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TEORIA DE JUEGOS Y APLICACIONES EN CIENCIAS SOCIALES

MTM2011-27731-C03-02

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Nombre agencia financiadora Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora MICINN
Programa Programa Nacional de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental
Subprograma Subprograma de Proyectos de Investigación Fundamental no Orientada
Convocatoria Proyectos I+D
Año convocatoria 2011
Plan Estatal 2008-2011 Plan Nacional de Investigación Científica, Desarrollo e Innovación Tecnológica
Unidad de gestión Subdirección General de Proyectos de Investigación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDADE DE SANTIAGO DE COMPOSTELA
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100004837

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 5
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The Owen and Banzhaf-Owen values revisited

  • Alonso Meijide, José María
  • Casas Méndez, Balbina
  • González Rueda, Ángel Manuel
  • Lorenzo Freire, Silvia
In this work, we consider games with coalitional structure. We afford two new parallel axiomatic characterizations for the well-known Owen and Banzhaf–Owen coalitional values. Two properties are common to both characterizations: a property of balanced contributions and a property of neutrality. The results prove that the main difference between these two coalitional values is that the former is efficient, while the latter verifies a property of 2-efficiency.
Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Gas transport networks: Entry-exit tariffs via least squares methodology

  • Bermúdez, Alfredo
  • González Díaz, Julio
  • González Diéguez, Francisco José
  • González Rueda, Ángel Manuel
Following some of the directives and regulations in the 3rd EU Energy Package, many of the EU members are reconsidering their methodologies to derive the tariffs charged for access and usage of their gas transport systems. Among these methodologies, the use of entry–exit tariffs computed via least squares has received the most attention over the last few years and there is a wide consensus towards the application of this approach. The main contribution of this paper is to raise awareness on the fact that, even after a given methodology has been chosen, there are still important details to be fixed before the final tariffs are computed. Within the context of the least squares methodology we argue that, although many of these details may seem minor, they can have a big impact on the final outcome. The paper also presents proposals on how these details can be handled while still pursuing the goals set by the EU; goals such as being transparent, cost-reflective, and non-discriminatory. Finally, the paper concludes with an illustration of the discussed proposals, applying them to the Spanish gas transport network.
Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Gas transmission networks in Europe: Connections between different entry-exit tariff methodologies

  • Bermúdez, Alfredo
  • González Díaz, Julio
  • González Diéguez, Francisco José
  • González Rueda, Ángel Manuel
Following a request of the European Commission in 2012, different bodies within the gas energy sector have been working on a Network Code for transmission tariffs. The final goal is to get a more harmonized structure within the European Union. This paper complements those efforts by developing a formal treatment of some methodological aspects arising in past and present drafts of the Network Code. First, the analysis provides simple formulas for the computation of the tariffs resulting from the application of two of the main methodologies that have been discussed in the official documents: the capacity-weighted distance approach and the least squares approach. Second, it is shown that the tariffs delivered by the two approaches are perfectly correlated with each other. Maybe more importantly, if a natural adjustment is performed to control tariff dispersion, then both approaches lead to exactly the same tariffs. Moreover, the analysis highlights an issue that may have been overlooked by regulators and also by past publications: the difference between weighted and unweighted versions of the methodologies under study and the reasons why weighted versions should be preferred. The paper concludes with a brief comparison with other methodologies and discussing some policy implications.
Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Loss allocation in energy transmission networks

  • Bergantiños, Gustavo
  • González Díaz, Julio
  • González Rueda, Ángel Manuel
  • Fernández de Córdoba, María P.
In this paper we study a cost allocation problem that is inherent to most energy networks: the allocation of losses. In particular, we study how to allocate gas losses between haulers in gas transmission networks. We discuss four allocation rules, two of them have already been in place in real networks and two others that are defined for the first time in this paper. We then present a comparative analysis of the different rules by studying their behavior with respect to a set of principles set forth by the European Union. This analysis also includes axiomatic characterizations of two of the rules. Finally, as an illustration, we apply them to the Spanish gas transmission network.
Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Axiomatic of the Shapley value of a game with a priori unions

  • Alonso Meijide, José María
  • Casas Méndez, Balbina
  • González Rueda, Ángel Manuel
  • Lorenzo Freire, Silvia
In this paper, we define a modification of the Shapley value for the model of TU games with a priori unions. We provide two characterizations of this value and a new characterization of the Banzhaf-Owen coalitional value.