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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Bargaining and idle public sector capacity in health care

  • Barros, Pedro Pita|||0000-0002-0881-4928
  • Martínez Giralt, Xavier|||0000-0002-5185-8395
A feature present in countries with a National Health Service is the co-existence of a públic and a private sector. Often, the public payer contracts with private providers while holding idle capacity. This is often seen as inefficiency from the management of public facilities. We present here a different rationale for the existence of such idle capacity: the public sector may opt to have idle capacity as a way to gain bargaining power vis-à-vis the private provider, under the assumption of a more efficient private than the public sector
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Preventive health care and payment systems

  • Martínez Giralt, Xavier|||0000-0002-5185-8395
  • Barros, Pedro Pita|||0000-0002-0881-4928
Prevention has been a main issue of recent policy orientations in health care. This renews the interest on how different organizational designs and the definition of payment schemes to providers may affect the incentives to provide preventive health care. We focus on the externality resulting from referral decisions from primary to acute care providers. This makes our analysis complementary to most works in the literature allowing to address in a more direct way the issue of preventive health care. The analysis is performed through a series of examples combining different payment schemes at the primary care center and hospital. When hospitals are reimbursed according to costs, prevention efforts are unlikely to occur. However, under a capitation payment for the primary care center and prospective budget for the hospital, prevention efforts increase when shifting from an independent to an integrated management. Also, from a normative standpoint, optimal payment schemes are simpler under joint management.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Voting by committees under constraints

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On exiting after voting

  • Berga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904
  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their membership by either staying or exiting. In turn, and as a consequence of the exit of some of its members, other members might now find undesirable to belong to the society as well. For general exit procedures we analyze the exit behavior of members after knowing the chosen alternative. For the case of monotonic preferences we propose, for each chosen alternative, an unambiguous and meaningful prediction of the subset of members that will exit.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Stability and voting by committees with exit

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
  • Berga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904
  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying founder's sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one maching model

  • Martínez, Ruth
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
  • Oviedo, Jorge
For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. Therefore, in centralized markets like entry-level professional labor markets if the proposed matching is the workers-optimal stable matching then, no group of workers can never benefit by reporting untruthfully their preference relations. We exhibit an example showing that this property fails if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings

  • Martínez, Ruth
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
  • Oviedo, Jorge
The paper proposes an algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings when agents have substitutable preferences. The algorithm starts by calculating the two optimal stable matchings using the deferred-acceptance algorithm. Then, it computes each remaining stable matching as the firm-optimal stable matching corresponding to a new preference profile, which is obtained after modifying the preferences of a previously identified sequence of firms.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest domain, for all possible values of M, admitting a rule (the extended uniform rule) satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry. We identify, for each M and n, a maximal domain of preferences under which the extended uniform rule also satisfies the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, "tops-onlyness", and continuity. These domains (called partially single-plateaued) are strictly larger than the set of single-plateaued preferences. However, their intersection, when M varies from zero to infinity, coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Winners and losers from the gradual formation of trading blocs

  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
  • Xue, Licun
Although global free trade is efficient, each country's benefit from free trade depends on the path that leads to the global free trade agreement. Using a dynamic model of trading bloc formation, we show that when global free trade is reached gradually the countries that are initially excluded gain less than the rest and may be even made worse off by the final free trade agreement than they were in the initial state of no trading blocs.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Negotiation advantages of professional associations in health care

  • Barros, Pedro Pita|||0000-0002-0881-4928
  • Martínez Giralt, Xavier|||0000-0002-5185-8395
In several instances, third-party payers negotiate prices of health care services with providers. We show that a third-party payer may prefer to deal with a professional association than with the sub-set constituted by the more efficient providers, and then apply the same price to all providers. The reason for this is the increase in the bargaining position of providers. The more efficient providers are also the ones with higher profits in the event of negotiation failure. This allows them to extract a higher surplus from the third-party payer.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On the weights of nations, assigning voting weights in a heterogeneous union

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Jackson, Matthew O.
We study indirect democracy in which countries, states, or districts each elect a representative who later votes at a union level on their behalf. We show that the voting rule that maximizes the total expected utility of all agents in the union involves assigning a weight to each district's vote and then sticking with the status quo unless at least a threshold of weighted votes is cast for change. We analyze how the weights relate to the population size of a country and the correlation structure of agents' preferences, and then we compare the voting weights in the Council of the European Union under the Nice Treaty and the recently proposed Constitution.