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Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Incomplete information and small cores in matching markets

  • Ehlers, Lars|||0000-0002-9521-9931
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We study Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms in centralized matching markets under incomplete information. We show that truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revelation game induced by a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if all the profiles in the support of the common belief have singleton cores. Our result matches the observations of Roth and Peranson (1999) in the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) in the United States: (i) the cores of the profiles submitted to the clearinghouse are small and (ii) while truth-telling is not a dominant strategy most participants of the NRMP truthfully reveal their preferences.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Voting by committees under constraints

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On exiting after voting

  • Berga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904
  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their membership by either staying or exiting. In turn, and as a consequence of the exit of some of its members, other members might now find undesirable to belong to the society as well. For general exit procedures we analyze the exit behavior of members after knowing the chosen alternative. For the case of monotonic preferences we propose, for each chosen alternative, an unambiguous and meaningful prediction of the subset of members that will exit.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Stability and voting by committees with exit

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
  • Berga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904
  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying founder's sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest domain, for all possible values of M, admitting a rule (the extended uniform rule) satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry. We identify, for each M and n, a maximal domain of preferences under which the extended uniform rule also satisfies the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, "tops-onlyness", and continuity. These domains (called partially single-plateaued) are strictly larger than the set of single-plateaued preferences. However, their intersection, when M varies from zero to infinity, coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences