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GESTION ESTRATEGICA EN SISTEMAS COMPLEJOS CON MULTIPLES AGENTES

PGC2018-097965-B-I00

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Funding agency name Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Funding agency acronym AEI
Program Programa Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento y Fortalecimiento Científico y Tecnológico del Sistema de I+D+i
Subprogram Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Call Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Call year 2018
State Plan 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Beneficiary centre UNIVERSIDAD MIGUEL HERNANDEZ DE ELCHE

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 5
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publication Otros (Other)

Allocating the surplus induced by cooperation in distribution chains with multiple suppliers and retailers

  • Guardiola, Luis A.
  • Meca, Ana
  • Puerto, Justo
  • Guardiola, Luis A.|||/items/e3a552b3-d66c-4863-b8c2-28bf05e1078d
The coordination of actions and the allocation of profit in supply chains under decentralized control plays an important role in improving the profits of retailers and suppliers in the supply chain. We focus on supply chains under decentralized control in which noncompeting retailers can order from multiple suppliers to replenish their stocks. The goal of the firms in the chain is to maximize their individual profits. As the outcome under decentralized control is inefficient, coordination of actions between cooperating agents can improve individual profits. Cooperative game theory is used to analyze cooperation between agents. We introduce multi-retailer-supplier games and show that agents can always achieve an optimal profit by cooperating and forming the grand coalition. Moreover, we show that there will always be stable allocations of total profit among the firms which cannot be improved by any coalition. In addition, we propose and characterize a stable allocation of the total surplus induced by cooperation.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publication Otros (Other)

Enforcing fair cooperation in production-inventory settings with heterogeneous agents

  • Guardiola, Luis A.
  • Meca, Ana
  • Puerto, Justo
  • Guardiola, Luis A.|||/items/e3a552b3-d66c-4863-b8c2-28bf05e1078d
Production-Inventory settings with heterogeneous agents appear frequently in the study of supply chain management. For instance, there are Production-Inventory situations in which certain agents are essential as they can reduce the costs of other agents (followers) when they cooperate with each other. The study of such a cooperation can be modelled by means of a cooperative game and studied finding fair cost allocations. These class of cooperative games was introduced in Guardiola et al. (in Games Econ Behav 65:205–219, 2009) where it was also proposed the Owen point. This cost allocation is an appealing solution concept that for Production-Inventory games (PI-games) is always stable, in the sense of the core. The Owen point allows all the players in the game to operate at minimum cost but it does not take into account the cost reduction induced by essential players over their followers. Thus, it may be seen as an altruistic allocation for essential players what can be criticized. The aim of this paper is two-fold: to introduce new core allocations for PI-games improving the weaknesses of the Owen point and to study the structure and complexity of set of stable cost allocations (the core) of PI-games.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publication Otros (Other)

Unitary Owen Points in Cooperative Lot-Sizing Models with Backlogging

  • Guardiola, Luis A.
  • Meca, Ana
  • Puerto, Justo
  • Guardiola, Luis A.|||/items/e3a552b3-d66c-4863-b8c2-28bf05e1078d
This paper analyzes cost sharing in uncapacitated lot-sizing models with backlogging and heterogeneous costs. It is assumed that several firms participate in a consortium aiming at satisfying their demand over the planning horizon with minimal operating cost. Each individual firm has its own ordering channel and holding technology, but cooperation with other firms consists in sharing that information. Therefore, the firms that cooperate can use the best ordering channels and holding technology among members of the consortium. This mode of cooperation is stable. in that allocations of the overall operating cost exist, so that no group of agents benefit from leaving the consortium. Our contribution in the current paper is to present a new family of cost sharing allocations with good properties for enforcing cooperation: the unitary Owen points. Necessary and sufficient conditions are provided for the unitary Owen points to belong to the core of the cooperative game. In addition, we provide empirical evidence, through simulation, showing that, in randomly-generated situations, the above condition is fulfilled in 99% of the cases. Additionally, a relationship between lot-sizing games and a certain family of production-inventory games, through Owen’s points of the latter, is described. This interesting relationship enables easily constructing a variety of coalitionally stable allocations for cooperative lot-sizing models.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publication Otros (Other)

The effect of consolidated periods in heterogeneous lot-sizing games

  • Guardiola, Luis A.
  • Meca, Ana
  • Puerto, Justo
  • Guardiola, Luis A.|||/items/e3a552b3-d66c-4863-b8c2-28bf05e1078d
We consider a cooperative game defined by an economic lot-sizing problem with heterogeneous costs over a finite time horizon, in which each firm faces demand for a single product in each period and coalitions can pool orders. The model of cooperation works as follows: ordering channels and holding and backlogging technologies are shared among the members of the coalitions. This implies that each firm uses the best ordering channel and holding technology provided by the participants in the consortium. That is, they produce, hold inventory, pay backlogged demand and make orders at the minimum cost of the coalition members. Thus, firms aim at satisfying their demand over the planing horizon with minimal operation cost. Our contribution is to show that there exist fair allocations of the overall operation cost among the firms so that no group of agents profit from leaving the consortium. Then we propose a parametric family of cost allocations and provide sufficient conditions for this to be a stable family against coalitional defections of firms. Finally, we focus on those periods of the time horizon that are consolidated and we analyze their effect on the stability of cost allocations.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publication Otros (Other)

Supply function competition in a mixed electric power market

  • Escrihuela Villar, Marc
  • Gutiérrez-Hita, Carlos
  • Vicente-Pérez, José
  • Vicente-Pérez, José|||/items/7fad998a-2853-4a32-852d-d0c16df35750
In this paper, we present a mixed oligopoly model where electric power generators compete in supply functions in a liberalized market. A former monopolist, the state‐owned generator, is assumed to be (partially) privatized. First, we obtain that there is a relationship between privatization and the number of electric power generators concerning the level of consumer surplus and total welfare. Indeed, a fully state‐owned generator is socially optimal, lowering private generators' profits and enhancing consumer surplus; that is, if the degree of privatization decreases, consumer surplus increases compensating the damage imposed on generators' profits. Second, as the number of generators increases, full privatization may provide similar levels of consumer surplus and social welfare than those observed in a mixed oligopoly. Moreover, it is also obtained that price‐cost margins increase as marginal cost increases. Overall, our results suggest that the state‐owned generator should be privatized when entry barriers are low enough, and competitiveness is enhanced. Otherwise, a state‐owned generator may protect consumers, enhancing consumer surplus.