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Artículo científico (JournalArticle)
Debt, diversification and earnings management
In this article we use panel-estimation techniques to calculate discretionary accruals (DAC) and to produce a better understanding of the nature of the relation between debt and earnings management Consistent with the transparency hypothesis (which suggests that diversification increases the complexity of firms' activities and reduces their transparency to outsiders), we find that for less-diversified (more transparent) firms, debt reduces positive discretionary accruals, whereas in relatively more-diversified (less transparent) firms the impact of debt becomes positive Our paper shows that marginal increases in debt provide the incentives for managers to manipulate earnings, and diversification provides the needed context for this accounting practice to be possible. We have also found that only in the sub-sample of aggressive firms, those that manage discretionary accruals with enough magnitude to increase income, do lenders exert their control Some firms, however. take advantage of diversification to avoid this control Out findings are robust to several earnings-management measures and methodologies.
Project:
Generalitat de Catalunya 2009 / SGR-976
,
Generalitat de Catalunya 2005 / SGR-00813
,
Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia SEJ2007-67895-C04-03
,
Ministerio de Ciencia y Educación SEJ2004-07530-C04-02
,
Ministerio de Ciencia y Educación SEJ2007-60995/ECON
HANDLE: https://ddd.uab.cat/record/324095, https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2009.10.005