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REGLAS DE DECISION COLECTIVA Y ANALISIS DE DISPARIDADES LABORALES

ECO2017-82241-R

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal de I+D+i Orientado a los Retos de la Sociedad
Convocatoria Proyectos I+D+i Retos de Investigación
Año convocatoria 2017
Plan Estatal 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD DE VIGO

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 27
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Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Allocating the costs of cleaning a river: expected responsibility versus median responsibility

  • Alcalde Unzu, Jorge
  • Gómez Rúa, María
  • Molis Bañales, Elena
We consider the problem of cleaning a transboundary river, proposed by Ni and Wang (Games Econ Behav 60:176–186, 2007). A river is modeled as a segment divided into subsegments, each occupied by one region, from upstream to downstream. The waste is transferred from one region to the next at some rate. Since this transfer rate may be unknown, the social planner could have uncertainty over each region’s responsibility. Two natural candidates to distribute the costs in this setting would be the method that assigns to each region its expected responsibility and the one that assigns to each region its median responsibility. We show that the latter is equivalent to the Upstream Responsibility method (Alcalde-Unzu et al. in Games Econ Behav 90:134–150, 2015) and the former is a new method that we call Expected Responsibility. We compare both solutions and analyze them in terms of a new property of monotonicity., Jorge Alcalde-Unzu acknowledges the financial support from the Spanish Government through projects PGC2018-093542-B-I00 and ECO2017-91589-EXP. María Gómez-Rúa acknowledges the financial support from the Spanish Government through projects ECO2014-52616-R and ECO2017-82241-R and the Galician Government through projects GRC 2015/014 and ED431B 2019/34. Elena Molis acknowledges the financial support from the Spanish Government through projects ECO2015-67519-P and PID2019-110783GB-I00, the Basque Government through project IT-568-13 and the Andalusian Government through the projects SEJ1436 and SEJ492.
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Mixed rules in multi-issue allocation situations

  • Bergantiño Cid, Gustavo
  • Chamorro Rivas, Jose María
  • Lorenzo Picado, Leticia
  • Lorenzo Freire, Silvia Maria
Multi-issue allocation situations study problems where an estate must be dividedamong a group of agents. The claim of each agent is a vector specifying the amountclaimed by each agent on each issue. We present a two-stage rule. First, we dividethe estate among the issues following the constrained equal awards rule. Second,the amount assigned to each issue is divided among the agents in proportion to theirdemands on this issue. We apply the rule to two real-world problems: the distributionof natural resources between countries and the distribution of budget for educationand research between universities., Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2014-52616-R, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P, Xunta de Galicia| Ref. ED431G/01 2016-2019, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C2016-015, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. GRC 2015/014, Fundación Séneca de la Región de Murcia | Ref. 19320/PI/14
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

How to apply penalties to avoid delays in projects

  • Bergantiño Cid, Gustavo
  • Lorenzo Picado, Leticia
A planner wants to carry out a project involving several firms. In many cases the planner, for instance the Spanish Administration, includes in the contract a penalty clause that imposes a payment per day if the firms do not complete their activities or the project on time. We discuss two ways of including such penalty clauses in contracts. In the first the penalty applies only when the whole project is delayed. In the second the penalty applies to each firm that incurs a delay even if the project is completed on time. We compare the two penalty systems and find that the optimal penalty (for the planner) is larger in the second method, the utility of the planner is always at least as large or larger in the second case, and the utility of the firms is always at least as large or larger in the first. Surprisingly, the final delay in the project is unrelated to which penalty system is chosen., Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. GRC 2015/014, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. 19320/PI/14, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Fundación Séneca de la Región de Murcia | Ref. 19320/PI/14
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

River flooding risk prevention: A cooperative game theory approach

  • Álvarez Bermúdez, Xana
  • Gómez Rúa, María
  • Vidal Puga, Juan José
Socio-economic development combined with changing hydrological factors represents a challenge for extending flood protection. In particular, land owners should be encouraged to use their land in a way that improves its water retention capacity. However, problems of fairness may arise because a landowner can benefit or lose out depending on the use of other lands. This paper sets out to study the possibility of applying game theory through a cooperative game to solve this problem. Specifically, we look for a sharing rule function to help the planners to distribute the total benefit among landowners, taking into account a principle of stability. We concentrate on enhancing upstream water retention and focus on the role played by forests as natural water retention features. This is a methodological contribution that analyzes land use management for flood retention. Land planners, governments and landowners could use cooperative games as a flood risk management tool. With this method, compensations and benefits could be established to raise awareness and encourage land owners to cooperate., Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2014-52616-R, Ministerio de Economia, Industria y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. 2015/014, CA16209 - Natural Flood Retention on Private Land | Ref. LAND4FLOOD
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The welfare effects of occupational segregation by gender and race: differences across US Regions

  • Alonso Villar, Maria Olga
  • Del Rio Otero, Coral
Using tools rooted in welfare economics, this paper explores the social welfare loss that arises from occupational segregation by gender and race in the US at the regional level. After controlling for characteristics, the losses are lower in the Northeast than in the South and West according to a wide range of indicators, including those that take into account the relative size of disadvantaged groups (incidence), the magnitude of their losses (intensity), and the inequality among those groups. The West has the highest (conditional) losses, although the intensity of the phenomenon barely differs from that in the South or Midwest., Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2016–76506-C4–2-R, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017–82241-R, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431B 2019/34
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Socio‐economic groups moving apart: an analysis of recent trends in residential segregation in Australia's main capital cities

  • Azpitarte Raposeiras, Francisco
  • Alonso Villar, Maria Olga
  • Hugo Rojas, Felipe
We study changes in the spatial distribution and segregation of socio‐economic groups in Australia using a new data set with harmonised census data for 1991 and 2011. We find a general increase in residential segregation by education and occupation groups across the major capital cities in Australia. Importantly, these trends cannot be explained in general by changes in the demographic structure of groups and areas but rather by the rise in the over and underrepresentation of groups across areas. In particular, our analysis reveals clear diverging trends in the spatial configuration of high and low socio‐economic groups as measured by their occupation and education. Whereas high‐skilled groups became more concentrated in the inner parts of cities, the low‐educated and those working in low‐status occupations became increasingly overrepresented in outer areas. This pattern is observed in all five major capital cities, but it is especially marked in Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane., Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431B2019/34, Brotherhood of St Laurence, University of Melbourne, Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Children and Families | Ref. CE140100027
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The folk rule through a painting procedure for minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple sources

  • Bergantiño Cid, Gustavo
  • Navarro Ramos, Adriana
We consider minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple sources. We propose a cost allocation rule based on a painting procedure. Agents paint the edges on the paths connecting them to the sources. We prove that the painting rule coincides with the folk rule., Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (Mexico) | Ref. 438366, Fundación Séneca de la Región de Murcia | Ref. 19320/PI/14, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2014-52616-R, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. GRC 2015/014
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Cooperative and axiomatic approaches to the knapsack allocation problem

  • Arribillaga, R. Pablo
  • Bergantiño Cid, Gustavo
In the knapsack problem a group of agents want to fill a knapsack with several goods. Two issues must be considered. The first is to decide optimally what goods to select for the knapsack. This issue has been studied in many papers in the literature on Operations Research and Management Science. The second issue is to divide the total revenue among the agents. This issue has been studied in only a few papers, and this is one of them. For each knapsack problem we consider three associated cooperative games. One of them (the pessimistic game) has already been considered in the literature. The other two (realistic and optimistic games) are defined in this paper. The pessimistic and realistic games have non-empty cores but the core of the optimistic game could be empty. We then follow the axiomatic approach. We propose two rules: The first is based on the optimal solution of the knapsack problem. The second is the Shapley value of the so called optimistic game. We offer axiomatic characterizations of both rules., Universidad Nacional de San Luis | Ref. 319502, Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas | Ref. PIP 112-200801-00655, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431B 2019/34
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

One-way and two-way cost allocation in hub network problems

  • Bergantiño Cid, Gustavo
  • Vidal Puga, Juan José
We consider a cost allocation problem arising from a hub network problem design. Finding an optimal hub network is NP-hard, so we start with a hub network that could be optimal or not. Our main objective is to divide the maintenance and/or building cost of such network among the nodes. We consider two cases. In the one-way flow case, we assume that the cost paid by a set of nodes depends only on the flow they send to other nodes (including nodes outside the set), but not on the flow they receive from nodes outside. In the two-way flow case, we assume that the cost paid by a set of nodes depends on the flow they send to other nodes (including nodes outside the set) and also on the flow they receive from nodes outside. In both cases, we study the core and the Shapley value of the corresponding cost game., Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2014-52616-R, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431B 2019/34
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Cooperative approach to a location problem with agglomeration economies

  • Bergantiño Cid, Gustavo
  • Navarro Ramos, Adriana
This paper considers agglomeration economies. A new firm is planning to open a plant in a country divided into several regions. Each firm receives a positive externality if the new plant is located in its region. In a decentralized mechanism, the plant would be opened in the region where the new firm maximizes its individual benefit. Due to the externalities, it could be the case that the aggregate utility of all firms is maximized in a different region. Thus, the firms in the optimal region could transfer something to the new firm in order to incentivize it to open the plant in that region. We propose two rules that provide two different schemes for transfers between firms already located in the country and the newcomer. The first is based on cooperative game theory. This rule coincides with the $$\tau$$ τ -value, the nucleolus, and the per capita nucleolus of the associated cooperative game. The second is defined directly. We provide axiomatic characterizations for both rules. We characterize the core of the cooperative game. We prove that both rules belong to the core., Xunta de Galicia | Ref. GED431B 2019/34, Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad, Gobierno de España | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología | Ref. 438366, Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad, Gobierno de España | Ref. PID2020-113440GB-I00
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The role of self and peer assessment in Higher Education

  • Iglesias Pérez, Maria Carmen
  • Vidal Puga, Juan José
  • Pino Juste, Margarita Rosa
Self-assessment and peer assignment have clear advantages for the training of responsible, critical, and reflective professionals. In recent years, self and peer evaluation have also been shown to be even more effective than lecturer evaluation when we assure anonymity through online platforms learning tools. Therefore, self and peer assessments are to become a core aspect of student-centred evaluation processes in Higher Education. In the present work, we compare the formative evaluation from the lecturer with the self and peer assessments through a virtual learning environment. The subject of study if formed by assessments prepared by students in a first-year course in a Social Sciences degree at the Universidade de Vigo, Spain. We find a strong concordance between peer assessment and lecturer assignment, and a moderate agreement between self-assessment and lecturer assignment. These results show that students perform well as peer evaluators, with peer assignment being a procedure with high validity and reliability., Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431B 2019/34, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C 2016/040
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Clique games: A family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value

  • Trudeau, Christian
  • Vidal Puga, Juan José
We introduce a new family of cooperative games for which there is coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value. These so-called clique games are such that agents are divided into cliques, with the value created by a coalition linearly increasing with the number of agents belonging to the same clique. Agents can belong to multiple cliques, but for a pair of cliques, at most a single agent belongs to their intersection. Finally, if two agents do not belong to the same clique, there is at most one way to link the two agents through a chain of agents, with any two non-adjacent agents in the chain belonging to disjoint sets of cliques. We examine multiple games defined on graphs that provide a fertile ground for applications of our results., Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada | Ref. 435-2014-0140, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2014-52616-R, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. GRC 2015/014
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements

  • Valencia Toledo, Alfredo
  • Vidal Puga, Juan José
We consider land rental between a single tenant and several lessors. The tenant should negotiate sequentially with each lessor for the available land. In each stage, we apply the Nash bargaining solution, as a short-cut to solving non-cooperative bargaining games. Our results imply that, when all land is necessary, a uniform price per unit is more favorable for the tenant than a lessor-dependent price. Furthermore, a lessor is better off with a lessor-dependent price only when negotiating first. For the tenant, lessors’ merging is relevant with lessor-dependent price but not with uniform price., Ministry of Education of Peru | Ref. PRONABEC, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2014-52616-R, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431B 2019/34
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Occupational segregation by sexual orientation in the U.S.: exploring its economic effects on same-sex couples

  • Del Rio Otero, Coral
  • Alonso Villar, Maria Olga
This paper examines the importance of the occupational sorting of individuals in same-sex couples in explaining the economic position of lesbian women and gay men beyond controlling for occupation in the estimation of their respective wage gaps, as usually done in the literature. The analysis reveals that the distribution of partnered gay men across occupations brings them a monetary gain, with respect to the average wage of coupled workers, whereas the occupational sorting of partnered lesbian women only allows them to depart from the large losses that straight partnered women have. The results show that when controlling for educational achievements, immigration profile, racial composition, and age structure, the gain for gay men associated with their occupational sorting shrinks substantially. Moreover, the small gain that lesbian women derive from their distribution across occupations turns into an earning disadvantage when one controls for characteristics. This leaves them with a loss, with respect to the average wage of coupled workers, that is not too different from to the one partnered straight women have. It is their higher educational attainments and, to a lower extent, their lower immigration profile that protects workers in same-sex couples, revealing that gay men do not enjoy the privilege of straight partnered men and that lesbian women are not free from the mark of gender., Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. GRC 2015/014
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Stable cores in information graph games

  • Núñez, Marina
  • Vidal Puga, Juan José
In an information graph situation, a finite set of agents and a source are the set of nodes of an undirected graph with the property that two adjacent nodes can share information at no cost. The source has some information (or technology), and agents in the same component as the source can reach this information for free. In other components, some agent must pay a unitary cost to obtain the information. We prove that the core of the derived information graph game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if the information graph is cycle-complete, or equivalently if the game is concave. Otherwise, whether there always exists a stable set is an open question. If the information graph consists of a ring that contains the source, a stable set always exists and it is the core of a related situation where one edge has been deleted., Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431B 2019/34, Generalitat de Catalunya | Ref. 2017SGR778, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2020-113110GB-I00
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Occupational achievements of same-sex couples in the United States by gender and race

  • Del Rio Otero, Coral
  • Alonso Villar, Maria Olga
This article offers a framework that allows for the simultaneous comparison of all sexual orientation–gender–race/ethnicity groups after controlling for characteristics. The analysis suggests that occupations matter in explaining earnings differences among groups. The article also displays the high magnitude of the gender wage gap in an intersectional framework. The sexual orientation wage premium of lesbians is quite small for blacks and much higher for Hispanics and Asians than for whites. For men, departing from the white heterosexual model involves a substantial punishment; the racial penalty is larger for heterosexuals whereas the sexual orientation penalty is greater for whites., Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2016‐76506‐C4‐2‐R, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017‐82241‐R, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431B2019/34
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Aggregator operators for dynamic rationing

  • Moreno Ternero, Juan D.
  • Vidal Puga, Juan José
We study dynamic rationing problems. In each period, a fixed group of agents hold claims over an insufficient endowment. The solution to each of these periods’ problems might be influenced by the solutions at previous periods. We single out a natural family of aggregator operators, which extend static rules (solving static rationing problems) to construct rules to solve dynamic rationing problems., Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431B 2019/34, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-83069-P
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems

  • Valencia Toledo, Alfredo
  • Vidal Puga, Juan José
We consider land rental problems where there are several communities that can act as lessors and a single tenant who does not necessary need all the available land. A rule should determine which communities become lessors, how much land they rent and at which price. We present a complete characterization of the family of rules that satisfy reassignment-proofness by merging and spliting, apart from land monotonicity. We also define two parametric subfamilies. The first one is characterized by adding a property of weighted standard for two-person. The second one is characterized by adding consistency and continuity, Ministerio de Educación, Gobierno de Perú | Ref. 2013-III, Beca Presidente de la República, PRONABEC, Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad, Gobierno de España | Ref. ECO2014-52616-R, Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad, Gobierno de España | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. GRC 2015/014
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Uncertainty in cooperative interval games: how Hurwicz criterion compatibility leads to egalitarianism

  • Mallozzi, Lina
  • Vidal Puga, Juan José
We study cooperative interval games. These are cooperative games where the value of a coalition is given by a closed real interval specifying a lower bound and an upper bound of the possible outcome. For interval cooperative games, several (interval) solution concepts have been introduced in the literature. We assume that each player has a different attitude towards uncertainty by means of the so-called Hurwicz coefficients. These coefficients specify the degree of optimism that each player has so that an interval becomes a specific payoff. We show that a classical cooperative game arises when applying the Hurwicz criterion to each interval game. On the other hand, the same Hurwicz criterion can also be applied to any interval solution of the interval cooperative game. Given this, we say that a solution concept is Hurwicz compatible if the two procedures provide the same final payoff allocation. When such compatibility is possible, we characterize the class of compatible solutions, which reduces to the egalitarian solution when symmetry is required. The Shapley value and the core solution cases are also discussed., Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2014-52616-R, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. GRC 2015/014
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A non-cooperative approach to the folk rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems

  • Hernández, Penélope
  • Peris, Josep E.
  • Vidal Puga, Juan José
This paper deals with the problem of finding a way to distribute the cost of a minimum cost spanning tree problem between the players. A rule that assigns a payoff to each player provides this distribution. An optimistic point of view is considered to devise a cooperative game. Following this optimistic approach, a sequential game provides this construction to define the action sets of the players. The main result states the existence of a unique cost allocation in subgame perfect equilibria. This cost allocation matches the one suggested by the folk rule., Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2016-77200- P, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-87245-R, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021-128228NB-I00, Generalitat Valenciana | Ref. AICO/2021/257, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431B 2019/34
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A review of cooperative rules and their associated algorithms for minimum-cost spanning tree problems

  • Bergantiño Cid, Gustavo
  • Vidal Puga, Juan José
Minimum-cost spanning tree problems are well-known problems in the operations research literature. Some agents, located at different geographical places, want a service provided by a common supplier. Agents will be served through costly connections. Some part of the literature has focused, mainly, in studying how to allocate the connection cost among the agents. We review the papers that have addressed the allocation problem using cooperative game theory. We also relate the rules defined through cooperative games with rules defined directly from the problem, either through algorithms for computing a minimal tree, either through a cone-wise decomposition, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431B 2019/34
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Optimization of tuna fishing logistic routes through information sharing policies: a game theory-based approach

  • Groba Presa, Carlos
  • Sartal Rodríguez, Antonio
  • Bergantiño Cid, Gustavo
The tuna fishing industry's increasing regulatory restrictions on the number of FADs per vessel is forcing companies to rethink their fishing practices to ensure their continued profitability. Despite these expanding constraints, and although many studies have been published on the use of FADs and their implications, to date there has been little research on how to help the tuna fishing industry optimize its procedures. Based on real data and using the game theory approach, we suggest a new collaborative method of employing FADs that involves their use between vessels, and we demonstrate that sharing FADs optimizes the use of fuel and time for entire fleets. Our findings show that, with the correct incentives, all stakeholders, including the company, the skipper, and even the environment, can achieve mutually improved results by sharing information., Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2016-76625-R, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. 2014/021, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. 2015/014, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431B 2019/34
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A characterization of the folk rule for multi-source minimal cost spanning tree problems

  • Bergantiño Cid, Gustavo
  • Navarro Ramos, Adriana
In this paper we provide an axiomatic characterization of the folk rule for minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple sources. The properties we need are: cone-wise additivity, cost monotonicity, symmetry, isolated agents, and equal treatment of source costs., Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (Mexico) | Ref. 438366
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

A non-cooperative approach to the folk rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems

  • Hernández, Penélope
  • Peris, Josep E.
  • Vidal-Puga, Juan
  • Peris, Josep E.|||/items/d36139fb-19ca-47a4-88e2-9503dd0ac04b
This paper deals with the problem of finding a way to distribute the cost of a minimum cost spanning tree problem between the players. A rule that assigns a payoff to each player provides this distribution. An optimistic point of view is considered to devise a cooperative game. Following this optimistic approach, a sequential game provides this construction to define the action sets of the players. The main result states the existence of a unique cost allocation in subgame perfect equilibria. This cost allocation matches the one suggested by the folk rule.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo preliminar (WorkingPaper)

Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous

  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We study individually rational rules to be used to allot, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisible good that is freely available only in whole units. A rule is individually rational if, at each preference profile, each agent finds that her allotment is at least as good as any whole unit of the good. We study and characterize two individually rational and efficient rules, whenever agents' preferences are symmetric single-peaked on the set of possible allotments. The two rules are in addition envy-free, but they differ on wether envy-freeness is considered on losses or on awards. Our main result states that (i) the constrained equal losses rule is the unique individually rational and efficient rule that satisfies justified envy-freeness on losses and (ii) the constrained equal awards rule is the unique individually rational and efficient rule that satisfies envy-freeness on awards.
Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous

  • Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
  • Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
  • Neme, Alejandro
We study individually rational rules to be used toallot, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisiblegood that is freely available only in whole units. Arule is individually rational if, at each preferenceprofile, each agent finds that her allotment is at leastas good as any whole unit of the good. We study andcharacterize two individually rational and efficientfamilies of rules, whenever agents' preferences aresymmetric single-peaked on the set of possibleallotments. Rules in the two families are in additionenvy-free, but they differ on whether envy-freeness isconsidered on losses or on awards. Our main resultstates that (a) the family of constrained equal lossesrules coincides with the class of all individuallyrational and efficient rules that satisfy justified envy-freeness on losses and (b) the family of constrainedequal awards rules coincides with the class of all in-dividually rational and efficient rules that satisfyenvy-freeness on awards.