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INTERVENCION POLITICA EN REDES SOCIALES Y ECONOMICAS

ECO2015-67171-P

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Nombre agencia financiadora Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Acrónimo agencia financiadora MINECO
Programa Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Año convocatoria 2015
Plan Estatal 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Unidad de gestión Secretaría de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades
Centro beneficiario AGENCIA ESTATAL CONSEJO SUPERIOR DE INVESTIGACIONES CIENTIFICAS (CSIC)
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 12
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Immigrant children’s school performance and immigration costs: Evidence from Spain

  • Albornoz, Facundo
  • Cabrales, Antonio
  • Calvo, Paula
  • Hauk, Esther
This note provides evidence on how immigration costs affect school performance of immigrant children exploiting the information provided by the CDI; a standardized exam for all students enrolled in the last year of Primary education in the Madrid region. For a given socio-economic background and parent characteristics, school performance of immigrant children improves with parental immigration costs., Hauk acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the second Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D and through CICYT project number ECO2015-67171-P (MINECO/FEDER) and from the Government of Catalonia through AUGUR 2017 SGR 1571., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Voters' private valuation of candidates' quality

  • Aragonés, Enriqueta
  • Xefteris, Dimitrios
Different voters might have different valuations of candidates' qualitative features. We argue that this intuitive fact acts as a strong stabilizing force in electoral competition dynamics when candidates are office motivated (pure strategy equilibria may exist, unlike when all voters favor the same candidate). Perhaps more importantly, it affects candidates' platform moderation incentives in a rather intriguing manner. When voters are evenly split, in terms of their candidates' quality valuations, then both candidates have incentives to locate sufficiently near - but not necessarily exactly at - the center of the policy space. However, as the number of voters who favor the same candidate rises, (maximum) equilibrium differentiation follows a non-trivial U-shaped pattern. It is first decreasing and then increasing in the fraction of voters who prefer the more popular candidate., Aragonés acknowledges financial support by the Generalitat de Catalunya Grant number 2014 SGR 1064, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness ECO2015-67171-P and the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics through SEV-2015-0563., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Intergenerational field transitions in economics

  • Albornoz, Facundo
  • Cabrales, Antonio
  • Hauk, Esther
  • Warnes, Pablo E.
This note documents trends of socialization and intergenerational mobility across research networks (fields) in economics. Using data on advisor–advisee pairs, we find that intergenerational field similarity is more prevalent in larger and successful fields. We then show that researchers who do choose different fields than those of their advisors are more likely to switch to highly demanded fields in the job market. These results are consistent with the equilibrium of a model in which advisors’ have concerns for their advisees’ socialization and production outcomes. We also document a positive relation between field productivity and the median level of co-authorship at the field level, which is consistent with complementaries between socialization and productive efforts., Hauk acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and through CICYT project number ECO2015-67171-P and from the government of Catalonia (2014 SGR 1064)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Preference shock and party consistency

  • Aragonés, Enriqueta
Trabajo presentado en el 41 Simposio de la Asociación Española de Economía, celebrado en Bilbao, del 14 al 17 de diciembre de 2016, I develop a two party electoral competition model in order to analyze the effects of an exogenous preference shock on the strategic policy choice of parties. I find that on the one hand, if the preference shock affects the issue that is currently most salient, then both parties strategically shift their policy choices in the direction of the shock, however the shifts are asymmetric: the policy shift of the party that is most favored by the preference shock is smaller. On the other hand, if the preference shock affects an issue that was not the most salient before and becomes salient because of the shock itself, then both parties strategically shift their policy choices towards the ideal point of the median voter of that issue. And again, the parties policy shift is asymmetric: the reaction of the party that is most favored by the preference shock is smaller. Finally, I show that the effects of a large policy shift that some parties perform when they are optimally reacting to a voters’ preference shocks may break the party’s internal equilibrium among its different factions, implying that exogenous preference shocks may cause important chanegs in a pary system, Aragones acknowledges financial support by the Generalitat de Catalunya Grant number 2014 SGR 1064, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness ECO2015-67171-P and the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics through SEV-2015-0563., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Fraud tolerance in optimal crowdfunding

  • Ellman, Matthew
  • Hurkens, Sjaak
Reward-based crowdfunding enables credit-constrained entrepreneurs to raise money to develop and create innovative products. Crowdfunders' low monitoring incentives open the door to fraud. In practice, fraud is surprisingly rare. Strausz (2017) proves that crowdfunding implements the optimal ex post individually ratio- nal mechanism design outcome in an environment with entrepreneurial moral hazard and private cost information. However, ex post individual rationality precludes all crowdfunding unless fraud can be prevented with certainty. Actual crowdfunding tolerates some fraud. We show this (i) generates strictly higher pro ts and welfare, but (ii) cannot implement the optimal ex interim individually rational outcome., We gratefully acknowledge financial support from 2016 FBBVA grant Innovación e Información en la Economía Digital, the Spanish Ministry via the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and grants ECO2017-88129-P (AEI/FEDER, UE) (Ellman) and ECO2015- 67171-P (MINECO) (Hurkens) and the Generalitat de Catalunya via the grant 2017-SGR-1136., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Occupational Choice with Endogenous Spillovers

  • Albornoz, Facundo
  • Cabrales, Antonio
  • Hauk, Esther
This article is part of a substantial revision of the paper circulated under the title ‘Targeted socialization and production’, We study a model that integrates productive and socialising efforts with occupational choice, and endogenous spillovers. We show that more talented individuals work harder and contribute more to externalities, but also have incentives to segregate. Average socialising increases the productivity of the occupation. The size of an occupation grows with its synergies. Individuals underinvest in productive and socialising effort, and sort themselves inefficiently into occupations. We derive the optimal subsidy for sorting into different occupations. Finally, we derive a rule to identify overpopulated sectors and establish the connection between inequality of talents, socialising, productive efforts and occupation size., Hauk acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and through La Comisión Interministerial de Ciencia y Tecnología (CICYT) project number ECO2015-67171-P (MINECO/FEDER) and from the government of Catalonia (2014 SGR 1064).
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Dominance and competitive bundling

  • Hurkens, Sjaak
  • Jeon, Doh-Shin
  • Menicucci, Domenico
We study how bundling affects competition between two asymmetric multi-product firms. One firm dominates the other in that it produces better products more efficiently. For low (high) levels of dominance, bundling intensifies (relaxes) price competition and lowers (raises) both firms' profits. For intermediate dominance levels, bundling increases the dominant firm's market share substantially, thereby raising its profit while reducing its rival's profit. Hence, the threat to bundle is then a credible foreclosure strategy. We also identify circumstances in which a firm that dominates only in some markets can profitably leverage its dominance to other markets by tying all its products., Hurkens acknowledges financial support from the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness grant number ECO2015-67171-P (MINECO/FEDER) and through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563)
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Voter heterogeneity and political corruption

  • Aragonés, Enriqueta
  • Rivas, Javier
  • Tóth, Áron
We show that policies that eliminate corruption can depart from socially desirable policies and this inefficiency can be large enough to allow corruption to live on. Political competition between an honest (welfare maximiser) and corrupt politicians is studied. In our model the corrupt politician is at a distinct disadvantage: there is no asymmetric information, no voter bias and voters are fully rational. Yet, corruption cannot be eliminated when voters have heterogeneous preferences., Aragonès acknowledges financial support by the Generalitat de Catalunya grant number 2017-SGR-1359, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness and FEDER grant number ECO2015-67171-P, and the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics through SEV-2015-0563.
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The stability of multi-level governments

  • Aragonés, Enriqueta
  • Ponsatí, Clara
This paper studies the stability of a multi-level government. We analyze an extensive form game played between two politicians leading two levels of government. We characterize the conditions that render such government structures stable. We also show that if leaders care about electoral rents and the preferences of the constituencies at different levels are misaligned, then the decentralized government structure may be unsustainable. This result is puzzling because, from a normative perspective, the optimality of decentralized decisions via a multi-level government structure is relevant precisely when different territorial constituencies exhibit preference heterogeneity, Aragones acknowledges financial support by the Generalitat de Catalunya grant number 2017-SGR-1359, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness and FEDER grant number ECO2015-67171-P, and the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics through SEV-2015-0563., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Fraud tolerance in optimal crowdfunding

  • Hurkens, Sjaak
  • Ellman, Matthew
Trabajo presentado en el 46th Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics, celebrado en Barcelona (España), del 30 de agosto al 1 de septiembre, Reward-based crowdfunding enables credit-constrained entrepreneurs to raise money to develop and create innovative products. Crowdfunders' low monitoring incentives open the door to fraud. In practice, fraud is surprisingly rare. Strausz (2017) claims that crowdfunding implements the optimal ex post individually rational mechanism design outcome in an environment with entrepreneurial moral hazard and private cost information. However, ex post individual rationality precludes all crowdfunding unless fraud can be prevented with certainty. Actual crowdfunding tolerates some fraud. We show this (i) generates strictly higher prots and welfare, but (ii) cannot implement the optimal ex interim individually rational outcome, We gratefully acknowledge financial support from 2016 FBBVA grant Innovación e Información en la Economía Digital, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness via the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and grants ECO2017-88129-P (Ellman) and ECO2015-67171-P (Hurkens) and the Generalitat de Catalunya via the grant 2017-SGR-1136
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Perception of corruption and public support for redistribution in Latin America

  • Hauk, Esther
  • Oviedo, Mónica
  • Ramos, Xavier
This paper studies the relationship between people’s beliefs about the quality of their institutions, as measured by corruption perceptions, and preferences for redistribution in Latin America. Our empirical study is guided by a theoretical model which introduces taxes into Foellmi and Oechslin’s (2007) general equilibrium model of non-collusive corruption. In this model perceived corruption influences people’s preferences for redistribution through two channels. On the one hand it undermines trust in government, which reduces people’s support for redistribution. On the other hand, more corruption decreases own wealth relative to average wealth of below-average-wealth individuals leading to a higher demand for redistribution. Thus, the effect of perceived corruption on redistribution cannot be signed a priori. Our novel empirical findings for Latin America suggest that perceiving corruption in the public sector increases people’s support for redistribution. Although the wealth channel dominates in the data, we also find evidence for the trust channel — from corruption to demand for redistribution via reduced trust., Xavier Ramos acknowledges financial support of projects PID2019-104619RB-C43 (Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, Spain) and 2017SGR-1571 (Generalitat de Catalunya, Spain). Esther Hauk acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI), through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S), and through CICYT project number ECO2015-67171-P (MINECO/FEDER), and from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities through project PGC2018-097898-B-100 MCIU/AEI/FEDER and from the government of Catalonia under project 2017SGR1571., Peer reviewed
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Perception of corruption and public support for redistribution in Latin America

  • Hauk, Esther|||0000-0002-3089-9307
  • Oviedo León, Mónica Juliana
  • Ramos Morilla, Xavier|||0000-0003-1947-4057
This paper studies the relationship between people's beliefs about the quality of their institutions, as measured by corruption perceptions, and preferences for redistribution in Latin America. Our empirical study is guided by a theoretical model which introduces taxes into Foellmi and Oechslin's (2007) general equilibrium model of non-collusive corruption. In this model perceived corruption influences people's preferences for redistribution through two channels. On the one hand it undermines trust in government, which reduces people's support for redistribution. On the other hand, more corruption decreases own wealth relative to average wealth of below-average-wealth individuals leading to a higher demand for redistribution. Thus, the effect of perceived corruption on redistribution cannot be signed a priori. Our novel empirical findings for Latin America suggest that perceiving corruption in the public sector increases people's support for redistribution. Although the wealth channel dominates in the data, we also find evidence for the trust channel - from corruption to demand for redistribution via reduced trust.