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CRIPTOGRAFIA PARA RETOS DIGITALES EMERGENTES: ESCENARIOS MULTI-USUARIO Y SEGURIDAD POST-CUANTICA

PID2019-109379RB-I00

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Funding agency name Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Funding agency acronym AEI
Program Programa Estatal de I+D+i Orientado a los Retos de la Sociedad
Call Proyectos de I+D+i (Generación de Conocimiento y Retos Investigación)
Call year 2019
State Plan 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSITAT POLITECNICA DE CATALUNYA

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 6
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC
Publication Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Shorter lattice-based zero-knowledge proofs for the correctness of a shuffle

  • Herranz Sotoca, Javier|||0000-0001-5141-7234
  • Martínez Pinilla, Ramiro|||0000-0003-0496-6462
  • Sánchez Torrón, Manuel
In an electronic voting procedure, mixing networks are used to ensure anonymity of the casted votes. Each node of the network re-encrypts the input list of ciphertexts and randomly permutes it in a process named shuffle, and must prove (in zero-knowledge) that the process was applied honestly. To maintain security of such a process in a post-quantum scenario, new proofs are based on different mathematical assumptions, such as lattice-based problems. Nonetheless, the best lattice-based protocols to ensure verifiable shuffling have linear communication complexity on N, the number of shuffled ciphertexts. In this paper we propose the first sub-linear (on N) post-quantum zero-knowledge argument for the correctness of a shuffle, for which we have mainly used two ideas: arithmetic circuit satisfiability results from Baum et al. (CRYPTO'2018) and Beneš networks to model a permutation of N elements. The achieved communication complexity of our protocol with respect to N is O(v(N)log^2(N)), but we will also highlight its dependency on other important parameters of the underlying lattice ingredients., The work is partially supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovaci´on (MICINN), under Project PID2019-109379RB-I00 and by the European Union PROMETHEUS project (Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program, grant 780701). Authors thank Tjerand Silde for pointing out an incorrect set of parameters (Section 4.1) that we had proposed in a previous version of the manuscript.
UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC
Publication Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Coercion-resistant cast-as-intended verifiability for computationally limited voters

  • Finogina, Tamara
  • Herranz Sotoca, Javier|||0000-0001-5141-7234
In this work, we investigate if two essential properties in electronic voting, coercion-resistance and cast-as-intended verifiability, can be jointly In this work, we investigate if two essential properties in electronic voting, coercion-resistance and cast-as-intended verifiability, can be jointly achieved in settings where voters are (very) limited from a computational point of view. This may be the case in elections where voters use a voting station or webpage to cast their votes but do not have specialized software or devices to perform complicated cryptographic operations (for instance, to verify zero-knowledge proofs or to generate one-way trapdoors). We provide a solution where the only things voters have to do are: remember and compare strings of numbers, on the one hand, and press a button at the appropriate moment, on the other hand. This button activates the participation of an online entity, which is trusted to choose a random nonce for each voter and to publish it only when that voter presses the button (and not before). The most expensive part of the verif ication is an OR proof of knowledge, which can be done by any (powerful enough) external verifier.
UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC
Publication Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

How (not) to achieve both coercion resistance and cast as intended verifiability in remote eVoting

  • Finogina, Tamara
  • Herranz Sotoca, Javier|||0000-0001-5141-7234
  • Larraia, Enrique
The version of record is available online at:10.1007/978-3-030-92548-2_25, We consider the problem of achieving, at the same time, cast-as-intended verifiability and coercion resistance, in remote electronic voting systems where there are no secure channels through which voters can receive secret information/credentials before the voting phase. We discuss why some simple solutions fail to achieve the two desired notions and we propose (a bit) more involved solutions that are satisfactory. Part of the discussion is closely related to the gap “full versus honest-verifier” when defining the zero-knowledge property of cryptographic zero-knowledge systems., Peer Reviewed
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Coercion-resistant cast-as-intended verifiability for computationally limited voters

  • Finogina, Tamara
  • Herranz Sotoca, Javier
In this work, we investigate if two essential properties in electronic voting, coercion-resistance and cast-as-intended verifiability, can be jointly In this work, we investigate if two essential properties in electronic voting, coercion-resistance and cast-as-intended verifiability, can be jointly achieved in settings where voters are (very) limited from a computational point of view. This may be the case in elections where voters use a voting station or webpage to cast their votes but do not have specialized software or devices to perform complicated cryptographic operations (for instance, to verify zero-knowledge proofs or to generate one-way trapdoors). We provide a solution where the only things voters have to do are: remember and compare strings of numbers, on the one hand, and press a button at the appropriate moment, on the other hand. This button activates the participation of an online entity, which is trusted to choose a random nonce for each voter and to publish it only when that voter presses the button (and not before). The most expensive part of the verif ication is an OR proof of knowledge, which can be done by any (powerful enough) external verifier., Postprint (published version)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

How (not) to achieve both coercion resistance and cast as intended verifiability in remote eVoting

  • Finogina, Tamara
  • Herranz Sotoca, Javier
  • Larraia, Enrique
The version of record is available online at:10.1007/978-3-030-92548-2_25, We consider the problem of achieving, at the same time, cast-as-intended verifiability and coercion resistance, in remote electronic voting systems where there are no secure channels through which voters can receive secret information/credentials before the voting phase. We discuss why some simple solutions fail to achieve the two desired notions and we propose (a bit) more involved solutions that are satisfactory. Part of the discussion is closely related to the gap “full versus honest-verifier” when defining the zero-knowledge property of cryptographic zero-knowledge systems., Peer Reviewed, Postprint (author's final draft)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
Publication Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Shorter lattice-based zero-knowledge proofs for the correctness of a shuffle

  • Herranz Sotoca, Javier
  • Martínez Pinilla, Ramiro
  • Sánchez Torrón, Manuel
In an electronic voting procedure, mixing networks are used to ensure anonymity of the casted votes. Each node of the network re-encrypts the input list of ciphertexts and randomly permutes it in a process named shuffle, and must prove (in zero-knowledge) that the process was applied honestly. To maintain security of such a process in a post-quantum scenario, new proofs are based on different mathematical assumptions, such as lattice-based problems. Nonetheless, the best lattice-based protocols to ensure verifiable shuffling have linear communication complexity on N, the number of shuffled ciphertexts. In this paper we propose the first sub-linear (on N) post-quantum zero-knowledge argument for the correctness of a shuffle, for which we have mainly used two ideas: arithmetic circuit satisfiability results from Baum et al. (CRYPTO'2018) and Beneš networks to model a permutation of N elements. The achieved communication complexity of our protocol with respect to N is O(v(N)log^2(N)), but we will also highlight its dependency on other important parameters of the underlying lattice ingredients., The work is partially supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovaci´on (MICINN), under Project PID2019-109379RB-I00 and by the European Union PROMETHEUS project (Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program, grant 780701). Authors thank Tjerand Silde for pointing out an incorrect set of parameters (Section 4.1) that we had proposed in a previous version of the manuscript., Postprint (author's final draft)