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Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Intergenerational mobility in education and occupation

  • Alonso Carrera, Jaime
  • Caballé, Jordi
  • Raurich, Xavier
We build a model that, according to the empirical evidence, gives rise to oscillations in wealth within a dynasty while keeping intergenerational persistence in education attainment. We propose a mechanism based on the interaction between wealth and effort as suggested by the Carnegie conjecture, according to which wealthier individuals devote less effort in their job occupations than poorer. Oscillations in wealth arise from changes in the occupation chosen by different generations of the same dynasty as a response to both inherited wealth and college premium. Our mechanism generates a rich social stratification with several classes in the long run due to the combination of different levels of education and occupation types. Furthermore, we generate a large mobility in wealth among classes even in the long run. Our model highlights the role played by the minimum cost on education investment, the borrowing constraints, and the complementarity between education and occupational effort., Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2015-66701, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2015-67602, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2015-68367, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. SEV-2015-0563, Agence Nationale de la Recherche (Francia) | Ref. ANR-11-IDEX-0001-02, Generalitat de Cataluña | Ref. 2017-SGR-1765
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Outsourcing with identical suppliers and shortest-first policy: a laboratory experiment

  • Klijn, Flip
  • Vorsatz, Marc
We study experimentally in the laboratory two 2-player games that mimic a decentralized decision-making situation in which firms repeatedly outsource production orders to multiple identical suppliers. The first game has a unique (inefficient) equilibrium in mixed strategies, while the second game has two (efficient) equilibria in pure strategies and an infinite number of (inefficient) equilibria in mixed strategies. In both games, the optimal social costs can also be obtained via dominated strategies. We find that only in the second game subjects manage to reach an efficient outcome more often when matched in fixed pairs than when randomly rematched each round. Surprisingly, this is because subjects coordinate on dominated strategies (and not an efficient pure strategy equilibrium). We show theoretically that preferences for efficiency cannot explain our experimental results. Inequality aversion, on the other hand, cannot be rejected., F. Klijn gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Generalitat de Catalunya (2014-SGR-1064), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica 2013–2016 (ECO2014-59302-P), and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563). He also gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Fundación Ramón Areces. M. Vorsatz gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Fundación Ramón Areces and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (ECO2012–31985 and ECO2015–65701–P)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Stock Price Booms and Expected Capital Gains

  • Adam, Klaus
  • Marcet, Albert
  • Beutel, Johannes
This paper replaces an earlier paper titled “Booms and Busts in Asset Prices” (Adam and Marcet 2010)., Investors' subjective capital gains expectations are a key element explaining stock price fluctuations. Survey measures of these expectations display excessive optimism (pessimism) at market peaks (troughs). We formally reject the hypothesis that this is compatible with rational expectations. We then incorporate subjective price beliefs with such properties into a standard asset-pricing model with rational agents (internal rationality). The model gives rise to boom-bust cycles that temporarily delink stock prices from fundamentals and quantitatively replicates many asset-pricing moments. In particular, it matches the observed strong positive correlation between the price dividend ratio and survey return expectations, which cannot be matched by rational expectations., Albert Marcet acknowledges support from Programa de Excelencia del Banco de España, the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563), Plan Nacional (Ministry of Education), SGR (Generalitat de Catalunya). Klaus Adam and Albert Marcet acknowledge support from the European Research Council under the EU 7th Framework Programme (FP/2007–2013), Starting Grant Agreement 284262 (Adam), and Advanced Grant Agreement 324048 (Marcet). Klaus Adam and Albert Marcet thank Fondation Banque de France for its support on this project., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists

  • Klaus, Bettina
  • Klijn, Flip
We study the structure of the set of (Nash) equilibria of a deferred acceptance game with complete lists: for a given marriage market with complete lists, men propose to women truthfully while women can accept or reject proposals strategically throughout the deferred-acceptance algorithm. Zhou (1991) studied this game and showed that a matching that is stable with respect to the true preferences can be supported by some preference profile (possibly a non-equilibrium one) if and only if it can be supported by an equilibrium as well. In particular, this result implies the existence of equilibria since the men-optimal stable matching is supported by true preferences and hence an equilibrium outcome. We answer an open question Zhou posed by showing that there need not exist an equilibrium matching that weakly dominates all other equilibrium matchings from the women’s point of view (Theorem 2)., B. Klaus gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNFS). F. Klijn gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Generalitat de Catalunya (2014-SGR-1064), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Plan Nacional I+D+i (ECO2014-59302-P), and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability

  • Klaus, Bettina
  • Klijn, Flip
We study many-to-many matching markets in which agents from a set A are matched to agents from a disjoint set B through a two-stage non-revelation mechanism. In the first stage, A-agents, who are endowed with a quota that describes the maximal number of agents they can be matched to, simultaneously make proposals to the B-agents. In the second stage, B-agents sequentially, and respecting the quota, choose and match to available A-proposers. We study the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the induced game. We prove that stable matchings are equilibrium outcomes if all A-agents' preferences are substitutable. We also show that the implementation of the set of stable matchings is closely related to the quotas of the A-agents. In particular, implementation holds when A-agents' preferences are substitutable and their quotas are non-binding., B. Klaus gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) for Project 100018_156201. F. Klijn gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Generalitat de Catalunya (2014-SGR-1064), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica 2013–2016 (ECO2014-59302-P), and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Voters' private valuation of candidates' quality

  • Aragonés, Enriqueta
  • Xefteris, Dimitrios
Different voters might have different valuations of candidates' qualitative features. We argue that this intuitive fact acts as a strong stabilizing force in electoral competition dynamics when candidates are office motivated (pure strategy equilibria may exist, unlike when all voters favor the same candidate). Perhaps more importantly, it affects candidates' platform moderation incentives in a rather intriguing manner. When voters are evenly split, in terms of their candidates' quality valuations, then both candidates have incentives to locate sufficiently near - but not necessarily exactly at - the center of the policy space. However, as the number of voters who favor the same candidate rises, (maximum) equilibrium differentiation follows a non-trivial U-shaped pattern. It is first decreasing and then increasing in the fraction of voters who prefer the more popular candidate., Aragonés acknowledges financial support by the Generalitat de Catalunya Grant number 2014 SGR 1064, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness ECO2015-67171-P and the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics through SEV-2015-0563., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Bank opacity and financial crises

  • Jungherr, Joachim
This paper studies a model of endogenous bank opacity. Why do banks choose to hide their risk exposure from the public? And should policy makers force banks to be more transparent? In the model, bank opacity is costly because it encourages banks to take on too much risk. But opacity also reduces the incidence of bank runs (for a given level of risk taking). Banks choose to be inefficiently opaque if the composition of their asset holdings is proprietary information. In this case, policy makers can improve upon the market outcome by imposing public disclosure requirements (such as Pillar Three of Basel II). However, full transparency maximizes neither efficiency nor stability. The model can explain why empirically a higher degree of bank competition leads to increased transparency., I am grateful for financial support from the European Union through ADEMU (Horizon 2020 Grant 649396) and ERC Advanced Grant (APMPAL) GA 324048, from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and through Grant ECO2013-48884-C3-1P, and from the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant 2014 SGR 1432)., Peer reviewed, Peer Reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A selfish allocation heuristic in scheduling: Equilibrium and inefficiency bound analysis

  • Braat, Jac
  • Hamers, Herbert
  • Klijn, Flip
  • Slikker, Marco
For single decision maker optimization problems that lack time efficient algorithms to determine the optimum, there is a need for heuristics. In the context of coordinated production planning, the seminal paper of Graham (1969) provided a performance analysis of heuristics and obtained a bound in relation to the centralized optimum. This paper introduces a framework that includes a performance analysis of a so-called equilibrium heuristic in the setting of multiple decision maker problems. The framework consists of three steps: a heuristic for each player that leads to a strategy profile, the verification that this strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium, and finally a worst case cost analysis to obtain a bound on the performance of the heuristic in terms of the aggregate cost in the obtained Nash equilibrium in relation to the centralized optimum. We implement our general framework in a setting of sequencing situations with selfish agents, multiple identical machines, and the sum of completion times as cost criterion. We provide a tight upper bound for the performance of our equilibrium heuristic. Simulations show that the equilibrium heuristic generally performs much better than the derived tight upper bound. Finally, the relation with the price of anarchy is discussed., He gratefully acknowledges the hospitality of Tilburg University and an extramural fellowship from CentER. He also gratefully acknowledges financial support from AGAUR-Generalitat de Catalunya (2017-SGR-1359), Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad (ECO2017-88130-P AEI/FEDER, UE), and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Liberté, égalité…religiosité

  • Esteban, Joan
  • Levy, Gilat
  • Mayoral, Laura
We study the effect of religiosity on the political choices over redistribution and the legal restrictions on personal liberties. We assume that the more religious an individual is, (i) the less he enjoys the use of liberties prohibited by his religion; and (ii) the higher the negative externality experienced when others practice those liberties. We show that legal restrictions on liberties has an impact on income inequality. We find that when the religious cleavage in society is large, high intolerance due to negative externalities leads to a political outcome consisting of repression of liberties and relatively low taxes., Joan Esteban and Laura Mayoral gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness Grant, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in RD (SEV-2015-0563) and grant number ECO2015-66883-P, Generalitat de Catalunya project number 2017SGR1359, and the National Science Foundation grant SES-1629370., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Predation, protection, and productivity: a firm-level perspective

  • Besley, Timothy
  • Mueller, Hannes
This paper studies the consequences of predation when firms deploy guard labor as a means of protecting themselves. We build a simple model and combine it with data for 144 countries from the World Bank enterprise surveys, which ask about firm-level experiences with predation and spending on protection. We use the model to estimate the output loss caused by the misallocation of labor across firms and from production to protection. The loss due to protection effort is substantial and patterns of state protection at the micro level can have a profound impact on aggregate output losses. Various extensions are discussed., Mueller acknowledges support from the Ramon y Cajal Programme, the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness Grant number ECO2015-66883-P and through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Intergenerational field transitions in economics

  • Albornoz, Facundo
  • Cabrales, Antonio
  • Hauk, Esther
  • Warnes, Pablo E.
This note documents trends of socialization and intergenerational mobility across research networks (fields) in economics. Using data on advisor–advisee pairs, we find that intergenerational field similarity is more prevalent in larger and successful fields. We then show that researchers who do choose different fields than those of their advisors are more likely to switch to highly demanded fields in the job market. These results are consistent with the equilibrium of a model in which advisors’ have concerns for their advisees’ socialization and production outcomes. We also document a positive relation between field productivity and the median level of co-authorship at the field level, which is consistent with complementaries between socialization and productive efforts., Hauk acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and through CICYT project number ECO2015-67171-P and from the government of Catalonia (2014 SGR 1064)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Firms and labor market inequality: evidence and some theory

  • Card, David
  • Cardoso, Ana Rute
  • Heining, Joerg
  • Kline, Patrick
We synthesize two related literatures on firm-level drivers of wage inequality. Studies of rent sharing that use matched worker-firm data find elasticities of wages with respect to value added per worker in the range of 0.05–0.15. Studies of wage determination with worker and firm fixed effects typically find that firm-specific premiums explain 20% of overall wage variation. To interpret these findings, we develop a model of wage setting in which workers have idiosyncratic tastes for different workplaces. Simple versions of this model can rationalize standard fixed effects specifications and also match the typical rent-sharing elasticities in the literature., Ana Rute Cardoso acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in Research and Development grant SEV-2015-0563) and the Research Council of Norway (Europe in Transition funding scheme project 227072/F10 at the Centre for the Study of Equality, Social Organization, and Performance)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Institutions, volatility, and investment

  • Besley, Timothy
  • Mueller, Hannes
Countries with strong executive constraints have lower growth volatility but similar average growth to those with weak constraints. This paper argues that this may explain the relationship between executive constraints and inflows of foreign investment. It uses a novel dataset of Dutch sector-level investments between 1983 and 2012 to explore this issue. It formulates an economic model of investment and uses data on the mean and variance of productivity growth to explain the relationship between investment inflows and executive constraints. The model can account for the aggregate change in inflows when strong executive constraints are adopted in terms of the reduction in the volatility in productivity growth. The data and model together suggest a natural way of thinking about country-level heterogeneity in investment inflows following the adoption of strong executive constraints., Both authors thank the IGC for financial support. Mueller acknowledges financial support from the Ramon y Cajal programme, the MINECO/FEDER through project ECO2015-66883-P and the MINECO through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D ( SEV-2015-0563)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

Coalitional bargaining with consistent counterfactuals

  • Burguet, Roberto
  • Caminal, Ramón
Trabajo presentado en la 17th SAET Conference on Current Trends in Economics, celebrada en Faro, Portugal del 25 al 30 de junio de 2017.-- Trabajo presentado en el 41 Simposio de la Asociación Española de Economía, celebrado en Bilbao, del 14 al 17 de diciembre de 2016.-- Trabajo presentado en el EEA Esem (2017): (32ne Annual Congress of the European Economic Association & 70th European Meeting of the Econometric Society), celebrado en Lisboa del 21 al 25 de agosto de 2017, We propose a new solution concept for TU cooperative games in characteristic function form, the SCOOP, that builds on the symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS), adding to it a consistency requirement for negotiations inside every coalition. The SCOOP speciÖes the probability of success and the payo§s to each coalition. Players share the surplus of a coalition according to the NBS, with disagreement payo§s that are computed as the expectation of payo§s in other coalitions, using some common probability distribution, which in turn is derived from the prior distribution. The predicted outcome can be probabilistic or deterministic, but only an e¢ cient coalition can succeed with probability one. We discuss necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an e¢ cient solution. In either case, the SCOOP always exists, is generically unique for superadditive games, and easy to compute. Moreover, in the spirit of the Nash program, we propose a reasonable non-cooperative protocol whose stationary equilibrium identiÖes the SCOOP as the limit equilibrium outcome, We acknowledge the support of the Spanish Ministry of Finance, Industry, and Competitiveness (ECO2017-88129-P, and Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D, SEV-2015-0563) and Generalitat de Catalunya (2017-SGR1136)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Preference shock and party consistency

  • Aragonés, Enriqueta
Trabajo presentado en el 41 Simposio de la Asociación Española de Economía, celebrado en Bilbao, del 14 al 17 de diciembre de 2016, I develop a two party electoral competition model in order to analyze the effects of an exogenous preference shock on the strategic policy choice of parties. I find that on the one hand, if the preference shock affects the issue that is currently most salient, then both parties strategically shift their policy choices in the direction of the shock, however the shifts are asymmetric: the policy shift of the party that is most favored by the preference shock is smaller. On the other hand, if the preference shock affects an issue that was not the most salient before and becomes salient because of the shock itself, then both parties strategically shift their policy choices towards the ideal point of the median voter of that issue. And again, the parties policy shift is asymmetric: the reaction of the party that is most favored by the preference shock is smaller. Finally, I show that the effects of a large policy shift that some parties perform when they are optimally reacting to a voters’ preference shocks may break the party’s internal equilibrium among its different factions, implying that exogenous preference shocks may cause important chanegs in a pary system, Aragones acknowledges financial support by the Generalitat de Catalunya Grant number 2014 SGR 1064, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness ECO2015-67171-P and the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics through SEV-2015-0563., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

Market interaction and efficient cooperation

  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Riedl, Arno
Reviesed version: May 2018 (December 2015), We experimentally study causal effects of competitive market experience on efficiency levels attained in a subsequent social dilemma. We compare behavior of pairs of traders who have been market-winners with that of pairs who have been marketlosers. We study both the cases where traders interacting in the social dilemma have competed with each other in the market before and where traders do not have a shared market experience. Shared market experience adversely affects efficiency in the social dilemma for both market-winner and market-loser pairs. Market-winners achieve higher efficiency levels in the social dilemma only if market experience is not shared., The authors thank the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness through grant ECO2014-59302-P and through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV2015-0563), the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2014 SGR 510) and the Antoni Serra Ramoneda Research Chair (UAB-Catalunya Caixa) for financial support., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

Targeted advertising and costly consumer search

  • Burguet, Roberto
  • Petrikaité, Vaiva
Trabajo presentado en el 87th SEA (Southern Economic Association) Annual Meeting, celebrada en Tampa, Florida, del 17 al 19 de noviembre de 2017, We study a model of advertising targeting based on information about the consumer’s likely ranking of products. With horizontally differentiated goods and costly search, ads then convey to consumers a noisy, positive signal of their unknown willingness to pay for the firms’ products. That implies a higher expected willingness to pay for a yet not sampled firm, which increases the incentives to search, but also a lower expected differentiation of the products that the consumers learn about, which reduces the incentives to search. The first effect is more important for lower search costs, and the second for larger number of products. Also, the equilibrium intensity of advertising will affect the precision of consumers’ information. Larger marginal cost of advertising results in larger endogenous segmentation and larger prices., The authors acknowledge the financial support of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563), grants No. ECO2014-59959-P and No. ECO2015-74328-JIN (AEI/FEDER/UE), and 2016 FBBVA grant “Innovación e Información en la Economía Digital”., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

Government debt management: the long and the short of it

  • Faraglia, Elisa
  • Marcet, Albert
  • Oikonomou, Rigas
  • Scott, Andrew
Trabajo presentado en el 8th Shanghai Macroeconomics Workshop, celebrado en Shanghai (China), del 17 al 19 de junio de 2017.--Trabajo presentado en el Government Debt: Constraints and Choices, organizado por la Universidad de Chicago durante los días 21 y 22 de abril de 2017.--This version: October 2018 (November 2014), Standard optimal Debt Management (DM) models prescribe a dominant role for long bonds and advocate against issuing short bonds. They require very large positions in order to complete markets and assume each period that governments repurchase all outstanding bonds and reissue ( r/r ) new ones. These features of DM are inconsistent with US data. We introduce incomplete markets via small transaction costs which serves to make optimal DM more closely resemble the data : r/r are negligible, short bond issuance substantial and persistent and short and long bonds positively co-vary. Intuitively long bonds help smooth taxes over states and short bonds over time. Solving incomplete market models with multiple assets is challenging so a further contribution of this paper is introducing a novel computational method to find global solutions., Faraglia gratefully acknowledges support from the Cambridge Endowment of Research in Finance (CERF), Marcet from Plan Nacional (Spanish Ministry of Science), Monfispol, AGAUR (Generalitat de Catalunya), the Axa Foundation, the Excellence Program of Banco de Espa˜na, European Research Council under the EU 7th Framework Programme (FP/2007-2013) Advanced ERC Grant Agreement n. 324048 - APMPAL and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and Scott from the ESRCs World Economy and Finance program., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

Optimal debt maturity and firm investment

  • Jungherr, Joachim
  • Schott, Immo
Trabajo presentado en el ADEMU Summer School celebrado en Toulousse, los días 19 y 20 de junio de 2017.--, Trabajo presentado en el EUI Macro Working Group, organizado por el Departamento de Económicas del European University Institute (Italia), el 16 de febrero de 2017, This paper introduces a maturity choice to the standard model of firm financing and investment. Long-term debt renders the optimal firm policy time-inconsistent. Lack of commitment gives rise to debt dilution. This problem becomes more severe during downturns. We show that cyclical debt dilution generates the observed counter-cyclical behavior of default, bond spreads, leverage, and debt maturity. It also generates the pro-cyclical term structure of corporate bond spreads. Debt dilution renders the equilibrium outcome constrained-inefficient: credit spreads are too high and investment is too low. In two policy experiments we find the following: (1) an outright ban of long-term debt improves welfare in our model economy, and (2.) debt dilution accounts for 84% of the credit spread and 25% of the welfare gap with respect to the first best allocation., Joachim Jungherr is grateful for financial support from the ADEMU project funded by the European Union (Horizon 2020 Grant 649396), from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and through Grant ECO2013-48884-C3-1P, and from the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant 2014 SGR 1432)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

Liberté, Égalité, ... Religiosité

  • Esteban, Joan
  • Levy, Gilat
  • Mayoral, Laura
In this paper we study the effect of religiosity on the political choices over redistribution and over the legal restrictions on personal liberties. Religious teachings generally restrict individual behavior on issues such as consumption of some goods, sexual orientation, divorce, abortion, gay marriage, contraception and so on. We assume that the more religious an individual is, (i) the less he enjoys the use of liberties prohibited by his religion; and (ii) the higher the negative externality experienced when others in society practice those liberties beyond what he deems adequate. The first assumption implies that, when the law allows for the use of liberties, secular individuals have a higher incentive to work than religious ones. As a result, the political choice of legal restrictions on liberties has an impact on income inequality. The second implies that religious individuals may prefer to repress liberties in society. As repression of liberties reduces income inequality, poor religious individuals may still prefer low taxes compared with richer and less religious ones. We also analyze the choice of redistribution and the legal cap on liberties as the majoritarian outcome in a citizen-candidate model. We obtain that when the majority of the population is religious and the religious cleavage in society is large, high intolerance due to negative externalities leads to a political outcome consisting of repression of liberties and relatively low income taxes., Joan Esteban and Laura Mayoral gratefully acknowledge financial support ´ from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness Grant, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in RD (SEV-2015-0563) and grant number ECO2015 − 66883−P, Generalitat de Catalunya project number 2017SGR1359, and the National Science Foundation grant SES-1629370, Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

Deliberative structures and their impact on voting behavior under social conflict

  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Gerhards, Leonie
  • Mechtenberg, Lydia
Trabajo presentado en el European Workshop on Experimental and Behavioral Economics (EWEBE), organizado por la Universidad de Bologna los días 26 y 27 de mayo de 2017 con el título: The impact of deliberative structures on voting behavio.--Trabajo presentado en los Bilkent Microeconomics Seminars organizados por la Bilkent University (Ankara, Turkey) el día 29 de noviembre de 2017, Inequalities in democracies are multi-faceted. They not only incorporate differences in economic opportunities, but also differences in access to information and social influence. In a lab experiment, we study the interaction of these inequalities to provide a better understanding of socio-political tensions in modern societies. We identify the tragedy of the elite, the dilemma that privileged access to information about a fundamental state that mediates political conflict creates lying incentives for the better informed. In our experiment, an electorate consists of two groups, one informed and one uninformed about an uncertain state of the world. Incentives depend on this state. Before voting the two groups can communicate. We study four different communication protocols which vary the access to communication channels of the two groups and are meant to represent societies with different degrees of openness. We hypothesize that the deliberative structures affect group identities, preferences, and voting. Our observed outcomes largely coincide with those predicted by our theoretical analysis., The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness through Grant: ECO2017-88130 and through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV2015-0563), the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2017 SGR 1136) and the Antoni Serra Ramoneda (UAB – Catalunya Caixa) Research Chair as well as from the Graduate School of the Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, Universit¨at Hamburg., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

The survival and demise of the state: a dynamic theory of secessions

  • Esteban, Joan
  • Flamand, Sabine
  • Morelli, Massimo
  • Rohner, Dominic
This paper analizes the repeated interaction between groups in a country as a repeated Stackelberg game, where conflict and secession can occur on the equilibrium path owing to commitment problems. If a group out of power is small enough and its contribution to total surplus not too large, then the group in power can always maintain peace with an acceptable offer of surplus sharing for every period. When there is a mismatch between the relative size and the relative surplus contribution of the minority group, conflict can occur. While in the static model secession can occur only as a peaceful outcome, in the infinite horizon game with high discount factor secession may result following costly conflict. We discuss our full characterization of equilibrium outcomes in the light of the available empirical evidence., Joan Esteban gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in RD (SEV-2015-0563) and grant number ECO2015−66883−P, from the Generalitat de Catalunya grant 2017SGR1359, and from National Science Foundation grant SES-1629370. Massimo Morelli wishes to thank the European Research Council, advanced grant 694583. Dominic Rohner is grateful for financial support from the ERC Starting Grant 677595., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Fraud tolerance in optimal crowdfunding

  • Ellman, Matthew
  • Hurkens, Sjaak
Reward-based crowdfunding enables credit-constrained entrepreneurs to raise money to develop and create innovative products. Crowdfunders' low monitoring incentives open the door to fraud. In practice, fraud is surprisingly rare. Strausz (2017) proves that crowdfunding implements the optimal ex post individually ratio- nal mechanism design outcome in an environment with entrepreneurial moral hazard and private cost information. However, ex post individual rationality precludes all crowdfunding unless fraud can be prevented with certainty. Actual crowdfunding tolerates some fraud. We show this (i) generates strictly higher pro ts and welfare, but (ii) cannot implement the optimal ex interim individually rational outcome., We gratefully acknowledge financial support from 2016 FBBVA grant Innovación e Información en la Economía Digital, the Spanish Ministry via the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and grants ECO2017-88129-P (AEI/FEDER, UE) (Ellman) and ECO2015- 67171-P (MINECO) (Hurkens) and the Generalitat de Catalunya via the grant 2017-SGR-1136., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
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Distributional Concerns in Managers’ Compensation Schemes for Heterogeneous Workers: Experimental Evidence

  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Ortiz, José M.
  • Solà, Carles
We present results from three-player experiments aimed at studying distributional concerns in how owner-managers compensate themselves and workers of different productivities and effort costs, as well as their relations to various equity principles. We are also interested in how owner-managers decisions’ are affected by pay secrecy. We use a game in which workers first exert effort and owner-managers then decide on bonuses for themselves and workers. Our design includes four treatments: (1) different productivities of workers with complete information; (2) different productivities of workers with pay secrecy among workers; (3) different effort cost of workers with complete information; and (4) different effort cost of workers with pay secrecy among workers. The equity principles we focus on are ‘production-equity’, higher production leads to higher wage, and ‘effort-cost equity’, higher effort-cost leads to higher wage. Across all treatments about 50% of all manager choices are compatible both with ‘production equity’ and with ‘effort- cost equity’, about 20% only with production equity and about 15% only with effort-cost equity. Overall, the effect of effort-cost equity is significantly stronger than that of production-equity. Pay secrecy does not significantly affect compensation differences among workers., The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Grant: ECO2017-88130), the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV2015-0563) the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2017 SGR 1136).and the Antoni Serra Ramoneda (UAB – Catalunya Caixa) Research Chair, Peer reviewed
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Constrained allocation of projects to heterogeneous workers with preferences over peers

  • Klijn, Flip
We study the problem of allocating projects to heterogeneous workers. The simultaneous execution of multiple projects imposes constraints across project teams. Each worker has preferences over the combinations of projects in which he can potentially participate and his team members in any of these projects. We propose a revelation mechanism that is Pareto-efficient and group strategy-proof (Theorem 1). We also identify two preference domains on which the mechanism is strongly group strategy-proof (Theorem 2). Our results subsume results by Monte and Tumennasan (2013) and Kamiyama (2013) ., Agència de Gestió d’Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca, (Grant / Award Number: ’2014-SGR-1064’) Aix-Marseille School of Economics, (Grant / Award Number: ) Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, (Grant / Award Number: ’ECO2014-59302-P’) Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D, (Grant / Award Number: ’SEV-2015-0563’)
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Implementation of optimal schedules in outsourcing with identical suppliers

  • Hamers, Herbert
  • Klijn, Flip
  • Slikker, Marco
This paper deals with decentralized decision-making situations in which firms outsource production orders to multiple identical suppliers. Each firm aims to minimize the sum of its completion times. We study whether a central authority can install a mechanism such that strategic interaction leads to a socially optimal schedule. For the case of single demand the shortest-first mechanism implements optimal schedules in Nash equilibrium. We show that for the general case there exists no anonymous mechanism that implements optimal schedules in correlated equilibrium., Financial support from from AGAUR–Generalitat de Catalunya (2014-SGR-1064 and 2017-SGR-1359), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013–2016 (ECO2014-59302-P and ECO2017-88130-P), and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) is also gratefully acknowledged.
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Life Satisfaction, Income Comparisons and Individual Traits

  • Budria, Santi
  • Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Ada
People gain utility from occupying a higher ranked position in the income distribution of the reference group. This paper investigates whether these gains depend on an individual's set of personality and affective traits. Using the 2000 to 2013 waves of the German Socio-economic Panel dataset (SOEP), a subjective question on Life Satisfaction, and three different measures of personal and affective traits, we find significant and robust differences across groups and conclude that traits determine the relationship between rank and life satisfaction. The heterogeneity on the importance of income comparisons is relevant, for example, when building economic models, predicting individuals' behavior, or making welfare judgments., Santiago Budria acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through grants ECO2012‐33993 and ECO2012‐36480, and by the Fundación Ramón Areces (Research Project: Determinants of social exclusion and recommendations for combating it); and Ada Ferrer‐i‐Carbonell acknowledges support from the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness Grant through project grant ECO2014‐59302‐P and SeveroOchoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV‐2015‐0563).
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Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Long-Term Impact of Minimum Wages on Workers’ Careers: Evidence from Two Decades of Longitudinal Linked Employer–Employee Data

  • Cardoso, Ana Rute
We analyze the impact of high youth minimum wages, relying on two decades of linked employer–employee data and a major law change. Alternative treatment/control groups follow from two strands of the literature, one tracking low-skilled workers employed before the law change, who are eligible for a large wage increase, and one tracking the employment of full cohorts, whether working or in school when the law changed. High minimum wages led to a short-term wage gain, which faded over time. They did not jeopardize employment prospects. Changes in the hours worked by part-time workers point to increased job attachment., I acknowledge the support of the Spanish Ministry of the Economy (Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D, SEV20150563), the AEI‐Spain, and FEDER‐UE (grant ECO2016‐76734‐P).
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Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Occupational Choice with Endogenous Spillovers

  • Albornoz, Facundo
  • Cabrales, Antonio
  • Hauk, Esther
This article is part of a substantial revision of the paper circulated under the title ‘Targeted socialization and production’, We study a model that integrates productive and socialising efforts with occupational choice, and endogenous spillovers. We show that more talented individuals work harder and contribute more to externalities, but also have incentives to segregate. Average socialising increases the productivity of the occupation. The size of an occupation grows with its synergies. Individuals underinvest in productive and socialising effort, and sort themselves inefficiently into occupations. We derive the optimal subsidy for sorting into different occupations. Finally, we derive a rule to identify overpopulated sectors and establish the connection between inequality of talents, socialising, productive efforts and occupation size., Hauk acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and through La Comisión Interministerial de Ciencia y Tecnología (CICYT) project number ECO2015-67171-P (MINECO/FEDER) and from the government of Catalonia (2014 SGR 1064).
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Optimal crowdfunding design

  • Ellman, Matthew
  • Hurkens, Sjaak
This paper characterizes profit- and welfare-maximizing reward-based crowdfunding, defined by an aggregate funding threshold for production. We disentangle crowdfunding's selling and funding roles, locating its key benefit in its market test role of adapting production to demand. Multiple prices prove necessary for effective learning and adaptation, even with relatively large crowds. Mechanism design proves general optimality in our baseline and shows the value of limiting reward quantities. Funding is not fundamental and crowdfunding may even complement traditional finance. We characterize welfare consequences, model price dynamics and identify platform designs and regulations that enhance innovation and social benefits., Financial support from the 2016 FBBVA grant “Innovación e Información en la Economía Digital”, the Net Institute grant 14-21 (www.Netinst.org), the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563), Spanish ministerial grants (ECO2017-88129-P (MCIU/AEI/FEDER, UE), Ellman, and PGC2018-097898-B-100 (MCIU/AEI/FEDER, UE), Hurkens) and Generalitat de Catalunya (2017 SGR 1136) is gratefully acknowledged.
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Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Personal liberties, religiosity, and effort

  • Esteban, Joan
  • Levy, Gilat
  • Mayoral, Laura
This paper results from the reorganisation of our previous work “Liberty, Equality, Religiosity” into two papers: Esteban, Levy and Mayoral (2018) and this one., In this paper, we study the role of religiosity in influencing the choice of labor effort. Many religions promote restrictions on personal liberties such as divorce, abortion, gender parity, or gay marriage, often regulated by law. We assume that the higher the degree of religiosity of an individual, the less he enjoys such personal liberties, and the less he likes to be in a society which allows them, while seculars enjoy such liberties. By standard consumer theory, the differential valuation induced by religiosity influences individual decisions on other dimensions as well, notably labour supply. We show empirically that this nexus holds and that the size of the effect is large. Specifically, we construct an index of personal liberties and find solid evidence in support of the joint effect of religiosity and liberties on labor effort. Our empirical results indicate that religiosity interacted with the legal level of liberties has a significant and strong negative effect on labor supply and that increases in the cap on liberties have a negative effect on the labor supply of the religious individuals and positive for the secular., The research leading to these results has received funding from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities, grant PGC 2018-096133-B-100 MCIU/AEI/FEDER-UE, the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563), the Generalitat de Catalunya grant 2017SGR1359, the National Science Foundation grant SES-1629370 and La Caixa Foundation project grant CG 2018- 03.
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Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Self-fulfilling runs and endogenous liquidity creation

  • Rivero Leiva, David
  • Rodríguez Mendizábal, Hugo
This paper incorporates endogenous money creation into the liquidity mismatch problem of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). We characterize a nominal economy where demandable deposits are created through lending. Depositors use sight deposits to buy consumption goods and the banks manage reserves to clear payments and to offset liquidity risk. We show that deposit contracts are suboptimal in terms of liquidity risk-sharing. We also observe that self-fulfilling runs depend on the refinancing rate of the central bank. Our analysis emphasizes the importance of effective lender of last resort policies to prevent expectational banking panics., Rodríguez Mendizábal would like to acknowledge the financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and through grant ECO2016-76734-P (AEI/FEDER, UE) as well as that of the Generalitat de Catalunya through Grant 2017 SGR 1571. He is also grateful for financial support from the ADEMU project, “A Dynamic Economic and Monetary Union”, funded by the European Union's Horizon 2020 Program under grant agreement No 649396.
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment

  • Klijn, Flip
  • Pais, Joana
  • Vorsatz, Marc
In the context of school choice, we experimentally study how behavior and outcomes are affected when, instead of submitting rankings in the student-proposing or school-proposing deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism, students make decisions dynamically, going through the steps of the underlying algorithms. Our main results show that, contrary to theory, (a) in the dynamic student-proposing DA mechanism, students propose to schools respecting the order of their true preferences slightly more often than in its static version while, (b) in the dynamic school-proposing DA mechanism, students react to proposals by always respecting the order and not accepting schools in the tail of their true preferences more often than in the corresponding static version. As a consequence, the dynamic mechanisms outperform their static counterparts in what stability and average payoffs are concerned. In the aggregate, the dynamic school-proposing DA mechanism is the best performing mechanism., He gratefully acknowledges financial support from AGAUR–Generalitat de Catalunya (2014-SGR-1064 and 2017-SGR-1359), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013–2016 (ECO2014-59302-P and ECO2017-88130-P), and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563). She gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia under project reference no. PTDC/IIM-ECO/4546/2014. He gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through project ECO2015-65701-P.
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs

  • Jaramillo, Paula
  • Kayi, Çagatay
  • Klijn, Flip
This paper deals with roommate problems (Gale and Shapley, Am Math Mon 69(1):9–15, 1962) that are solvable, i.e., have a non-empty core (set of stable matchings). We study rank-fairness within pairs of stable matchings and the size of the core by means of maximal and average rank gaps. We provide upper bounds in terms of maximal and average disagreements in the agents’ rankings. Finally, we show that most of our bounds are tight., The first draft of this paper was written while F. Klijn was visiting Universidad del Rosario. He gratefully acknowledges the hospitality of Universidad del Rosario and support from AGAUR-Generalitat de Catalunya (2014-SGR-1064 and 2017-SGR-1359), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013-2016 (ECO2014-59302-P and ECO2017-88130-P), and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563).
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Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The dynamic provision of product diversity under duopoly

  • Caminal, Ramón
This paper builds a dynamic duopoly model to examine the provision of new varieties over time. Consumers experience temporary satiation, and hence higher consumption of the current variety lowers demand for future varieties. The equilibrium can be characterized by a combination of monopolistic pricing and nearly zero profits (competitive timing). In particular, if the cost of producing a new variety is not too low then firms tend to avoid head-to-head competition and set the short-run profit maximizing price. However, firms tend to introduce new varieties as soon as demand has grown sufficiently to cover costs. From a second best perspective, the equilibrium may exhibit excessive product diversity. However, if firms coordinate their frequency of new product introductions, then consumers are likely to be harmed. It is also shown that equilibrium prices are moderated by two factors. First, consumers’ option value of waiting reduces their willingness to pay. Second, competition reduces firms’ incentives to engage in intertemporal price discrimination., I also acknowledge the financial support of the Spanish Ministry of Finance, Industry, and Competitiveness (ECO2017-88129-P, and Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D, SEV-2015-0563) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (2017-SGR-1136).
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Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Are there gender differences in status-ranking aversion?

  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Gërxhani, Klarita
  • Schram, Arthur
Competition involves two dimensions, rivalry for resources and social-status ranking. In our experiment we exclude the first dimension and investigate gender differences in the preference for status ranking. Participants perform a task under non-rivalry incentives. Before doing so, individuals indicate whether they prefer to do the task in an environment with social-status ranking or one without, knowing whether or not the choice will be imposed upon the whole group (as opposed to being personal) and whether the ranking will be observed by a man or a woman. We find no gender difference in mean status-ranking aversion when the ranking is personal. When the ranking is imposed, there are still no gender differences in the preferences for social ranking when the rank observer is a woman, and women are not affected by the rank observer's gender. With a male rank observer, however, men have a much stronger desire to be ranked than with a female rank observer., We thank the EUI (Grant IP53), the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness through (Grant: ECO2017-88130) and through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV2015-0563) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2017 SGR 1136) for financial support.
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Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Improving schools through school choice: An experimental study of deferred acceptance

  • Klijn, Flip
  • Pais, Joana
  • Vorsatz, Marc
In the context of school choice, we experimentally study the student-optimal stable mechanism where subjects take the role of students and schools are passive. Specifically, we study if a school can be better off when it unambiguously improves in the students’ true preferences and its (theoretic) student-optimal stable match remains the same or gets worse. Using first-order stochastic dominance to evaluate the schools’ distributions over their actual matches, we find that schools’ welfare almost always changes in the same direction as the change of the student-optimal stable matching, i.e., incentives to improve school quality are nearly idle., Financial support from AGAUR-Generalitat de Catalunya, Spain (2017-SGR-1359), Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades, Spain (ECO2017-88130-P), and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D, Spain (SEV-2015-0563). Financial support from the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Portugal under project reference no. PTDC/IIM-ECO/4546/2014. Financial support from Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades, Spain (PGC2018-096977-B-I00).
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Market interaction and efficient cooperation

  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Riedl, Arno
We experimentally study causal effects of competitive experience in markets with a short and a long side on efficiency levels attained in a subsequent social dilemma. We find that market experience affects efficiency when traders previously competed in the same market on the same side. The effect is strong for market-loser pairs and also exists for market-winner pairs, albeit to a lesser extent. Cooperation efficiency is unaffected for pairs consisting of a market-winner and a market-loser. When traders did not interact on the same market before, efficiency of cooperation is higher for market-winner pairs, but only in the short run., The authors thank the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness through grant ECO2014-59302-P and through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV2015-0563), the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2014 SGR 510) and the Antoni Serra Ramoneda Research Chair (UAB-Catalunya Caixa) for financial support.
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Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Dominance and competitive bundling

  • Hurkens, Sjaak
  • Jeon, Doh-Shin
  • Menicucci, Domenico
We study how bundling affects competition between two asymmetric multi-product firms. One firm dominates the other in that it produces better products more efficiently. For low (high) levels of dominance, bundling intensifies (relaxes) price competition and lowers (raises) both firms' profits. For intermediate dominance levels, bundling increases the dominant firm's market share substantially, thereby raising its profit while reducing its rival's profit. Hence, the threat to bundle is then a credible foreclosure strategy. We also identify circumstances in which a firm that dominates only in some markets can profitably leverage its dominance to other markets by tying all its products., Hurkens acknowledges financial support from the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness grant number ECO2015-67171-P (MINECO/FEDER) and through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563)
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Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Voter heterogeneity and political corruption

  • Aragonés, Enriqueta
  • Rivas, Javier
  • Tóth, Áron
We show that policies that eliminate corruption can depart from socially desirable policies and this inefficiency can be large enough to allow corruption to live on. Political competition between an honest (welfare maximiser) and corrupt politicians is studied. In our model the corrupt politician is at a distinct disadvantage: there is no asymmetric information, no voter bias and voters are fully rational. Yet, corruption cannot be eliminated when voters have heterogeneous preferences., Aragonès acknowledges financial support by the Generalitat de Catalunya grant number 2017-SGR-1359, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness and FEDER grant number ECO2015-67171-P, and the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics through SEV-2015-0563.
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Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Narrow banking with modern depository institutions: Is there a reason to panic?

  • Rodríguez Mendizábal, Hugo
What would be the effect of imposing a 100 percent reserve requirement to depository institutions? This paper contends that reserves do not compete with loans on the asset side of banks’ balance sheets. Thus, they only affect liquidity provision by banks indirectly through their impact on the cost of loan and deposit creation. This cost could be driven to zero if, as the Eurosystem does, central banks remunerated required reserves at the same rate of their refinancing operations. The paper argues that the crucial constraint imposed by a fully backed banking system is collateral availability by depository institutions., I would like to acknowledge the financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and through grant ECO2016-76734-P (AEI/FEDER, UE) as well as that of the Generalitat de Catalunya through Grant 2017-SGR-1571. I am also grateful for financial support from the ADEMU project, “A Dynamic Economic and Monetary Union,” funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Program under grant agreement no. 649396.
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Government Debt Management: The Long and the Short of It

  • Faraglia, Elisa
  • Marcet, Albert
  • Oikonomou, Rigas
  • Scott, Andrew
Standard optimal Debt Management (DM) models prescribe a dominant role for long bonds and advocate against issuing short bonds. They require very large positions in order to complete markets and assume each period that governments repurchase all outstanding bonds and reissue (r/r) new ones. These features of DM are inconsistent with U.S. data. We introduce incomplete markets via small transaction costs which serves to make optimal DM more closely resemble the data : r/r are negligible, short bond issuance substantial and persistent and short and long bonds positively co-vary. Intuitively, long bonds help smooth taxes over states and short bonds over time. Solving incomplete market models with multiple assets is challenging so a further contribution of this article is introducing a novel computational method to find global solutions., E.F. gratefully acknowledges support from the Cambridge Endowment of Research in Finance (CERF), A.M. from Plan Nacional (Spanish Ministry of Science), Monfispol, AGAUR (Generalitat de Catalunya), the Axa Foundation, the Excellence Program of Banco de España, European Research Council under the EU 7th Framework Programme (FP/2007-2013) Advanced ERC Grant Agreement no. 324048 - APMPAL and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and A.S. from the ESRCs World Economy and Finance program.
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Advice from women and men and selection into competition

  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Rott, Christina
Advice processes are omnipresent in our professional and private lives. We use a laboratory experiment to study how gender and gender matching affect advice giving and how gender matching affects advice following about entry into a real-effort tournament. For advice giving we find that women are less likely than men to recommend tournament entry to advisees than are intermediate performers. Furthermore, women maximize less often the expected earnings of advisees than intermediate performers. For advice following we find that men enter the tournament significantly more often than women in the intermediate-performance group do. Gender matching does not seem to affect advice giving or following. Overall, when it is less clear what the better advice or decision is, gender differences emerge. These results are consistent with findings in other areas that document that gender differences emerge in situations that are more ambiguous., The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Grant: ECO2017-88130), the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV2015-0563) the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2017 SGR 1136) and the Antoni Serra Ramoneda (UAB – Catalunya Caixa) Research Chair., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The stability of multi-level governments

  • Aragonés, Enriqueta
  • Ponsatí, Clara
This paper studies the stability of a multi-level government. We analyze an extensive form game played between two politicians leading two levels of government. We characterize the conditions that render such government structures stable. We also show that if leaders care about electoral rents and the preferences of the constituencies at different levels are misaligned, then the decentralized government structure may be unsustainable. This result is puzzling because, from a normative perspective, the optimality of decentralized decisions via a multi-level government structure is relevant precisely when different territorial constituencies exhibit preference heterogeneity, Aragones acknowledges financial support by the Generalitat de Catalunya grant number 2017-SGR-1359, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness and FEDER grant number ECO2015-67171-P, and the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics through SEV-2015-0563., Peer reviewed
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Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Language-in-education, language skills and the intergenerational transmission of language in a bilingual society

  • Caminal, Ramón
  • Cappellari, Lorenzo
  • Di Paolo, Antonio
We investigate the causal effect of parents’ linguistic skills on the intergenerational language transmission in a bilingual society. We consider the case of Catalonia, where the two main speech communities, Spanish and Catalan, are of similar sizes, and both languages are official, and exploit the natural experiment generated by a language-in-education reform. We discuss theoretically the main alternative channels through which such policies may affect the language parents speak to their children. Empirically, we find that the reform improved oral skills in Catalan among native Spanish speakers. These greater skills increased the propensity to speak Catalan with the offspring, which highlights the intergenerational spillovers overs of the reform. We also show that the effect is not confounded by spurious trends, potential changes in language identity, and linguistically mixed partnership formation., We gratefully acknowledge funding from: Spanish Ministry of Finance, Industry, and Competitiveness ECO2017–88129-P (AEI/FEDER, UE), Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D SEV-2015–0563 and Generalitat de Catalunya 2017-SGR1136 (Caminal); Università Cattolica D32 ESEM strategic research grant (Cappellari); Spanish Ministry of Finance, Industry, and Competitiveness ECO2016–75805-R, RecerCaixa 2016ACUP00020 (Di Paolo).
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Almost mutually best in matching markets: rank gaps and size of the core

  • Klijn, Flip
  • Walzl, Markus
  • Kah, Christopher
This paper studies the one-to-one two-sided marriage model (Gale and Shapley 1962). If agents’ preferences exhibit mutually best (i.e., each agent is most preferred by her/his most preferred matching partner), there is a unique stable matching without rank gaps (i.e., in each matched pair the agents assign one another the same rank). We study in how far this result is robust for matching markets that are “close” to mutually best. Without a restriction on preference profiles, we find that natural “distances” to mutually best neither bound the size of the core nor the rank gaps at stable matchings. However, for matching markets that satisfy horizontal heterogeneity, “local” distances to mutually best provide bounds for the size of the core and the rank gaps at stable matchings., The first draft of this paper was written while F. Klijn was LFUI guest professor at Innsbruck University. He gratefully acknowledges the hospitality of Innsbruck University and support from AGAUR-Generalitat de Catalunya (2017-SGR-1359), Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (ECO2017-88130-P), and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563 and CEX2019-000915-S). C. Kah and M. Walzl thank the Austrian Science Foundation (FWF) for support through project P-28632-G27 and SFB63.
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Otros (Other)

Distaste for Inequality? The Role of Risk Aversion

  • Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Ada
  • Ramos, Xavier
Risk aversion is an important argument to explain why individuals may dislike inequality. However, this relationship has not been empirically tested for large representative samples. Using a representative panel for Germany, we estimate this relationship by linking subjective well-being (a proxy for utility), inequality, and self-reported risk attitudes. The results confirm that risk aversion has a positive effect on dislike for inequality: more risk averse individuals are also more inequality averse. This relationship however is partly driven by other individual characteristics (gender, education, and income) that are correlated with risk attitudes., Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563), from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO2014-59302-P), and the Catalan Government (01414-SGR). Xavier Ramos acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness’ project ECO2016-76506-C4-4-R), and the Catalan Government (SGR2014-1279)., Peer reviewed
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Publicación Contribución de congreso (ConferenceOutput)

Fraud tolerance in optimal crowdfunding

  • Hurkens, Sjaak
  • Ellman, Matthew
Trabajo presentado en el 46th Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics, celebrado en Barcelona (España), del 30 de agosto al 1 de septiembre, Reward-based crowdfunding enables credit-constrained entrepreneurs to raise money to develop and create innovative products. Crowdfunders' low monitoring incentives open the door to fraud. In practice, fraud is surprisingly rare. Strausz (2017) claims that crowdfunding implements the optimal ex post individually rational mechanism design outcome in an environment with entrepreneurial moral hazard and private cost information. However, ex post individual rationality precludes all crowdfunding unless fraud can be prevented with certainty. Actual crowdfunding tolerates some fraud. We show this (i) generates strictly higher prots and welfare, but (ii) cannot implement the optimal ex interim individually rational outcome, We gratefully acknowledge financial support from 2016 FBBVA grant Innovación e Información en la Economía Digital, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness via the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and grants ECO2017-88129-P (Ellman) and ECO2015-67171-P (Hurkens) and the Generalitat de Catalunya via the grant 2017-SGR-1136
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Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Relative deprivation in Tanzania: Relative concerns and empathy

  • Bédhat Atsebi, Jean-Marc
  • Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Ada
This paper examines the importance of relative deprivation in Tanzania, a poor African country, using three waves of the Tanzanian National Panel Survey. We contribute to earlier literature in Africa by controlling for time persistent unobservable individual characteristics (panel data) and, most important, by using two measures of satisfaction (life and financial satisfaction), two definitions of the reference group, and testing different hypothesis. By comparing results between satisfaction measures and across definitions of reference groups we can understand the mechanisms through which comparisons work in a poor setting. In contrast with earlier literature, we find strong evidence of relative deprivation in financial satisfaction of all individuals in Tanzania, and evidence for life satisfaction only for individuals with weaker ties with their community. For those with strong ties (45% of our total sample; 52% of the rural sample), we find evidence of a positive correlation between life satisfaction and the leave-out mean consumption of close neighbors and argue that this can be explained by feelings of empathy. We argue in favor of taking comparisons to others into account when assessing and introducing welfare policies, also in less developed countries., Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D [SEV-2015–0563]; the AEI/FEDER, UE [PID2020–114251GB-I00]; and the AGAUR-Generalitat de Catalunya [SGR2017–1359]. We gratefully acknowledge the comments from two anonymous referees, as well as from Scott Kostyshak, Joan Llull, and the participants of the micro seminar at the University of Florida., Peer reviewed
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Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Centralized Admissions, Affirmative Action and Access of Low-income Students to Higher Education

  • Mello, Úrsula
I analyze how two reforms, introduced to expand college access in Brazil, impacted enrollments of low-SES students. The first policy centralized applications in a nationwide platform (SISU), and the second expanded affirmative action quotas (AA) to a uniform share of 50 percent of vacancies offered by degree. Results show that SISU changes enrollment decisions of high-SES students, crowding out low-SES groups from the least competitive degrees disproportionately. In contrast, AA increases enrollments of low-SES individuals not only mechanically but also through behavioral responses. Finally, their interaction creates a complementary effect, protecting the low-SES groups from the crowding-out of centralization., I acknowledge financial support from the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in RD (SEV2015-0563) and the 2017 SGR 1359 Secretaria d’Universitats i Recerca-Generalitat de Catalunya. Finally, I thank the National Institute for Educational Studies and Research Anísio Teixeira (INEP) for the access to the administrative data from Brazil and the kind help in all the steps of this process., Peer reviewed
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Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Serial Rules in a Multi-Unit Shapley-Scarf Market

  • Biró, Péter
  • Klijn, Flip
  • Pápai, Szilvia
We study generalized Shapley-Scarf exchange markets where each agent is endowed with multiple units of an indivisible and agent-specific good and monetary compensations are not possible. An outcome is given by a circulation which consists of a balanced exchange of goods. We focus on circulation rules that only require as input ordinal preference rankings of individual goods, and agents are assumed to have responsive preferences over bundles of goods. We study the properties of serial dictatorship rules which allow agents to choose either a single good or an entire bundle sequentially, according to a fixed ordering of the agents. We also introduce and explore extensions of these serial dictatorship rules that ensure individual rationality. The paper analyzes the normative and incentive properties of these four families of serial dictatorships and also shows that the individually rational extensions can be implemented with efficient graph algorithms., PBiró gratefully acknowledges the financial support by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Momentum Grant No. LP2021-2, and by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund, OTKA, Grant No. K143858. F. Klijn gratefully acknowledges financial support from AGAUR–Generalitat de Catalunya (2017-SGR-1359) and the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI) through grants ECO2017-88130-P and PID2020-114251GB-I00 (funded by MCIN/ AEI /10.13039/501100011033) and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics, SEV-2015-0563 and CEX2019-000915-S). S. Pápai gratefully acknowledges financial support from an FRQSC grant titled “Formation des coalitions et des réseaux dans les situations économiques et sociales avec des externalités” (SE-144698)
DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
Datos de investigación Set de datos (Dataset)

Data and code for: Centralized Admissions, Affirmative Action and Access of Low-income Students to Higher Education

  • Mello, Úrsula
These files contain the programs and the public data for the journal article: "Centralized Admissions, Affirmative Action and Access of Low-income Students to Higher Education", American Economic Journal: Economic Policy., Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in RD - SEV2015-0563, CEX2019-000915-S); Institute for Economic Analysis (2017 SGR 1359 Secretaria d’Universitats i Recerca-Generalitat de Catalunya), With funding from the Spanish government through the "Severo Ochoa Centre of Excellence" accreditation (CEX2019-000915-S)., Peer reviewed
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Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Immigration, Wages, and Education: A Labour Market Equilibrium Structural Model

  • Llull, Joan
Recent literature analysing wage effects of immigration assumes labour supply is fixed across education-experience cells. This article departs from this assumption estimating a labour market equilibrium dynamic discrete choice model on U.S. micro-data for 1967–2007. Individuals adjust to immigration by changing education, participation, and/or occupation. Adjustments are heterogeneous: 4.2–26.2% of prime-aged native males change their careers; of them, some switch to white-collar careers and increase education by about three years; others reduce labour market attachment and reduce education also by about three years. These adjustments mitigate initial effects on wages and inequality. Natives that are more similar to immigrants are the most affected on impact, but also have a larger margin to adjust and differentiate. Adjustments also produce a self-selection bias in the estimation of wage effects at the lower tail of the distribution, which the model corrects., Financial support from European Research Council through Starting Grant n. 263600, and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through grant ECO2014-59056-JIN, and through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075 and SEV-2015-0563) is gratefully acknowledged., Peer reviewed
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Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Marriage and health: Selection, protection, and assortative mating

  • Guner, Nezih
  • Kulikova, Yuliya
  • Llull, Joan
Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), we analyze the health gap between married and unmarried individuals of working-age. Controlling for observables, we find a gap that peaks at 10% points at ages 55–59 years. The marriage health gap is similar for men and women. If we allow for unobserved heterogeneity in innate health (permanent and age-dependent), potentially correlated with timing and likelihood of marriage, we find that the effect of marriage on health disappears below age 40 years, while about 5% points difference between married and unmarried individuals remains at older ages (55–59 years). This indicates that the observed gap is mainly driven by selection into marriage at younger ages, but there might be a protective effect of marriage at older ages. Exploring the mechanisms behind this result, we find that better innate health is associated with a higher probability of marriage and a lower probability of divorce, and there is strong assortative mating among couples by innate health. We also find that married individuals are more likely to have a healthier behavior compared to unmarried ones. Finally, we find that health insurance is critical for the beneficial effect of marriage., Financial support from European Research Council (ERC) through Starting Grant no. 263600, from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (ECO2013-49357-EXP, ECO2014-59056-JIN, ECO2014-54401-P, and Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D, SEV-2011-0075 and SEV-2015-0563), and from the Generalitat de Catalunya (2017-SGR-1765) is gratefully acknowledged., Peer reviewed
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Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Reprint of: Marriage and health: Selection, protection, and assortative mating

  • Guner, Nezih
  • Kulikova, Yuliya
  • Llull, Joan
Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), we analyze the health gap between married and unmarried individuals of working-age. Controlling for observables, we find a gap that peaks at 10% points at ages 55–59 years. The marriage health gap is similar for men and women. If we allow for unobserved heterogeneity in innate health (permanent and age-dependent), potentially correlated with timing and likelihood of marriage, we find that the effect of marriage on health disappears below age 40 years, while about 5% points difference between married and unmarried individuals remains at older ages (55–59 years). This indicates that the observed gap is mainly driven by selection into marriage at younger ages, but there might be a protective effect of marriage at older ages. Exploring the mechanisms behind this result, we find that better innate health is associated with a higher probability of marriage and a lower probability of divorce, and there is strong assortative mating among couples by innate health. We also find that married individuals are more likely to have a healthier behavior compared to unmarried ones. Finally, we find that health insurance is critical for the beneficial effect of marriage., Financial support from European Research Council (ERC) through Starting Grant no. 263600, from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (ECO2013-49357-EXP, ECO2014-59056-JIN, ECO2014-54401-P, and Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D, SEV-2011-0075 and SEV-2015-0563), and from the Generalitat de Catalunya (2017-SGR-1765) is gratefully acknowledged., Peer reviewed
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Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Minimum working age and the gender mortality gap

  • Bellés-Obrero, Cristina
  • Jiménez-Martín, Sergi
  • Vall-Castelló, Judit
In 1980, a few years after its democratization process, Spain raised the minimum working age from 14 to 16, while the compulsory education age remained at 14. This reform changed the within-cohort incentives to remain in the educational system. We use a difference-in-differences approach, where our treated and control individuals only differ in their month of birth, to analyze the gender asymmetries in mortality generated by this change. The reform decreased mortality at ages 14–29 among men by 6.4% and women by 8.9%, mainly from a reduction in deaths due to traffic accidents. However, the reform also increased mortality for women ages 30–45 by 7%. This is driven by increases in HIV mortality, as well as by diseases related to the nervous and circulatory systems. We show that women’s health habits deteriorated as a consequence of the reform, while this was not the case for men. The gender differences in the impact of the reform on smoking and drinking should be understood in the context of the gender equalization process that affected women were experiencing when the reform took place. All in all, these patterns help explain the narrowing age gap in life expectancy between women and men in many developed countries while, at the same time, they provide important policy implications for middle-income countries that are undergoing those gender equalization processes right now., Jiménez-Martín received financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563), and Bellés-Obrero from the German Research Foundation (DFG) through CRC TR 224 (Project A02), and the project ECO2017-82350-R., Peer reviewed
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Publicación Otros (Other)

The Impact of Immigration on Productivity

  • Llull, Joan
Llull presents a cross-country analysis of the impact of immigration on productivity and employment. Push-distance interactions provide relevant and exogenous variation for identification. Results suggest that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of immigrants in the population reduces GDP per capita by 2%, the employment rate by 0.89 percentage points, and average hours worked conditional on working by 1.28%, whereas it increases the unemployment rate by 0.55 percentage points. Back-of-the-envelope calculations based on a simple production framework provide a structural interpretation. Estimates imply a semi-elasticity of native wages to immigration of −0.7 if the extensive margin of labour supply is ignored (the zeroes of displaced workers are averaged in), and +0.12 on the wages of those who remain working. The effect on immigrant wages is unambiguously negative., This work has been supported by the European Research Council (ERC), through Starting Grant n. 804989, the Generalitat de Catalunya, through the SGR grant 2017-SGR-1765, the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation, and Universities and FEDER, through grant PGC2018-094364-B-I00, and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D, though grant SEV-2015-0563., Peer reviewed
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Intergenerational mobility, measurement and the role of borrowing constraints and inherited tastes

  • Caballé, Jordi|||0000-0003-0253-5634
In this paper, I present some popular measures of mobility in economic outcomes within a family across generations. I also discuss two of the most important factors preventing intergenerational mobility: existence of financially constrained individuals and transmission of tastes from parents to children. Finally, I show how these two factors could give raise to dramatic reversals of fortune affecting successive generations of the same dynasty. I will cast the results of the different models I use in terms of the previous measures of intergenerational mobility
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Private versus social incentives for pharmaceutical innovation

  • González, Paula|||0000-0003-1630-9726
  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
We provide a theoretical framework to contribute to the current debate regarding the tendency of pharmaceutical companies to direct their R&D toward marketing products that are follow-on drugs of already existing drugs, rather than toward the development of breakthrough drugs. We construct a model with a population of patients who can be treated with drugs that are horizontally and vertically differentiated. In addition to a pioneering drug, a new drug can be marketed as the result of an innovative process. We analyze physician prescription choices and the optimal pricing decision of an innovative firm. We also characterize the incentives of the innovative firm to conduct R&D activities, disentangling the quest for breakthrough drugs from the firm effort to develop follow-on drugs. Our results offer theoretical support for the conventional wisdom that pharmaceutical firms devote too many resources to conducting R&D activities that lead to incremental innovations.
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Endogenous matching in university-industry collaboration, theory and empirical evidence from the UK

  • Banal Estañol, Albert
  • Macho Stadler, Inés|||0000-0002-2415-7972
  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
We use a two-sided matching framework to analyze collaboration between heterogeneous academics and firms. We consider both horizontal and vertical characteristics-those related to affinity (e.g., preferences for a type of scientific research) and those related to ability (e.g., capacity to produce high-quality scientific output). We build a unique data set based on the teams of academics and firms that proposed research projects to the UK's Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council. Our results are suggestive of positive assortative matching in terms of ability and type, while the matching is negative assortative in terms of their interactions. The most able and the most applied academics are the ones that are more likely to propose collaborative as opposed to noncollaborative projects.
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On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets

  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
  • Sotomayor, Marilda A. Oliveira
We analyze the manipulability of competitive equilibrium allocation rules for the simplest many-to-many extension of Shapley and Shubik's (Int J Game Theory 1:111-130, 1972) assignment game. First, we show that if an agent has a quota of one, then she does not have an incentive to manipulate any competitive equilibrium rule that gives her her most preferred competitive equilibrium payoff when she reports truthfully. In particular, this result extends to the one-to-many (respectively, many-to-one) models the Non-Manipulability Theorem of the buyers (respectively, sellers), proven by Demange (Strategyproofness in the assignment market game. École Polytechnique, Laboratoire d'Économetrie, Paris, 1982), Leonard (J Polit Econ 91:461-479, 1983), and Demange and Gale (Econometrica 55:873-888, 1985) for the assignment game. Second, we prove a "General Manipulability Theorem" that implies and generalizes two "folk theorems" for the assignment game, the Manipulability Theorem and the General Impossibility Theorem, never proven before. For the one-to-one case, this result provides a sort of converse of the Non-Manipulability Theorem.
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The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer-seller markets when the agents play strategically

  • Pérez Castrillo, David|||0000-0002-1840-7621
  • Sotomayor, Marilda A. Oliveira
We analyze the two-stage games induced by competitive equilibrium rules for the buyer-seller market of Shapley and Shubik (Int J Game Theory 1:111-130, 1972). In these procedures, first sellers and then buyers report their valuation and the outcome is determined by a competitive equilibrium outcome for the market reported by the agents. We provide results concerning buyers and sellers' equilibrium strategies. In particular, our results point out that, by playing first, sellers are able to instigate an outcome that corresponds to the sellers' optimal competitive equilibrium allocation for the true market.
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The theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design. The Nobel Prize in Economics 2012 for Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2012 was awarded jointly to Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley for their contributions to the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design. The theory of stable allocations consists of a family of models that study assignment problems in which two disjoint sets of agents (or a set of agents and a set of objects) have to be matched. For example, men to women, workers to firms, students to schools, or patients to live donor kidneys. A matching is stable if no subset of agents can improved upon their proposed matches by rematching only among themselves. Stability is an essential property if matching is voluntary. The practice of market design consists of applying those two-sided matching models to specific assignment problems with the aim of proposing improvements on how they are solved. This paper presents a brief description of the academic career of the laureates and describes their contributions by presenting the most basic two-sided matching model and some of its market design applications, including the organization of a centralized system to propose kidney transplantations to use kidneys of live donors that are incompatible with their respective patients, the yearly assignment of North-American medical students to hospital internship programs, and children to schools in cities such as Boston and New York. [Contrib Sci 11(1): 103-112 (2015)]
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On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships, Strategy-proofness

  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also the subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We assume that each agent is indifferent between any two alternatives (pairs of final societies and outcomes) provided that the agent does not belong to any of the two final societies, regardless of the chosen outcome. Under this preference domain restriction we characterize the class of all strategy-proof, unanimous and outsider independent rules as the family of all serial dictator rules.
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On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness

  • Catterji, Shurojit
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles. We show that if the rule satisfies in addition tops-onlyness, anonymity and unanimity, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as semilattice single-peakedness). We do so by deriving from the rule an endogenous partial order (a semilattice) from which the concept of a semilattice single-peaked preference can be defined. We also provide a converse of this main finding. Finally, we show how well-known restricted domains under which nontrivial strategy-proof rules are admissible are semilattice single-peaked domains.
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Comparing Voting by Committees According to their Manipulability

  • Arribillaga, R. Pablo|||0000-0002-0521-0301
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We consider the class of voting by committees to be used by a society to collectively choose a subset from a given set of objects. We offer a simple criterion to compare two voting by committees without dummy agents according to their manipulability. This criterion is based on the set-inclusion relationships between the two corresponding pairs of sets of objects, those at which each agent is decisive and those at which each agent is vetoer. We show that the binary relation "to be as manipulable as" endows the set of equivalence classes of anonymous voting by committees (i.e., voting by quotas) with a complete upper semilattice structure, whose supremum is the equivalence class containing all voting by quotas with the property that the quota of each object is strictly larger than one and strictly lower than the number of agents. Finally, we extend the comparability criterion to the full class of all voting by committees.
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On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships, Internal Stability and Consistency

  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also a subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We study the extensions of approval voting, scoring methods and the Condorcet winner to our setting from the point of view of their internal stability and consistency properties.
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Les aportacions de John F. Nash a l'economia, equilibri i negociació

  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
John F. Nash va rebre el Premi Nobel d'Economia l'any 1994, juntament amb John C. Harsanyi i Reinhard Selten, «per les seves anàlisis de l'equilibri en la teoria dels jocs no cooperatius», i el Premi Abel de Matemàtiques l'any 2015, juntament amb Louis Nirenberg, «per les seves contribucions notables i fonamentals a la teoria d'equacions en derivades parcials no lineals i les seves aplicacions a l'anàlisi geomètrica». Aquest article presenta les dues contribucions més importants de Nash a l'economia: l'equilibri de Nash d'un joc no cooperatiu i la solució de Nash al problema de la negociació.
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Intergenerational Mobility under Education-Effort Complementarity

  • Alonso Carrera, Jaime|||0000-0001-8525-7769
  • Caballé, Jordi|||0000-0003-0253-5634
  • Raurich, Xavier|||0000-0002-5210-1909
We build a model that, according to the empirical evidence, gives rise to oscillations in wealth within a dynasty while keeping intergenerational persistence in education attainment. We propose a mechanism based on the interaction between wealth and e§ort as suggested by the Carnegie conjecture, according to which wealthier individuals devote less e§ort in their job occupations than poorer. Oscillations in wealth arise from changes in the occupation chosen by di§erent generations of the same dynasty as a response to both inherited wealth and college premium. Our mechanism generates a rich social stratiÖcation with several classes in the long run due to the combination of di§erent levels of education and occupation types. Furthermore, we generate a large mobility in wealth among classes even in the long run. Our model highlights the role played by the minimum cost on education investment, the borrowing constraints, and the complementarity between education and occupational e§ort.
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Education outcomes and the labor market

  • Obiols Homs, Francesc|||0000-0003-2316-0288
  • Sanchez Marcos, Virginia
The quality of education appears to be negatively correlated with both the overeducation of workers at the tasks they perform and the unemployment rate across EU-15 countries, and positively correlated with the wage premium associated to tertiary education. We develop a model of the labor market with frictions to quantitatively investigate the impact of the education outcomes on the labor market. We show that both the ability of educated and non educated workers have sizable effects on the incentives of firms regarding the type of vacancies they open and also regarding the incentives of educated workers as of where to search for a job. Therefore education outcomes are relevant to understand the overeducation phenomena observed in the labor market. According to our quantitative analysis had the quality of education observed in Spain been similar to the European average then the overeducation rate would have been between 5 and 10 percentage points lower and the unemployment rate of the two types of workers would be reduced by 40%, but the tertiary education wage premium would be slightly smaller than in the benchmark economy.
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On the effects of ranking by unemployment duration

  • Preugschat, Edgar|||0000-0003-0245-7023
  • Fernández-Blanco, Javier|||0000-0001-6788-5032
We propose a theory based on the firm's hiring behavior that rationalizes the observed significant decline of callback rates for an interview and exit rates from unemployment and the mild decline of reemployment wages over unemployment duration. We build a directed search model with symmetric incomplete information on worker types and non-sequential search by firms. Sorting due to firms' testing of applicants in the past makes expected productivity fall with duration, which induces firms to rank applicants by duration. In equilibrium callback and exit rates both fall with unemployment duration. In our numerical exercise using U.S. data we show that our model can replicate quite well the observed falling patterns, with the firm's ranking decision accounting for a sizable part.
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Worker turnover and unemployment insurance

  • Choi, Sekyu
  • Fernández-Blanco, Javier|||0000-0001-6788-5032
This article studies a competitive search model of the labor market with learning about match-specific productivity in which risk-averse workers factor present and future unemployment risks in their search decisions. We examine internally efficient equilibrium allocations in which match termination occurs only if the joint value of a worker-firm pair is negative. Internal efficiency poses a trade-off between present and future risks. Public insurance provision also affects this trade-off and, hence, worker turnover and job composition. In addition to unemployment benefits, the implementation of the planner's allocation requires a negative income tax and a 0 layoff tax.
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A generalization of the strong Fitzpatrick inequality

  • Elias, Leonardo M.
  • Martínez Legaz, Juan Enrique|||0000-0002-6845-6202
We present a generalization of the strong Fitzpatrick inequality in the context of reflexive Banach spaces, involving a twisted bigger conjugate function. We also introduce a related family of gap functions for maximal monotone inclusion problems.
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Weakly Motzkin Predecomposable Sets

  • Martínez Legaz, Juan Enrique|||0000-0002-6845-6202
  • Todorov, M. I.
We introduce and study the class of weakly Motzkin predecomposable sets, which are those sets in R n that can be expressed as the Minkowski sum of a bounded convex set and a convex cone, none of them being necessarily closed. This class contains that of Motzkin predecomposable sets, for which the bounded components are compact, which in turn contains the class of Motzkin decomposable sets, for which the bounded components are compact and the conic components are closed.
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A general nonconvex multiduality principle

  • Bonenti, Francesca
  • Martínez Legaz, Juan Enrique|||0000-0002-6845-6202
  • Riccardi, Rossana
We introduce a (possibly infinite) collection of mutually dual nonconvex optimization problems, which share a common optimal value, and give a characterization of their global optimal solutions. As immediate consequences of our general multiduality principle, we obtain Toland-Singer duality theorem as well as an analogous result involving generalized perspective functions. Based on our duality theory, we propose an extension of an existing algorithm for the minimization of d.c. functions, which exploits Toland-Singer duality, to a more general class of nonconvex optimization problems.
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On Bregman-type distances for convex functions and maximally monotone operators

  • Burachik, Regina|||0000-0003-1332-6213
  • Martínez Legaz, Juan Enrique|||0000-0002-6845-6202
Given two point to set operators, one of which is maximally monotone, we introduce a new distance in their graphs. This new concept reduces to the classical Bregman distance when both operators are the gradient of a convex function. We study the properties of this new distance and establish its continuity properties. We derive its formula for some particular cases, including the case in which both operators are linear monotone and continuous. We also characterize all bi-functions D for which there exists a convex function h such that D is the Bregman distance induced by h.
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Should capital flow from rich to poor Countries?

  • Monge-Naranjo, Alejandro
  • Sánchez, Juan M.
  • Santaeulàlia-Llopis, Raül|||0000-0001-6067-2050
  • Sohail, Faisal
Are human and physical capital stocks allocated efficiently across countries? To answer this question, we need to differentiate misallocation from factor intensity differences. We use newly available estimates on factor shares from Monge-Naranjo, Santaeulàlia-Llopis, and Sánchez (2019) to correctly measure the factor shares of physical and human capital for a large number of countries and periods. We find that the global efficiency losses of the misallocation of human capital are much more substantial than those of physical capital, amounting to 40 percent of the world's output. Moreover, contrary to the findings of Monge-Naranjo, Santaeulàlia-Llopis, and Sánchez (2019) for physical capital, the global misallocation of human capital does not seem to be subsiding. We argue that the proper measure of global misallocation requires considering the potential gains of reallocating both physical and human capital. In this case, the implied efficiency loses from misallocation are up to 60 percent of global output. Attaining those gains, contrary to the prominent Lucas paradox (Lucas, 1990), would often require physical capital to flow from poor to rich countries.
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Maturity and school outcomes in an inflexible system, evidence from Catalonia

  • Calsamiglia, Caterina|||0000-0003-2079-7179
  • Loviglio, Annalisa|||0000-0002-6078-7234
The existence of a rigid cutoff date which determines when children start primary school creates a large heterogeneity in students' level of maturity within the classroom. We use rich administrative data of the universe of public schools in Catalonia to show that: (1) relatively younger children do significantly worse both in tests administered at the school level and at the regional level, and they experience greater retention. (2) These effects are homogeneous across SES and significant across the whole distribution of performance. (3) Younger children in our data exhibit higher dropout rates and choose the academic track in secondary school less often. (4) Younger children are more frequently diagnosed with learning disorders.
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Robust design in monotonic matching markets, a case for firm-proposing deferred-acceptance

  • Ehlers, Lars|||0000-0002-9521-9931
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We study two-sided matching markets among workers and firms. Workers seek one position at a firm but firms may employ several workers. In many applications those markets are monotonic: leaving positions unfilled is costly as for instance, for hospitals this means not being able to provide full service to its patients. A huge literature has advocated the use of stable mechanisms for clearinghouses. The interests among workers and firms are polarized among stable mechanisms, most famously the firm-proposing DA and the worker-proposing DA. We show that for the firmproposing DA ex-ante incentive compatibility and ex-post incentive compatibility are equivalent whereas this is not necessarily true for the worker-proposing DA. The firm-proposing DA turns out to be more robust than the worker-proposing DA under incomplete information when incentives of both sides of the market are important.
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Automation and sectoral reallocation

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Foundations of pseudomarkets, walrasian equilibria for discrete resources

  • Miralles, Antonio|||0000-0001-8146-2140
  • Pycia, Marek
We study the assignment of discrete resources in a general model encompassing a wide range of applied environments, such as school choice, course allocation, and refugee resettlement. We allow single-unit and general multi-unit demands and any linear constraints. We prove the Second Welfare Theorem for these environments and a strong version of the First Welfare Theorem. In this way, we establish an equivalence between strong efficiency and decentralization through prices in discrete environments. Showing that all strongly efficient outcomes can be implemented through pseudomarkets, we provide a foundation for using pseudomarkets in market design.
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Ordinal relative satisficing behavior, theory and experiments

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Neme, Alejandro
We propose a notion of r-rationality, a relative version of satisficing behavior based on the idea that, for any set of available alternatives, individuals choose one of their r-best according to a single preference. We fully characterize the choice functions satisfying the condition for any r, and provide an algorithm to compute the maximal degree of r-rationality associated with any given choice function. The notion is extended to individuals whose r may vary with the set of available alternatives. We provide experimental evidence that the predictive power of our theory, measured by Seltenís index, improves upon that of alternative ones.
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Immigration, wages, and education, a labour market equilibrium structural model

  • Llull Cabrer, Joan|||0000-0002-5250-242X
Recent literature analysing wage effects of immigration assumes labour supply is fixed across education-experience cells. This article departs from this assumption estimating a labour market equilibrium dynamic discrete choice model on U.S. micro-data for 1967-2007. Individuals adjust to immigration by changing education, participation, and/or occupation. Adjustments are heterogeneous: 4.2-26.2% of prime-aged native males change their careers; of them, some switch to white-collar careers and increase education by about three years; others reduce labour market attachment and reduce education also by about three years. These adjustments mitigate initial effects on wages and inequality. Natives that are more similar to immigrants are the most affected on impact, but also have a larger margin to adjust and differentiate. Adjustments also produce a self-selection bias in the estimation of wage effects at the lower tail of the distribution, which the model corrects.
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Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Berga, Dolors|||0000-0002-4873-7904
  • Moreno, Bernardo|||0000-0003-0651-4427
We study mechanisms that operate in interdependent values environments. We show that when defined on knit and strict environments, only constant mechanisms can be ex post incentive compatible. Knitness is also necessary for this result to hold for mechanisms with two alternatives in the range. For partially knit and strict environments, we prove that ex post incentive compatibility extends to groups, and that strategy-proofness implies strong group strategy-proofness in the special case of private values. The results extend to mechanisms operating on non-strict domains under an additional requirement of respectfulness. We discuss examples of environments where our theorems apply.
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Daunou's voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • Bossert, Walter
  • Suzumura, Kotaro
Pierre Daunou, a contemporary of Borda and Condorcet during the era of the French Revolution and active debates on alternative voting rules, proposed a rule that chooses the strong Condorcet winner if there is one, otherwise eliminates Condorcet losers and uses plurality voting on the remaining candidates. We characterize his rule which combines potentially conflicting desiderata of majoritarianism by ordering them lexicographically. This contribution serves not just to remind ourselves that a 19th-century vintage may still retain excellent aroma and taste, but also to promote a promising general approach to reconcile potentially conflicting desiderata by accommodating them lexicographically.
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Order-k rationality

  • Barberà, Salvador|||0000-0001-6586-2398
  • de Clippel, Geoffroy
  • Neme, Alejandro
  • Rozen, Kareen
A decision maker (DM) may not perfectly maximize her preference over the feasible set. She may feel it is good enough to maximize her preference over a sufficiently large consideration set; or just require that her choice is sufficiently well-ranked (e.g., in the top quintile of options); or even endogenously determine a threshold for what is good enough, based on an initial sampling of the options. Heuristics such as these are all encompassed by a common theory of order-k rationality, which relaxes perfect optimization by only requiring choices from a set S to fall within the set's top k(S) elements according to the DM's preference ordering. Heuristics aside, this departure from rationality offers a natural way, in the classic 'as if' tradition, to gradually accommodate more choice patterns as k increases. We characterize the empirical content of order-k rationality (and related theories), and provide a tractable testing method which is comparable to the method of checking SARP
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Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous

  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We study individually rational rules to be used toallot, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisiblegood that is freely available only in whole units. Arule is individually rational if, at each preferenceprofile, each agent finds that her allotment is at leastas good as any whole unit of the good. We study andcharacterize two individually rational and efficientfamilies of rules, whenever agents' preferences aresymmetric single-peaked on the set of possibleallotments. Rules in the two families are in additionenvy-free, but they differ on whether envy-freeness isconsidered on losses or on awards. Our main resultstates that (a) the family of constrained equal lossesrules coincides with the class of all individuallyrational and efficient rules that satisfy justified envy-freeness on losses and (b) the family of constrainedequal awards rules coincides with the class of all in-dividually rational and efficient rules that satisfyenvy-freeness on awards.
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On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness

  • Arribillaga, R. Pablo|||0000-0002-0521-0301
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We characterize the set of all obviously strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. Since obvious strategy-proofness implies strategy-proofness, and the set of strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on this domain coincides with the class of generalized median voter schemes, we focus on this class. We identify a condition on generalized median voter schemes for which the following characterization holds. A generalized median voter scheme is obviously strategy-proof if and only if it satisfies the increasing intersection property. Our proof is constructive; for each generalized median voter scheme that satisfies the increasing intersection property we define an extensive game form that implements it in obviously dominant strategies.
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Regime change in large information networks

  • Milán, Pau|||0000-0003-2879-5792
  • de Martí, Joan
We study global games of regime change within networks of truthful communication. Agents can choose between attacking and not attacking a status quo, whose strength is unknown. Players share private signals on this state of the world with their immediate neighbors. Communication with neighboring players introduces local correlations in posterior beliefs and also allows for the pooling of information. In order to isolate the latter effect, we provide, as a methodological contribution, sparseness conditions on networks that allow for asymptotic approximations that eliminate covariances from equilibrium strategies. We ask how changes in the distribution of connectivities in the population affect the types of coordination in equilibrium as well as the likelihood of successful rally. We find that without a public signal strategic incentives align, and the probability of success remains independent of the type of network. With a public signal the distribution of degrees unambiguously affects the probability of success, although the direction of change is not monotone, and depends crucially on the cost of attack.
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Search and matching in the labor market without unemployment insurance

  • Obiols Homs, Francesc|||0000-0003-2316-0288
I study the effect of the market arrangement on competitive allocations in a model in which the distribution of idiosyncratic uncertainty is determined endogenously. The particular application I consider is a search model of the labor market embedded in a general equilibrium model with production and asset accumulation. It is shown that costly search with incomplete markets introduces a wealth effect at low levels of wealth such that poor agents do not search much or even find optimal not to look for a job. The combination of this effect with the usual one at higher wealth levels delivers equilibrium allocations that are remarkably different from the one that obtains under complete markets. I also use numerical methods to obtain quantitative predictions in a calibrated version of the model. The effect of the market arrangement remains dramatically large due to search externalities.
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On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness

  • Bonifacio, Agustín G.
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice singlepeaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the necessary condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. We characterize the class of all such rules on that domain and show that they are deeply related to the supremum of the underlying semilattice structure.
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All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof

  • Arribillaga, R. Pablo|||0000-0002-0521-0301
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
For the division problem with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991) we show that all sequential allotment rules, identified by Barberà, Jackson and Neme (1997) as the class of strategy-proof, efficient and replacement monotonic rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.