Pasar al contenido principal

ECONOMIA EXPERIMENTAL, MERCADOS BILATERALES Y BIENESTAR SUBJETIVO

ECO2014-59302-P

•
Nombre agencia financiadora Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Acrónimo agencia financiadora MINECO
Programa Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Año convocatoria 2014
Plan Estatal 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Unidad de gestión Secretaría de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades
Centro beneficiario AGENCIA ESTATAL CONSEJO SUPERIOR DE INVESTIGACIONES CIENTIFICAS (CSIC)
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 2
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

Market interaction and efficient cooperation

  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Riedl, Arno
Reviesed version: May 2018 (December 2015), We experimentally study causal effects of competitive market experience on efficiency levels attained in a subsequent social dilemma. We compare behavior of pairs of traders who have been market-winners with that of pairs who have been marketlosers. We study both the cases where traders interacting in the social dilemma have competed with each other in the market before and where traders do not have a shared market experience. Shared market experience adversely affects efficiency in the social dilemma for both market-winner and market-loser pairs. Market-winners achieve higher efficiency levels in the social dilemma only if market experience is not shared., The authors thank the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness through grant ECO2014-59302-P and through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV2015-0563), the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2014 SGR 510) and the Antoni Serra Ramoneda Research Chair (UAB-Catalunya Caixa) for financial support., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

Supply function competition, private information and market power: a laboratory study

  • Bayona, Anna
  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Vives, Xavier
In the context of supply function competition with private information, we test in the laboratory whether—as predicted in Bayesian equilibrium—costs that are positively correlated lead to steeper supply functions and less competitive outcomes than do uncorrelated costs. We find that the majority of subjects bid in accordance with the equilibrium prediction when the environment is simple (uncorrelated costs treatment) but fail to do so in a more complex environment (positively correlated costs treatment). Although we find no statistically significant differences between treatments in average behaviour and outcomes, there are significant differences in the distribution of supply functions. Our results are consistent with the presence of sophisticated agents that on average best respond to a large proportion of subjects who ignore the correlation among costs. Experimental welfare losses in both treatments are higher than the equilibrium prediction owing to a substantial degree of productive inefficiency., Anna Bayona acknowledges the financial support from Banc de Sabadell. Jordi Brandts acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness (Grant ECO2014-59302-P) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (AGAUR Grant 2014 SGR 510). Xavier Vives acknowledges financial support of the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness (Grant ECO2015- 63711-P) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (AGAUR Grant 2014 SGR 1496)., Peer reviewed