DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación
Artículo científico (JournalArticle)
Fraud tolerance in optimal crowdfunding
Reward-based crowdfunding enables credit-constrained entrepreneurs to raise
money to develop and create innovative products. Crowdfunders' low monitoring
incentives open the door to fraud. In practice, fraud is surprisingly rare. Strausz
(2017) proves that crowdfunding implements the optimal ex post individually ratio-
nal mechanism design outcome in an environment with entrepreneurial moral hazard
and private cost information. However, ex post individual rationality precludes all
crowdfunding unless fraud can be prevented with certainty. Actual crowdfunding
tolerates some fraud. We show this (i) generates strictly higher pro ts and welfare,
but (ii) cannot implement the optimal ex interim individually rational outcome., We gratefully acknowledge financial support from 2016 FBBVA grant Innovación e Información en
la Economía Digital, the Spanish Ministry via the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence
in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and grants ECO2017-88129-P (AEI/FEDER, UE) (Ellman) and ECO2015-
67171-P (MINECO) (Hurkens) and the Generalitat de Catalunya via the grant 2017-SGR-1136., Peer reviewed
Proyecto:
MINECO / Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013-2016 SEV-2015-0563
,
MINECO / Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013-2016 ECO2017-88129-P
,
MINECO / Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013-2016 ECO2015-67171-P