lexicographical use of complementary choice criteria, in the spirit of previous proposals by noted authors like Pierre Daunou and Duncan Black.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Modeling the modeler, a normative theory of experimental design

  • Payro Chew, Fernando|||0000-0001-7161-4294
  • Piermont, E.
We consider an analyst whose goal is to identify a subject's utility function through revealed preference analysis. We argue the analyst's preference about which experiments to run should adhere to three normative principles: The first, Structural Invariance, requires that the value of a choice experiment only depends on what the experiment may potentially reveal. The second, Identification Separability, demands that the value of identification is independent of what would have been counterfactually identified had the subject had a different utility. Finally, Information Monotonicity asks that more in- formative experiments are preferred. We provide a representation theorem, showing that these three principles characterize Expected Identification Value maximization, a functional form that unifies several theories of experimental design. We also study several special cases and discuss potential applications.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Stone-Geary meets CES, an extended linear expenditure system

  • Sancho Pifarré, Ferran|||0000-0002-6200-116X
We reformulate the Stone-Geary utility function to incorporate non-unitary elasticities of substitution. We show that this extended linear expenditure System eliminates some of the restrictions implied by the Stone-Geary function. In particular, and most significantly, the proportions of expenditure over supernumerary income become price responsive under the extended demand system and their price derivatives behave coherently with the degree of substitution.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

(Not) Addressing Issues in Electoral Campaigns

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Gerber, Anke|||0000-0001-6069-9296
Two candidates competing for election may raise some issues for debate during the electoral campaign, while avoiding others. We present a model in which the decision to introduce an issue, or to reply to the opponent's position on one that she raised, may result in further additions to the list of topics that end up being discussed. Candidates' strategic decisions are driven by their appraisal of their expected vote share at the end of the campaign. Our analysis appeals to a protocol-free equilibrium concept, and predicts the list of topics that will be touched upon by each candidate, and the order in which they might be addressed. We show that important phenomena observed during campaigns, like the convergence of the parties to address the same issues, or else their diverging choice on which ones to treat, or the relevance of issue ownership can be explained within our stark basic model.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Opinion aggregation, borda and condorcet revisited

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Bossert, Walter
In a world admitting a fixed finite set of alternatives, an opinion is an ordered pair of alternatives. Such a pair expresses the idea that one alternative is superior to another in some sense, and an opinion aggregator assigns an aggregate relation on the set of alternatives to every possible state of opinion. Our primary motivation is to extend the standard model of social choice theory to a more general one in which no specific reference to agents generating or holding opinions is needed. Although our analysis has some bearing on those cases where opinions reflect the goodness relations of agents in a society, it is not limited to them. In addition to that interpretation, opinions can also be used to represent other forms of comparative assessments emerging from different sources. The main results of the paper provide characterizations of suitably formulated versions of the Borda rule and Condorcet's majority rule, essential aggregation methods that remain well-defined in our larger context.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Identifying strong voter support, Condorcet and Smith revisited

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Bossert, Walter
The conditions of strong Condorcet winner consistency and strong Condorcet loser consistency are, in essence, universally accepted as attractive criteria to evaluate the performance of social choice functions. However, there are many situations in which these conditions are silent because such winners and losers may not exist. Hence, weakening these desiderata in order to extend the domain of profiles where they apply is an appealing task. Yet, the often-proposed and accepted weak counterparts of these properties suffer from the shortcoming that a weak Condorcet winner can be a weak Condorcet loser at the same time. We propose new notions of Condorcet-type winners and losers that are between these two extremes: they share the intuitive appeal of strong Condorcet winner consistency and strong Condorcet loser consistency and avoid the contradictory recommendations that would derive from the double identification of candidates as being weak Condorcet winners and losers at the same time. We provide a thorough examination of the extent to which some important reference properties are satisfied by social choice functions that are consistent with our new proposals. In addition, we revisit the concept of Smith sets (Smith, 1973) and examine a possible modification. As is the case for our intermediate Condorcet winners and losers, these notions are intended to generalize Condorcet's ideas. Using our reference properties again, we discuss the social choice functions that are consistent with the selection of candidates from these sets. By contrasting the consequences of using the suggestions inspired by Smith with those that are implied by the intermediate Condorcet consistency conditions that we propose, we hope to shed new light on the possibilities of extending Condorcet's principles to a larger set of circumstances.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Incentive contracts and peer effects in the workplace

  • Milán Solé, Pau|||0000-0003-2879-5792
  • Oviedo-Dávila, Nicolás
Risk-averse workers in a team exert effort to produce joint output. Workers' incentives are connected via chains of productivity spillovers, represented by a network of peer-effects. We study the problem of a principal offering wage contracts that simultaneously incentivize and insure agents. We solve for the optimal linear contract for any network and show that optimal incentives are loaded more heavily on workers that are more central in a specific way. We conveniently link firm profits to network structure via the networks spectral properties. When firms can't personalize contracts, better connected workers ex- tract rents. In this case, a group composition result follows: large within-group differences in centrality can decrease firm's profits. Finally, we find that modular production has important implications for how peer structures distribute incentives.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

The limits to local insurance

  • Milán Solé, Pau|||0000-0003-2879-5792
  • Gierlinger, Johannes|||0000-0002-9615-4076
We study decentralized insurance when multiple risks are payoff-relevant, but each agent may only trade a (possibly different) subset of risks. Unless (at least) one agent can trade every risk, insurance markets remain incomplete, and the economy is not resilient to worst-case events. We also identify spill overs in any feasible allocation: others' inability to trade some risks restricts an agent's resilience to joint realizations. Unless an agent can trade a superset of i's risks, agent i is not resilient to them. In an application, we model constraints as risk-sharing networks and measure resilience in a Malawian village.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Simple market structures are incomplete

  • Milán, Pau.|||0000-0003-2879-5792
  • Gierlinger, Johannes|||0000-0002-9615-4076
We study how risk is shared using simple assets, each of which pays on a specific subset of payoff-relevant variables. We show that a market composed of simple assets is incomplete - no matter how many or which assets exist- because it can never address the joint realizations of some distinct risks. We also show that this inability to refine trades generates spill overs between agents with different types of financial constraints. Agents of type i are exposed to uninsurable income risk unless there exists another type j who can condition on all variables affecting i's income.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Updating under imprecise information

  • Lin, Yi-Hsuan
  • Payro Chew, Fernando|||0000-0001-7161-4294
This paper models an agent that ranks actions with uncertain payoffs after observing a signal that could have been generated by multiple objective information structures. Under the assumption that the agent's preferences conform to the multiple priors model (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)), we show that a simple behavioral axiom characterizes a generalization of Bayesian Updating. Our axiom requires that whenever all possible sources of information agree that it is more 'likely' for an action with uncertain payoffs to be better than one with certain payoffs, the agent prefers the former. We also provide axiomatizations for several special cases. Finally, we consider the situation where the informational content of a signal is purely subjective. We characterize the existence of a subjective set of information structures under full Bayesian updating for two extreme cases: (i) No ex-ante state ambiguity, and (ii) No signal ambiguity.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
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Mechanisms to appoint arbitrator panels or sets of judges by compromise between concerned parties

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Coelho, Danilo
We propose mechanisms for two parties with potentially con.icting objectives to jointly select a predetermined number of candidates to occupy decision-making positions. Two leading examples of these situations are: i) the selection of an arbitrator panel by two con.icting .rms, and ii) the bipartisan coalition.s selection of a set of judges to occupy court vacancies. We analyze the e¢ ciency, fairness, and simplicity of equilibrium outcomes in strategic games induced by these mechanisms. Their e¤ectiveness hinges on the parties. preferences over the sets containing the required number of candidates to be chosen.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

On the endogenous order of play in sequential games

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Gerber, Anke|||0000-0001-6069-9296
We formalize, under the name of games of addition, the strategic interaction between agents that can play non-simultaneously by adding payoff relevant actions to those that any other players or themselves have already taken previously, but may also agree unanimously to stop adding them and collect the payoffs associated with the truncated sequence of moves. Our formalization differs from that of extensive form games in that the order of the agents' moves is not predetermined but emerges endogenously when applying an adapted version of a solution concept proposed by Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (2004). We provide results regarding the properties of solutions to games of addition, and we also compare their corresponding equilibria with those we would obtain if using extensive form games and subgame perfection as alternative tools of analysis.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

False-name-proof and strategy-proof voting rules under separable preferences

  • Fioravanti, Federico
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We consider the problem of a society that uses a voting rule to select a subset from a given set of objects (candidates, binary issues or alike). We assume that voters' preferences over subsets of objects are separable: Adding an object to a set leads to a better set if and only if the object is good (as a singleton set, the object is better than the empty set). A voting rule is strategy-proof if no voter benefits by not revealing its preferences truthfully and it is false-name-proof if no voter gains by submitting several votes under other identities. We characterize all voting rules that verify false-name-proofness, strategy-proofness, unanimity, anonymity, and neutrality as either the class of voting by quota one (all voters can be decisive for all objects) or the class of voting by full quota (all voters can veto all objects).
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Technology determinants of carbon emissions from demand and supply perspectives

  • Cardenete Flores, Manuel Alejandro|||0000-0001-7495-7479
  • Lima Díaz, Mª Carmen|||0000-0002-0219-1475
  • Sancho Pifarré, Ferran|||0000-0002-6200-116X
We study the role that the productive structure plays in determining carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by industry. Specifically, we distinguish and isolate the interdependencies originating from the structure of the demand for inputs from those resulting from the supply structure. This separation has the advantage of enabling a better identification of the causal origin of emissions and allows the establishment of a catalog of industries based on their characteristics as demanders or suppliers of inputs. This information, linked to the different nature of demand or supply, can be relevant for designing more effective emission containment measures. The empirical basis of the analysis utilizes input-output data for Spain in 2020, while the methodological platform is an adaptation of the hypothetical extraction method (HEM).
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publication Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Obvious strategy-proofness with respect to a partition

  • Arribillaga, R. Pablo|||0000-0002-0521-0301
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We define and study obvious strategy-proofness with respect to a partition of the set of agents. It encompasses strategy-proofness as a special case when the partition is the coarsest one and obvious strategy-proofness when the partition is the finest. For any partition, it falls between these two extremes. We establish two general properties of this new notion and apply it to the simple anonymous voting problem with two alternatives and strict preferences.