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GESTION ESTRATEGICA EN SISTEMAS COMPLEJOS CON MULTIPLES AGENTES

MTM2014-54199-P

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Nombre agencia financiadora Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
Acrónimo agencia financiadora MINECO
Programa Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Año convocatoria 2014
Plan Estatal 2013-2016 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Unidad de gestión Secretaría de Estado de Educación, Formación Profesional y Universidades
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD MIGUEL HERNANDEZ DE ELCHE
Identificador persistente http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 3
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On benefits of cooperation under strategic power

  • Fiestras Janeiro, Maria Gloria
  • García Jurado, Ignacio
  • Meca Martínez, Ana
  • Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
We introduce a new model involving TU-games and exogenous structures. Specifically, we consider that each player in a population can choose an element in a strategy set and that, for every possible strategy profile, a TU-game is associated with the population. This is what we call a TU-game with strategies. We propose and characterize the maxmin procedure to map every game with strategies to a TU-game. We also study whether or not the relevant properties of TU-games are transmitted by applying the maxmin procedure. Finally, we examine two relevant classes of TU-games with strategies: airport and simple games with strategies., Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. PGC2018-097965-B-100, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2017-87197-C3-1-P, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2017-87197-C3-2-P, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2014-53395-C3-3-P, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2014-54199-P, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C-2016-015, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C-2016-040, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431G/01
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On horizontal cooperation in linear production processes with a supplier that controls a limited resource

  • Gutierrez, Elisabeth
  • Llorca, Natividad
  • Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
  • Sánchez Soriano, Joaquín
In this paper we consider a two-echelon supply chain with one supplier that controls a limited resource and a finite set of manufacturers who need to purchase this resource. We analyze the effect of the limited resource on the horizontal cooperation of manufacturers. To this end, we use cooperative game theory and the existence of stable distributions of the total profit among the manufacturers as a measure of the possibilities of cooperation. The game theoretical model that describes the horizontal cooperation involves externalities, which arise because of the possible scarcity of the limited resource and the possible coalition structures that can be formed. Furthermore, manufacturers do not know how the supplier will allocate the limited resource, therefore, how much of this resource they will obtain is uncertain for all concerned. Nevertheless, when the limited resource is not scarce for the grand coalition, the existence of stable distributions of the total profit is guaranteed and consequently the collaboration among the manufacturers is profitable for them all. In the event that the limited resource is insufficient for the grand coalition, we introduce a new cooperative game that assesses the expectations of each coalition of manufacturers regarding the amount of the limited resource they can obtain. We analyze two extreme expectations: the optimistic and the pessimistic. In the optimistic case, we cannot reach a conclusion regarding the full cooperation of the manufacturers. In the pessimistic case, with one reasonable assumption, the existence of stable distributions of the total profit is guaranteed and as a result the collaboration among manufacturers is a win–win deal., Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2014-54199-P, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2014-53395-C3-3-P, Fundación Séneca | Ref. 19320/PI/14
RUC. Repositorio da Universidade da Coruña
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On benefits of cooperation under strategic power

  • Fiestras Janeiro, María Gloria
  • García-Jurado, Ignacio
  • Meca Martínez, Ana
  • Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review (when applicable) and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https:// doi.org/10.1007/s10479-019-03495-6, [Abstract]: We introduce a new model involving TU-games and exogenous structures. Specifically, we consider that each player in a population can choose an element in a strategy set and that, for every possible strategy profile, a TU-game is associated with the population. This is what we call a TU-game with strategies. We propose and characterize the maxmin procedure to map every game with strategies to a TU-game. We also study whether or not the relevant properties of TU-games are transmitted by applying the maxmin procedure. Finally, we examine two relevant classes of TU-games with strategies: airport and simple games with strategies., The authors would like to thank two anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions to improve this article. This work has been supported by the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad through Grants PGC2018-097965-B-100, MTM2017-87197-C3-1-P, MTM2017-87197-C3-2-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-3-P, MTM2014-54199-P, and by the Xunta de Galicia through the European Regional Development Fund (Grupos de Referencia Competitiva ED431C-2016-015 and ED431C-2016-040, and Centro Singular de Investigación de Galicia ED431G/01)., Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-015, Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-040, Xunta de Galicia; ED431G/01