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ASPECTOS MATEMATICOS, COMPUTACIONALES Y SOCIALES EN CONTEXTOS DE VOTACION Y DE COOPERACION.

MTM2015-66818-P

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Funding agency name Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Funding agency acronym MINECO
Program Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprogram Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Call Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Call year 2015
State Plan 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Management unit Secretaría de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSITAT POLITECNICA DE CATALUNYA

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 5
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC
Publication Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

On the characterization of weighted simple games

  • Freixas Bosch, Josep|||0000-0002-9033-9432
  • Freixas Boleda, Marc
  • Kurz, Sascha
The final publication is available at link.springer.com via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-017-9606-z, This paper has a twofold scope. The first one is to clarify and put in evidence the isomorphic character of two theories developed in quite different fields: on one side, threshold logic, on the other side, simple games. One of the main purposes in both theories is to determine when a simple game is representable as a weighted game, which allows a very compact and easily comprehensible representation. Deep results were found in threshold logic in the sixties and seventies for this problem. However, game theory has taken the lead and some new results have been obtained for the problem in the past two decades. The second and main goal of this paper is to provide some new results on this problem and propose several open questions and conjectures for future research. The results we obtain depend on two significant parameters of the game: the number of types of equivalent players and the number of types of shift-minimal winning coalitions., Peer Reviewed
UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC
Publication Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

A value for j-cooperative games: some theoretical aspects and applications

  • Freixas Bosch, Josep|||0000-0002-9033-9432
This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge/CRC Press in Handbook of the Shapley value on December 6, 2019, available online: https://www.crcpress.com/Handbook-of-the-Shapley-Value/Algaba-Fragnelli-Sanchez-Soriano/p/book/9780815374688, A value that has all the ingredients to be a generalization of the Shapley value is proposed for a large class of games called j-cooperative games which are closely related to multi-choice games. When it is restricted to cooperative games, i.e. when j equals 2, it coincides with the Shapley value. An explicit formula in terms of some marginal contributions of the characteristic function is provided for the proposed value. Different arguments support it: (1) The value can be inferred from a natural probabilistic model. (2) An axiomatic characterization uniquely determines it. (3) The value is consistent in its particularization from j-cooperative games to j-simple games. This chapter also proposes various ways of calculating the value by giving an alternative expression that does not depend on the marginal contributions. This chapter shows how the technique of generating functions can be applied to determine such a value when the game is a weighted j-simple game. The chapter concludes by presenting several applications, among them the computation of the value for a proposed reform of the UNSC voting system., Peer Reviewed
UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC
Publication Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

An equivalent formulation for the Shapley value

  • Freixas Bosch, Josep|||0000-0002-9033-9432
The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-58464-4_1., An equivalent explicit formula for the Shapley value is provided, its equivalence with the classical one is proven by double induction. The importance of this new formula, in contrast to the classical one, is its capability of being extended to more general classes of games, in particular to j-cooperative games or multichoice games, in which players choose among different levels of participation in the game., Peer Reviewed
UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC
Publication Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

Preorders in simple games

  • Freixas Bosch, Josep|||0000-0002-9033-9432
  • Pons Vallès, Montserrat|||0000-0003-1592-0347
The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70647-4_5., Any power index defines a total preorder in a simple game and, thus, induces a hierarchy among its players. The desirability relation, which is also a preorder, induces the same hierarchy as the Banzhaf and the Shapley indices on linear games, i.e., games in which the desirability relation is total. The desirability relation is a sub–preorder of another preorder, the weak desirability relation, and the class of weakly linear games, i.e., games for which the weak desirability relation is total, is larger than the class of linear games. The weak desirability relation induces the same hierarchy as the Banzhaf and the Shapley indices on weakly linear games. In this paper, we define a chain of preorders between the desirability and the weak desirability preorders. From them we obtain new classes of totally preordered games between linear and weakly linear games., Peer Reviewed
UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC
Publication Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

A probabilistic unified approach for power indices in simple games

  • Freixas Bosch, Josep|||0000-0002-9033-9432
  • Pons Vallès, Montserrat|||0000-0003-1592-0347
The final publication is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-60555-4_11, Many power indices on simple games have been defined trying to measure, under different points of view, the “a priori” importance of a voter in a collective binary voting scenario. A unified probabilistic way to define some of these power indices is considered in this paper. We show that six well-known power indices are obtained under such a probabilistic approach. Moreover, some new power indices can naturally be obtained in this way., Peer Reviewed