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DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

How to attack a galaxy: from Star Wars to Star Trek

  • Hernández-Álvarez, Luis
  • González de la Torre, Miguel Ángel
  • Iglesias Hernández, E.
  • Hernández Encinas, Luis
Proceedings of CSCE 2023 Congress in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, & Applied Computing, July, 24-27, 2023, Las Vegas, USA. 8 páginas, 8 tablas, Recently, the National Institute of Standards and Technology set CRYSTALS¿Kyber as post-quantum public key encryption/key encapsulation mechanism standard, and CRYSTALS¿Dilithium as post¿quantum digital signature standard. These post quantum cryptosystems are also recommended for national security systems. As a result, it is important to identify and analyze the weaknesses and potential information leakage points, so that they can be resolved. In this work, we study the newest side channel attacks based on artificial intelligence models against Kyber and Dilithium, focusing on the specific function attacked. We also examine the artificial intelligence algorithms employed in these attacks and their configurations, discussing which parameters and setting are suitable, and identifying different tools that might be useful., This work was supported in part by the R&D&I project P2QProMeTe, Grant PID2020-112586RBI00 funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033; in part by ORA- CLE Project, with reference PCI2020-120691-2, funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033, and European Union “NextGenerationEU/PRTR”, and in part by the EU Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, project SPIRS (Grant Agreement No. 952622). L.H.A. and E.I.H. would like to thank CSIC Projects CASDiM and EFiDiP, respectively, for their support., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

How to attack a galaxy: from Star Wars to Star Trek

  • Hernández-Álvarez, Luis
  • González de la Torre, Miguel Ángel
  • Iglesias Hernández, E.
  • Hernández Encinas, Luis
Proceedings of CSCE 2023 Congress in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, & Applied Computing, July, 24-27, 2023, Las Vegas, USA. 8 páginas, 8 tablas, Recently, the National Institute of Standards and Technology set CRYSTALS¿Kyber as post-quantum public key encryption/key encapsulation mechanism standard, and CRYSTALS¿Dilithium as post¿quantum digital signature standard. These post quantum cryptosystems are also recommended for national security systems. As a result, it is important to identify and analyze the weaknesses and potential information leakage points, so that they can be resolved. In this work, we study the newest side channel attacks based on artificial intelligence models against Kyber and Dilithium, focusing on the specific function attacked. We also examine the artificial intelligence algorithms employed in these attacks and their configurations, discussing which parameters and setting are suitable, and identifying different tools that might be useful., This work was supported in part by the R&D&I project P2QProMeTe, Grant PID2020-112586RBI00 funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033; in part by ORA- CLE Project, with reference PCI2020-120691-2, funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033, and European Union “NextGenerationEU/PRTR”, and in part by the EU Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, project SPIRS (Grant Agreement No. 952622). L.H.A. and E.I.H. would like to thank CSIC Projects CASDiM and EFiDiP, respectively, for their support., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

QKD Authentication Using Quantum-Safe Lightweight Cryptography: Analysis and Use Cases

  • García Callejo, Aída
  • Sarasa Laborda, Ventura
  • Hernández Encinas, Luis
  • Fernández Mármol, Verónica
10th ETSI/IQC Quantum Safe Cryptography Conference, Singapore, 14-16 May 2024, This work examines the integration of quantum-safe lightweight cryptography (LWC) schemes for classical channel authentication in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). With a focus on applications for mobile nodes and resource-constrained environments, the study evaluates the feasibility and effectiveness of the NIST standard for LWC, ASCON-80pq, integrated into experimental QKD setups. It aims to determine its advantages over other costly alternatives and assesses the performance of the protocol., This work has been partially funded by the State Investigation Agency (AEI) of the Ministry of Science and Innovation (MCIN) and by the European Union NextGerationUE/PRTR in P2QProMeTe project (PID2020-112586RBI00/AEI/10.13039/501100011033, co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund: ESF, ERDF and ERDF, EU); and QURSA project (TED2021- 130369BC33, MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033). This study was also supported by project 101091638 - EuroQCI-SPAIN funded by the European Union and CSIC’s program for the Spanish Recovery, Transformation and Resilience Plan funded by the Recovery and Resilience Facility of the European Union, established by the Regulation(EU) 2020/2094
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Ataques por canal lateral contra AES mediante correlación de consumo de potencia

  • González de la Torre, Miguel Ángel
  • Sarasa Laborda, Ventura
  • Hernández-Álvarez, Luis
  • Morales Sandoval, Iván
  • Hernández Encinas, Luis
IX Jornadas Nacionales de Investigación en Ciberseguridad (JNIC’2024), 2024, Sevilla 27-29 mayo, 2024. 8 páginas, 9 figuras., Los ataques por canal lateral son un tipo de ataque que pretende vulnerar la seguridad de los algoritmos criptográficos implementados en dispositivos físicos. El proceso consiste en obtener información de determinadas medidas colaterales (tiempo, consumo de potencia, radiación electromagnética, etc.) que afectan al comportamiento del dispositivo atacado y deducir de ellas información valiosa, principalmente, las claves secretas almacenadas en los mismos. En este trabajo se investiga la seguridad de las implementaciones sin contramedidas del algoritmo estándar de cifrado simétrico AES para sus tres longitudes de clave: 128, 192 y 256 bits, utilizando la plataforma ChipWhisperer. Se han logrado ataques exitosos que permiten obtener las claves secretas de AES para las tres versiones consideradas ejecutando el algoritmo de cifrado. También se ha conseguido obtener la clave de AES-128 considerando el proceso de descifrado, conjeturándose que este ataque es extensible a las otras dos versiones de AES., Este trabajo ha sido parcialmente financiado por la Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI) del Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (MCIN) y por la Unión Europea NextGerationUE/PRTR en los proyectos P2QProMeTe (PID2020-112586RBI00/AEI/10.13039/501100011033, cofinanciado por el Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional: FSE, FEDER y FEDER, UE); y QURSA (TED2021- 130369BC33, MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033); en parte por el Proyecto ORACLE (PCI2020-120691-2, MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033) y en parte por el programa de investigación e innovación Horizonte 2020 de la UE, proyecto SPIRS (Grant Agreement N° 952622). M.A.G.T. y L.H-A. desean agradecer su apoyo a los proyectos del CSIC EFiDiP y SAIACAP, respectivamente., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publication Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Seguridad de los criptosistemas postcuánticos basados en retículos

  • González de la Torre, Miguel Ángel
  • Rojas Rodríguez, Diego
I Jornadas de Jóvenes Investigadores del ITEFI, 20 noviembre 2024, Madrid., This work has been partially funded by the State Investigation Agency (AEI) of the Ministry of Science and Innovation (MCIN) and by the European Union NextGerationUE/PRTR in P2QProMeTe project (PID2020-112586RBI00/AEI/10.13039/501100011033, co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund: ESF, ERDF and ERDF, EU)., Peer reviewed