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OPTIMIZACION Y COOPERACION CON APLICACIONES EN ECONOMIA

MTM2017-87197-C3-2-P

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D (Excelencia / Generación de Conocimiento)
Año convocatoria 2017
Plan Estatal 2017-2020 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD DE VIGO

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 13
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Mergeable weighted majority games and characterizations of some power indices

  • Armijos Toro, Livino Manuel
  • Alonso Meijide, José María
  • Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
In this paper, we introduce a notion of mergeable weighted majority games with the aim of providing the first characterization of the Colomer–Martínez power index (Colomer and Martínez in J Theor Polit 7(1):41–63, 1995). Furthermore, we define and characterize a new power index for the family of weighted majority games that combines ideas of the Public Good (Holler in Polit Stud 30(2):262–271, 1982) and Colomer–Martínez power indices. Finally, we analyze the National Assembly of Ecuador using these and some other well-known power indices
Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On stratified sampling for estimating coalitional values

  • Saavedra Nieves, Alejandro
This paper addresses two sampling methodologies to respectively estimate the Owen value and the Banzhaf–Owen value for TU-games with a priori unions. Both proposals are based on stratified sampling on the set of those coalitions that are compatible with the system of unions according to their cardinalities. These sampling methodologies are analysed in terms of the theoretical properties and of the establishment of bounds for the absolute error from a statistical point of view. Finally, we evaluate the performance of these tools on several real well-known examples in the literature
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Deviation from proportionality and Lorenz-domination for claims problems

  • Mirás Calvo, Miguel Ángel
  • Núñez Lugilde, Iago
  • Quinteiro Sandomingo, Maria Del Carmen
  • Sánchez Rodríguez, María Estela
The Lorenz order is commonly used to compare rules for claims problems. In this paper, we incorporate the average of awards rule, the mean value of the set of awards vectors for a claims problem, to the ranking of the standard rules by proving some properties that are satisfied by this rule. We define a pair of coefficients, inspired by the Gini index, aimed at measuring, for any given claims problem, the discrepancy between the awards assigned by a rule and the proportional division. We generalize the proportionality deviation indices by introducing coefficients that measure the deviation between the awards selected by any two division rules. We show how these deviation indices are related to the Lorenz order., Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades | Ref. MTM2017-87197-C3-2-P, Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades | Ref. PID2019-106281GB-I00, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED481A 2021/325
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

An application of power indices for the family of weighted majority games in partition function form

  • Alonso Meijide, José María
  • Armijos Toro, L.M.
  • Casas Méndez, Balbina
  • Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
Based on Holler (1982), Colomer and Martínez (1995), and Armijos-Toro et al. (2021), we propose two power indices to measure the influence of the players in these classes of weighted majority games in partition function form. We compare the new power indices with their original versions on the class of games in characteristic function form. Finally, we use both new power indices and the two power indices for games in partition function form studied in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2017) to study the distribution of power in the National Assembly of Ecuador that emerged after the elections of February 7, 2021., Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2017-87197-C3-2-P, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2017-87197-C3-3-P, Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C32, Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C33, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C-2021/24, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C-2020/03
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Evaluating the impact of items and cooperation in inventory models with exemptable ordering costs

  • Fiestras Janeiro, Maria Gloria
  • García Jurado, Ignacio
  • Meca, Ana
  • Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
In this paper we introduce and analyse, from a game theoretical perspective, several multi-agent or multi-item continuous review inventory models in which the buyers are exempted from ordering costs if the price of their orders is greater than or equal to a certain amount. For all models we obtain the optimal ordering policy. We first analyse a simple model with one firm and one item. Then, we study a model with one firm and several items, for which we design a procedure based on cooperative game theory to evaluate the impact of each item on the total cost. Then, we deal with a model with several firms and one item for each firm, for which we characterise a rule to allocate the total cost among the firms in a coalitionally stable way. Finally, we discuss a model with several firms and several items, for which we characterise a rule to allocate the total cost among the firms in a coalitionally stable way and to evaluate the impact of each item on the cost that would be payable to each firm when using the allocation rule. All the concepts and results of this article are illustrated using data from a case study., Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. MTM2017-87197-C3-1-P, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. MTM2017-87197-C3-2-P, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PGC2018-097965-B-I00, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C31, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C33, MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/ | Ref. PID2022-137211NB-100, Comunidad Valenciana | Ref. PROMETEO/2021/063, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C-2020/03, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C-2020/14, Universidade da Coruña/CISUG
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Sequencing situations and games with non-linear cost functions under optimal order consistency

  • Schouten, Jop
  • Saavedra Nieves, Alejandro
  • Fiestras Janeiro, Maria Gloria
This paper considers sequencing situations with non-linear cost functions under optimal order consistency. Specifically, we study sequencing situations with discounting cost functions and logarithmic cost functions of the completion time. In both settings, we show that the neighbor switching gains are non-negative and non-decreasing for every misplaced pair of players. We derive new conditions on the time-dependent neighbor switching gains in a sequencing situation under optimal order consistency to guarantee convexity of the associated sequencing game. Furthermore, we define two types of gain splitting rules for the class of sequencing situations under optimal order consistency. Each one of them is based on a procedure that specifies a path from the initial order to an optimal order, dividing the neighbor switching gains in every step among the two involved players. We prove that these allocations are stable under the same conditions that are required for convexity. These requirements are fulfilled for discounting and logarithmic sequencing situations, as well as in other settings, such as in sequencing situations with exponential cost functions., Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades | Ref. MTM2017-87197-C3-2-P, Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades | Ref. MTM2017-87197- C3-3-P, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C- 2016-040, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C-2017/38, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C2020-03
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On benefits of cooperation under strategic power

  • Fiestras Janeiro, Maria Gloria
  • García Jurado, Ignacio
  • Meca Martínez, Ana
  • Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
We introduce a new model involving TU-games and exogenous structures. Specifically, we consider that each player in a population can choose an element in a strategy set and that, for every possible strategy profile, a TU-game is associated with the population. This is what we call a TU-game with strategies. We propose and characterize the maxmin procedure to map every game with strategies to a TU-game. We also study whether or not the relevant properties of TU-games are transmitted by applying the maxmin procedure. Finally, we examine two relevant classes of TU-games with strategies: airport and simple games with strategies., Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. PGC2018-097965-B-100, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2017-87197-C3-1-P, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2017-87197-C3-2-P, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2014-53395-C3-3-P, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2014-54199-P, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C-2016-015, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C-2016-040, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431G/01
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Analysis of the impact of DMUs on the overall efficiency in the event of a merger

  • Saavedra Nieves, Alejandro
  • Fiestras Janeiro, Maria Gloria
This paper addresses several mechanisms for overall ranking Decision Making Units (DMUs) according to the contribution of DMUs to the relative efficiency score of a merger considering aggregate units The possible organization of agents outside each possible merger naturally influences the relative efficiency score, which motivates the use of games in partition function form and specific ranking indices for DMUs based on the Shapley value. Several computational problems arise in their exact computation when the number of DMUs increases. We describe two sampling alternatives to reduce these drawbacks. Finally, we apply these methods to analyse the efficiency of the hotel industry in Spain., Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. MTM2017-87197-C3-2-P, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. MTM2017-87197-C3-3-P, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C 2017/38, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C 2020/03
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Mergeable weighted majority games and characterizations of some power indices

  • Armijos Toro, Livino M.
  • Alonso Meijide, José M.
  • Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
In this paper, we introduce a notion of mergeable weighted majority games with the aim of providing the first characterization of the Colomer–Martínez power index (Colomer and Martínez in J Theor Polit 7(1):41–63, 1995). Furthermore, we define and characterize a new power index for the family of weighted majority games that combines ideas of the Public Good (Holler in Polit Stud 30(2):262–271, 1982) and Colomer–Martínez power indices. Finally, we analyze the National Assembly of Ecuador using these and some other well-known power indices, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. MTM2017-87197-C3-2-P, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. MTM2017-87197-C3-3-P, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C32, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C33, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C 2020/03, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C 2021/24
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Sampling methods to estimate the Banzhaf–Owen value

  • Saavedra Nieves, Alejandro
  • Fiestras Janeiro, Maria Gloria
This paper addresses two sampling methods to estimate the Banzhaf–Owen value for general cooperative games. The first approach is based on simple random sampling without replacement of those coalitions that are compatible with the system of unions. Additionally, using the interpretation of the Banzhaf–Owen value as a mean of means, we propose an alternative estimation procedure based on two-stage sampling that reduces the required computation time. Both approaches are analysed by establishing the theoretical statistical properties and bounds of the incurred error and their performance is compared with other sampling methodologies in the literature. Finally, we evaluate these tools on estimating the power of the members of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2002 and 2016, and we compare the power of some countries in both compositions., Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. MTM2017-87197-C3-2-P, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C 2016/040, Universidade de Vigo
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

The average-of-awards rule for claims problems

  • Mirás Calvo, Miguel Ángel
  • Quinteiro Sandomingo, Maria Del Carmen
  • Sánchez Rodríguez, María Estela
Financiado para publicación en acceso aberto: Universidade de Vigo/CISUG, Given a claims problem, the average-of-awards rule (AA) selects the expected value of the uniform distribution over the set of awards vectors. The AA rule is the center of gravity of the core of the coalitional game associated with a claims problem, so it corresponds to the core-center. We show that this rule satisfies a good number of properties so as to be included in the inventory of division rules. We also provide several representations of the AA rule and a procedure to compute it in terms of the parameters that define the problem., Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. MTM2017-87197-C3-2-P, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2019-106281GB-I00
RUC. Repositorio da Universidade da Coruña
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On benefits of cooperation under strategic power

  • Fiestras Janeiro, María Gloria
  • García-Jurado, Ignacio
  • Meca Martínez, Ana
  • Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review (when applicable) and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https:// doi.org/10.1007/s10479-019-03495-6, [Abstract]: We introduce a new model involving TU-games and exogenous structures. Specifically, we consider that each player in a population can choose an element in a strategy set and that, for every possible strategy profile, a TU-game is associated with the population. This is what we call a TU-game with strategies. We propose and characterize the maxmin procedure to map every game with strategies to a TU-game. We also study whether or not the relevant properties of TU-games are transmitted by applying the maxmin procedure. Finally, we examine two relevant classes of TU-games with strategies: airport and simple games with strategies., The authors would like to thank two anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions to improve this article. This work has been supported by the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad through Grants PGC2018-097965-B-100, MTM2017-87197-C3-1-P, MTM2017-87197-C3-2-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-3-P, MTM2014-54199-P, and by the Xunta de Galicia through the European Regional Development Fund (Grupos de Referencia Competitiva ED431C-2016-015 and ED431C-2016-040, and Centro Singular de Investigación de Galicia ED431G/01)., Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-015, Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-040, Xunta de Galicia; ED431G/01
RUC. Repositorio da Universidade da Coruña
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Evaluating the impact of items and cooperation in inventory models with exemptable ordering costs

  • Fiestras Janeiro, María Gloria
  • García-Jurado, Ignacio
  • Meca Martínez, Ana
  • Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
[Absctract]: In this paper we introduce and analyse, from a game theoretical perspective, several multi-agent or multi-item continuous review inventory models in which the buyers are exempted from ordering costs if the price of their orders is greater than or equal to a certain amount. For all models we obtain the optimal ordering policy. We first analyse a simple model with one firm and one item. Then, we study a model with one firm and several items, for which we design a procedure based on cooperative game theory to evaluate the impact of each item on the total cost. Then, we deal with a model with several firms and one item for each firm, for which we characterise a rule to allocate the total cost among the firms in a coalitionally stable way. Finally, we discuss a model with several firms and several items, for which we characterise a rule to allocate the total cost among the firms in a coalitionally stable way and to evaluate the impact of each item on the cost that would be payable to each firm when using the allocation rule. All the concepts and results of this article are illustrated using data from a case study., This work is part of the R+D+I project grants MTM2017-87197-C3-1-P, MTM2017-87197-C3-2-P, PGC2018-097965-B-I00, PID2021-124030NB-C31, PID2021-124030NB-C33 and PID2022-137211NB-100, that were funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/ and by “ERDF A way of making Europe”/EU. This research was also funded by project PROMETEO/2021/063 from the Comunidad Valenciana, and by Grupos de Referencia Competitiva ED431C-2020/03 and ED431C-2020/14 from the Consellería de Cultura, Educación e Universidades, Xunta de Galicia. Funding for open access charge: Universidade da Coruña/CISUG . The authors would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments, which have contributed to the improvement of this article., Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2020/03, Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2020/14, Generalitat Valenciana; PROMETEO/2021/063