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OPTIMIZACION Y REPARTO EN PROBLEMAS DE DECISION MULTI-AGENTE CON APLICACIONES EN PROBLEMAS DE RUTAS

MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P

•
Nombre agencia financiadora Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Acrónimo agencia financiadora MINECO
Programa Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Año convocatoria 2014
Plan Estatal 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Unidad de gestión Secretaría de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDADE DA CORUÑA
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329

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Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 14
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Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The Owen and Banzhaf-Owen values revisited

  • Alonso Meijide, José María
  • Casas Méndez, Balbina
  • González Rueda, Ángel Manuel
  • Lorenzo Freire, Silvia
In this work, we consider games with coalitional structure. We afford two new parallel axiomatic characterizations for the well-known Owen and Banzhaf–Owen coalitional values. Two properties are common to both characterizations: a property of balanced contributions and a property of neutrality. The results prove that the main difference between these two coalitional values is that the former is efficient, while the latter verifies a property of 2-efficiency.
Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Subgame perfection and the rule of k-names

  • García Jurado, Ignacio
  • Méndez Naya, Luciano
In this paper we revisit the rule of k names from a game theoretic perspective. This rule can be described as follows. Given a set of candidates for a position, a committee (formed by the proposers) selects k elements of that set using a screening rule; then a single individual from outside the committee (the chooser) chooses for the position one of the k selected candidates. In this context we first give conditions for the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium. Then we provide conditions for the existence of subgame perfect q-strong equilibria when the screening rule is -majoritarian. Finally, we show that when the chooser can strategically appoint a delegate to choose on behalf of him, the conditions for the existence of subgame perfect q-strong equilibria are weaker.
Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Mental equilibrium and strategic emotions

  • Winter, Eyal
  • Méndez Naya, Luciano
  • García Jurado, Ignacio
We model mental states as part of an equilibrium notion. In a mental equilibrium each player “selects” an emotional state that determines the player’s preferences over the outcomes of the game. These preferences typically differ from the players’ material preferences. The emotional states interact to play a Nash equilibrium and, in addition, each player’s mental state must be a best response to the mental states of the others (in the sense of maximizing material payoffs). We discuss the concept behind the definition of mental equilibrium and examine it in the context of some of the most popular games discussed in the experimental economics literature. In particular, our approach allows us to identify the mental states (the psychology) that lead players to play various prominent experimental outcomes. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for mental equilibria to be sustained by material preferences. Finally, we discuss the concept of collective emotions, which is based on the idea that players can coordinate their mental states.
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Mixed rules in multi-issue allocation situations

  • Bergantiño Cid, Gustavo
  • Chamorro Rivas, Jose María
  • Lorenzo Picado, Leticia
  • Lorenzo Freire, Silvia Maria
Multi-issue allocation situations study problems where an estate must be dividedamong a group of agents. The claim of each agent is a vector specifying the amountclaimed by each agent on each issue. We present a two-stage rule. First, we dividethe estate among the issues following the constrained equal awards rule. Second,the amount assigned to each issue is divided among the agents in proportion to theirdemands on this issue. We apply the rule to two real-world problems: the distributionof natural resources between countries and the distribution of budget for educationand research between universities., Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2014-52616-R, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P, Xunta de Galicia| Ref. ED431G/01 2016-2019, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C2016-015, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. GRC 2015/014, Fundación Séneca de la Región de Murcia | Ref. 19320/PI/14
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On benefits of cooperation under strategic power

  • Fiestras Janeiro, Maria Gloria
  • García Jurado, Ignacio
  • Meca Martínez, Ana
  • Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
We introduce a new model involving TU-games and exogenous structures. Specifically, we consider that each player in a population can choose an element in a strategy set and that, for every possible strategy profile, a TU-game is associated with the population. This is what we call a TU-game with strategies. We propose and characterize the maxmin procedure to map every game with strategies to a TU-game. We also study whether or not the relevant properties of TU-games are transmitted by applying the maxmin procedure. Finally, we examine two relevant classes of TU-games with strategies: airport and simple games with strategies., Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. PGC2018-097965-B-100, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2017-87197-C3-1-P, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2017-87197-C3-2-P, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2014-53395-C3-3-P, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2014-54199-P, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C-2016-015, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C-2016-040, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431G/01
RUC. Repositorio da Universidade da Coruña
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On coalition formation in a non-convex multi-agent inventory problem

  • Saavedra-Nieves, Alejandro
  • García-Jurado, Ignacio
  • Fiestras Janeiro, María Gloria
This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-017-2616-y., [Abstract]: A multi-agent inventory problem is a situation in which several agents face individual inventory problems and can coordinate their orders to reduce costs. This paper analyses a multi-agent inventory problem in which each agent faces a continuous-review inventory problem, with a deterministic linear demand, no holding costs and a limited capacity warehouse. In the case under study, shortages are allowed as follows. Goods are bought from an external supplier and then they are stored in each agent’s warehouse. These stored goods usually satisfy demand. However, each agent may alternative produce their own goods, which are less costly but of lower quality. When a shortage of the purchased goods occurs, demand is satisfied with the produced goods until a new order arrives. The problem under study herein arises in a farming community, and is a variation of a problem addressed by Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2015). However, the existence of two acquisition costs makes it substantially different from Fiestras-Janeiro et al.’s problem and significantly complicates its analysis since the resulting cost functions may now be non-convex. This paper establishes the optimal inventory policies for our problem and obtains a stable order structure when agents allocate the joint costs using a proportional rule. In addition, it illustrates the performance of our model and results in an example., Authors acknowledge the financial support of Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad through projects MTM2011-27731-C03-01, MTM2011-27731-C03-03, MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-2-P and MTM2014-53395-C3-3-P, and of Xunta de Galicia through the ERDF (Grupos de Referencia Competitiva ED431C-2016-015 and ED431C-2016-040, and Centro Singular de Investigación de Galicia ED431G/01)., Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-015, Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-040, Xunta de Galicia; ED431G/01
RUC. Repositorio da Universidade da Coruña
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A heuristic approach to the task planning problem in a home care business

  • Méndez-Fernández, Isabel
  • Lorenzo Freire, Silvia
  • García-Jurado, Ignacio
  • Costa, Julián
  • Carpente, Luisa
This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review (when applicable) and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https:// doi.org/10.1007/s10729-020-09509-1, [Abstract]: In this paper, we study a task scheduling problem in a home care business. The company has a set of supervisors in charge of scheduling the caregivers’ weekly plans. This can be a time-consuming task due to the large number of services they work with, as well as the need to consider user preferences, services required time windows and travel times between users’ homes. Apart from that, it is also important to have a continuity of care, i.e., that users generally prefer not to have their caregiver changed. This problem involves both route planning and employee task planning, which are usually very challenging. We first propose to model it using integer linear programming methodology. Since the real instances that the company needs to solve are very large, we design a heuristic algorithm, based on the simulated annealing philosophy, that allows the company to obtain the caregivers’ weekly schedules. Lastly, we check the algorithm’s good performance, by comparing the solutions it proposes with those provided by the integer linear programming methodology, in small size problems, and we present a case study to confirm that the algorithm correctly solves real-life instances. © 2020, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature., This work has been supported by the ERDF; the MINECO/AEI grants MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P, MTM2017-87197-C3-1-P and ITC-20151247; and by the Xunta de Galicia (Grupos de Referencia Competitiva ED431C-2016-015 and Centro Singular de Investigación de Galicia ED431G/01). The authors would like to thank two anonymous referees for their very helpful suggestions to improve this article., Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-015, Xunta de Galicia; ED431G/01
RUC. Repositorio da Universidade da Coruña
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Subgame Perfection and the Rule of k Names

  • García-Jurado, Ignacio
  • Méndez-Naya, Luciano
This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-019-09625-6, [Abstract]: In this paper we revisit the rule of k names from a game theoretic perspective. This rule can be described as follows. Given a set of candidates for a position, a committee (formed by the proposers) selects k elements of that set using a screening rule; then a single individual from outside the committee (the chooser) chooses for the position one of the k selected candidates. In this context we first give conditions for the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium. Then we provide conditions for the existence of subgame perfect q-strong equilibria when the screening rule is majoritarian. Finally, we show that when the chooser can strategically appoint a delegate to choose on behalf of him, the conditions for the existence of subgame perfect q-strong equilibria are weaker., This work has been supported by the ERDF, the MINECO/AEI grants MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P, MTM2017-87197-C3-1-P, MTM2017-87197-C3-3-P, and by the Xunta de Galicia (Grupo de Referencia Competitiva ED431C-2016-015 and Centro Singular de Investigación de Galicia ED431G/01)., Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-015, Xunta de Galicia; ED431G/01
RUC. Repositorio da Universidade da Coruña
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On benefits of cooperation under strategic power

  • Fiestras Janeiro, María Gloria
  • García-Jurado, Ignacio
  • Meca Martínez, Ana
  • Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review (when applicable) and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https:// doi.org/10.1007/s10479-019-03495-6, [Abstract]: We introduce a new model involving TU-games and exogenous structures. Specifically, we consider that each player in a population can choose an element in a strategy set and that, for every possible strategy profile, a TU-game is associated with the population. This is what we call a TU-game with strategies. We propose and characterize the maxmin procedure to map every game with strategies to a TU-game. We also study whether or not the relevant properties of TU-games are transmitted by applying the maxmin procedure. Finally, we examine two relevant classes of TU-games with strategies: airport and simple games with strategies., The authors would like to thank two anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions to improve this article. This work has been supported by the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad through Grants PGC2018-097965-B-100, MTM2017-87197-C3-1-P, MTM2017-87197-C3-2-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-3-P, MTM2014-54199-P, and by the Xunta de Galicia through the European Regional Development Fund (Grupos de Referencia Competitiva ED431C-2016-015 and ED431C-2016-040, and Centro Singular de Investigación de Galicia ED431G/01)., Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-015, Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-040, Xunta de Galicia; ED431G/01
RUC. Repositorio da Universidade da Coruña
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Sharing delay costs in stochastic scheduling problems with delays

  • Gonçalves-Dosantos, J.C.
  • García-Jurado, Ignacio
  • Costa, Julián
This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10288-019-00427-9., [Abstract]: An important problem in project management is determining ways to distribute amongst activities the costs that are incurred when a project is delayed because some activities end later than expected. In this study, we address this problem in stochastic projects, where the durations of activities are unknown but their corresponding probability distributions are known. We propose and characterise an allocation rule based on the Shapley value, illustrate its behaviour by using examples, and analyse features of its calculation for large problems., This work has been supported by the MINECO grants MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P and MTM2017-87197-C3-1-P, and by the Xunta de Galicia through the ERDF (Grupos de Referencia Competitiva ED431C-2016-015 and Centro Singular de Investigación de Galicia ED431G/01). The authors also acknowledge the useful comments of two anonymous referees., Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-015, Xunta de Galicia; ED431G/01
RUC. Repositorio da Universidade da Coruña
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Optimization in Sanger sequencing

  • Carpente, Luisa
  • Cerdeira-Pena, Ana
  • Lorenzo Freire, Silvia
  • Saavedra Places, Ángeles
© 2019. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. This version of the article Carpente, L., Cerdeira-Pena, A., Lorenzo-Freire, S., Places, Á.S., 2019. Optimization in Sanger sequencing. Computers & Operations Research 109, 250–262 has been accepted for publication in Computers & Operations Research. The Version of Record is available online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cor.2019.05.011, [Abstract]: The main objective of this paper is to solve the optimization problem that is associated with the classification of DNA samples in PCR plates for Sanger sequencing. To achieve this goal, we design an integer linear programming model. Given that the real instances involve the classification of thousands of samples and the linear model can only be solved for small instances, the paper includes a heuristic to cope with bigger problems. The heuristic algorithm is based on the simulated annealing technique. This algorithm obtains satisfactory solutions to the problem in a short amount of time. It has been tested with real data and yields improved results compared to some commercial software typically used in (clinical) laboratories. Moreover, the algorithm has already been implemented in the laboratory and is being successfully used., This work has been supported by MINECO: MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P, MINECO: MTM2017-87197-C3-1-P, Xunta de Galicia/FEDER-UE ERDF: ED431C-2016-015, Xunta de Galicia/FEDER-UE ERDF: ED431G/01, FEDER-UE ESF, Xunta de Galicia Conecta Peme-2014: IN852A-2014/9, Xunta de Galicia/FEDER-UE CSI: ED431G/01, Xunta de Galicia/FEDER-UE GRC: ED431C 2017/58, MINECO-CDTI/FEDER-UE CIEN LPS-BIGGER: IDI-20141259, MINECO-CDTI/FEDER-UE INNTERCONECTA uForest: ITC-20161074, MINECO-AEI/FEDER-UE eDSalud: RTC-2016-5143-1, MINECO-AEI/FEDER-UE Datos 4.0: TIN2016-78011-C4-1-R and MINECO-AEI/FEDER-UE ETOME-RDFD3: TIN2015-69951-R., Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-015, Xunta de Galicia; ED431G/01, Xunta de Galicia; ED431G/01, Xunta de Galicia; ED431C 2017/58, Xunta de Galicia; IN852A-2014/9
RUC. Repositorio da Universidade da Coruña
Publicación Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

Estimation of the Owen Value Based on Sampling

  • Saavedra-Nieves, Alejandro
  • García-Jurado, Ignacio
  • Fiestras Janeiro, María Gloria
This version of the paper has been accepted for publication, after peer review, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73848-2_33., [Abstract]: In this paper we introduce a procedure based on sampling to estimate the Owen value of a cooperative game. It is an adaptation of an analogous procedure for the estimation of the Shapley value, and it is specially useful when dealing with games having large sets of players. We provide some results in order to choose a sample size guaranteeing a bound for the absolute error with a given probability, and illustrate our procedure with an example taken from the game theoretical literature., This work has been supported by MINECO grants MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-2-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-3-P, and by the Xunta de Galicia through the ERDF (Grupos de Referencia Competitiva ED431C-2016-015 and ED431C-2016-040, and Centro Singular de Investigación de Galicia ED431G/01)., Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-015, Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-040, Xunta de Galicia; ED431G/01
RUC. Repositorio da Universidade da Coruña
Publicación Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

Placing Joint Orders When Holding Costs Are Negligible and Shortages Are Not Allowed

  • Saavedra-Nieves, Alejandro
  • García-Jurado, Ignacio
  • Fiestras Janeiro, María Gloria
This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61603-2_16, [Abstract]: In this paper we analyse multi-agent inventory systems where each agent has a deterministic demand and a capacitated warehouse with constant holding costs. Additionally, shortages are not allowed, the leadtime is constant and the cost of placing an order has two components: a fixed cost and a variable cost. We consider that agents cooperate by placing joint orders and that the variable cost is not necessarily additive. For this model we obtain the optimal policy and propose an allocation rule for the joint ordering costs., Authors acknowledge the financial support of Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad through projects MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-2-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-3-P and of Xunta de Galicia through the ERDF (Grupos de Referencia Competitiva ED431C-2016-015 and ED431C-2016-040, and Centro Singular de Investigación de Galicia ED431G/01), Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-015, Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-040, Xunta de Galicia; ED431G/01
RUC. Repositorio da Universidade da Coruña
Publicación Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

Values, nullifiers and dummifiers

  • Alonso-Meijide, José Mª
  • Costa, Julián
  • García-Jurado, Ignacio
This is an Accepted Manuscript version of the following paper: Alonso-Meijide, J. M., Costa, J., & García-Jurado, I. (2019). ‘Values, nullifiers and dummifiers’ , accepted for publication in Handbook of the Shapley value (pp. 75-92). Chapman and Hall/CRC. ISBN: 978-0-8153-7468-8. https://doi.org/10.1201/9781351241410 ., [Abstract]: In this chapter, we provide new axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf values using properties concerning nullifying and dummifying players. Then, we introduce a novel value for TU-games using an axiomatic approach: the e-Banzhaf value. Specifically, we take the properties of efficiency, symmetry, additivity, and combine them with the property for nullifying players that we consider most natural: the nullifying players pay for the mean property. We prove that these four properties characterize the e-Banzhaf value. This novel value possesses some properties of the Shapley value and some of the Banzhaf value, and can be seen as a kind of efficient variation of the Banzhaf value. However, it is not invariant to S-equivalence and it does not satisfy the dummifying players pay for the mean property. Finally, we introduce an alternative novel value for TU-games: the ie-Banzhaf value. It is the unique value for TU-games that satisfies efficiency, symmetry, additivity and the dummifying players pay for the mean property. We prove that the ie-Banzhaf value is also a kind of efficient variation of the Banzhaf value and that it is invariant to S-equivalence., This work has been supported by MINECO grants MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-2-P, MTM2017-87197-C3-1-P and MTM2017-87197-C3-3-P, and by the Xunta de Galicia through the ERDF (Grupos de Referencia Competitiva ED431C-2016-015 and ED431C 2017/38, and Centro Singular deInvestigación de Galicia ED431G/01)., Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-015, Xunta de Galicia; ED431C 2017/38, Xunta de Galicia; ED431G/01