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OPTIMIZACION, APRENDIZAJE Y COOPERACION CON APLICACIONES EN ECONOMIA

PID2021-124030NB-C33

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal para Impulsar la Investigación Científico-Técnica y su Transferencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D+i (Generación de Conocimiento y Retos Investigación)
Año convocatoria 2021
Plan Estatal 2021-2023 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD DE VIGO

Resultados relacionados

Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 22
Encontrada(s) 1 página(s)

Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A sampling approach for the approximation of the Deegan-Packel index

  • Armijos-Toro, L. M.
  • Alonso-Meijide, J. M.
  • Mosquera Criado, María Jesús
  • Saavedra Nieves, Alejandro
In this paper, we address a sampling procedure for approximating the Deegan-Packel index, which is particularly advantageous when tackling with large-scale problems. It is based on the estimation of an expectation in a subdomain. Its performance is analyzed in terms of statistical properties and of bounds for the incurred absolute error. The effectiveness of this tool is demonstrated through a real-world example where this power index can be exactly computed. Finally, we use it to determine a new power distribution for two compositions of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The resulting distributions of the power are compared with the ones prescribed by the Shapley and the Banzhaf values.
Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Mergeable weighted majority games and characterizations of some power indices

  • Armijos Toro, Livino Manuel
  • Alonso Meijide, José María
  • Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
In this paper, we introduce a notion of mergeable weighted majority games with the aim of providing the first characterization of the Colomer–Martínez power index (Colomer and Martínez in J Theor Polit 7(1):41–63, 1995). Furthermore, we define and characterize a new power index for the family of weighted majority games that combines ideas of the Public Good (Holler in Polit Stud 30(2):262–271, 1982) and Colomer–Martínez power indices. Finally, we analyze the National Assembly of Ecuador using these and some other well-known power indices
Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Sequencing situations with position-dependent effects under cooperation

  • Saavedra Nieves, Alejandro
  • Mosquera, M. A.
  • Fiestras Janeiro, M.G.
This paper innovatively addresses the effect of cooperation on sequencing situations with position-dependent effects. Specifically, we ensure the convexity of the associated sequencing games under the fulfillment of certain conditions related to the neighbor switching gains. Additionally, we propose two families of allocation rules based on sharing the neighbor switching gains under two distinct procedures, each providing a path from the initial order to an optimal order. From a theoretical point of view, an axiomatization of both families of allocations is provided, and their stability is also ensured under the conditions related to convexity.
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On generating functions to compute some power measures for weighted majority games

  • Armijos Toro, L.M.
  • Alonso Meijide, J.M.
  • Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
  • Saavedra Nieves, A.
In this paper we introduce new procedures, based on generating functions, for calculating some power measures for weighted majority games. In particular, we present methods for computing the Johnston index and the Colomer–Martínez measure. Besides, we introduce a new power measure that combines the principles underlying the Johnston index and Colomer–Martínez measure as well as a procedure for computing it using generating functions. Finally, we introduce the new R package powerindexR and describe its capabilities to compute some power measures by means of generating functions. We illustrate its performance with a real example., Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C33, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C32, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C-2020/03, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C 2021/24, Universidade de Vigo/CISUG
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Capítulo o parte de un libro (BookPart)

An application of power indices for the family of weighted majority games in partition function form

  • Alonso Meijide, José María
  • Armijos Toro, L.M.
  • Casas Méndez, Balbina
  • Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
Based on Holler (1982), Colomer and Martínez (1995), and Armijos-Toro et al. (2021), we propose two power indices to measure the influence of the players in these classes of weighted majority games in partition function form. We compare the new power indices with their original versions on the class of games in characteristic function form. Finally, we use both new power indices and the two power indices for games in partition function form studied in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2017) to study the distribution of power in the National Assembly of Ecuador that emerged after the elections of February 7, 2021., Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2017-87197-C3-2-P, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. MTM2017-87197-C3-3-P, Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C32, Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C33, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C-2021/24, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C-2020/03
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

An algorithm to compute the average-of-awards rule for claims problems with an application to the allocation of CO2 emissions

  • Mirás Calvo, Miguel Ángel
  • Núñez Lugilde, Iago
  • Quinteiro Sandomingo, Maria Del Carmen
  • Sánchez Rodríguez, María Estela
The set of awards vectors for a claims problem coincides with the core of the associated coalitional game. We analyze the structure of this set by defining for each group of claimants a, so called, utopia game, whose core comprises the most advantageous imputations available for the group. We show that, given a claims problem, the imputation set of the associated coalitional game can be partitioned by the cores of the utopia games. A rule selects for each claims problem a unique allocation from the set of awards vectors. The average-of-awards rule associates to each claims problem the geometric center of the corresponding set of awards vectors. Based on the decomposition of the imputation set, we obtain an interpretation of the average-of-awards rule as a point of fairness between stable and utopia imputations and provide a backward recurrence algorithm to compute it. To illustrate our analysis, we present an application to the distribution of CO2 emissions., Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2019‐106281GB‐I00, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021‐124030NB‐C33, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED481A 2021/325, Universidade de Vigo/CISUG
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

An operational toolbox for solving conflicting claims problems

  • Mirás Calvo, Miguel Ángel
  • Núñez Lugilde, Iago
  • Quinteiro Sandomingo, Maria Del Carmen
  • Sánchez Rodríguez, María Estela
A conflicting claims problem arises when a group of agents have claims over a resource that add up to more than it is available. Typical situations are the division of property among heirs, bankruptcy problems, tax distribution, or the global emissions budget. This paper introduces the R package ClaimsProblems, a toolbox for computing and comparing the central division rules introduced in the literature. The software can be used by researchers and managers interested in problems concerning the allocation of scarce resources., Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2019‐106281GB‐I00, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021‐124030NB‐C33, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED481A 2021/325
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On the least square prenucleolus for games with externalities

  • Fiestras Janeiro, Maria Gloria
  • Saavedra Nieves, A.
Abstract In this paper we address the problem of determining the least square prenucleolus for games with externalities. Specifically, this solution is based on the minimization of the variance of the excess vectors that can be associated to any allocation vector over the set of all embedded coalitions using a least square criterion. From a theoretical point of view, an axiomatization of this solution is provided. Besides, we analyse its relations with other proposals of solution in the game-theoretical literature., Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C-2020/03, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C 2021/24, Universidade de Vigo/CISUG, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C33, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021- 124030NB-C32
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Evaluating the impact of items and cooperation in inventory models with exemptable ordering costs

  • Fiestras Janeiro, Maria Gloria
  • García Jurado, Ignacio
  • Meca, Ana
  • Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
In this paper we introduce and analyse, from a game theoretical perspective, several multi-agent or multi-item continuous review inventory models in which the buyers are exempted from ordering costs if the price of their orders is greater than or equal to a certain amount. For all models we obtain the optimal ordering policy. We first analyse a simple model with one firm and one item. Then, we study a model with one firm and several items, for which we design a procedure based on cooperative game theory to evaluate the impact of each item on the total cost. Then, we deal with a model with several firms and one item for each firm, for which we characterise a rule to allocate the total cost among the firms in a coalitionally stable way. Finally, we discuss a model with several firms and several items, for which we characterise a rule to allocate the total cost among the firms in a coalitionally stable way and to evaluate the impact of each item on the cost that would be payable to each firm when using the allocation rule. All the concepts and results of this article are illustrated using data from a case study., Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. MTM2017-87197-C3-1-P, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. MTM2017-87197-C3-2-P, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PGC2018-097965-B-I00, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C31, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C33, MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/ | Ref. PID2022-137211NB-100, Comunidad Valenciana | Ref. PROMETEO/2021/063, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C-2020/03, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C-2020/14, Universidade da Coruña/CISUG
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On how the rules that extend the concede-and-divide principle differ for pairs of claimants

  • Mirás Calvo, Miguel Ángel
  • Núñez Lugilde, Iago
  • Quinteiro Sandomingo, Maria Del Carmen
  • Sánchez Rodríguez, María Estela
In the context of conflicting claims problems, the Talmud, adjusted proportional, random arrival, minimal overlap, and average-of-awards rules are well-known extensions of the two-claimant concede-and-divide rule to larger populations. We analyze how the awards recommended by these rules for each couple of claimants differ from what they would receive if the concede-and-divide principle were applied to distribute among them their joint payoff. To compare the behavior of these rules for pairs of claimants, we rely on geometric features of the corresponding two-dimensional paths of awards. We study properties pertaining to the impact, in absolute and relative terms, that one claimant leaving the problem has on the awards of the remaining claimants., Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C31, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C33, Universidade de Vigo/CISUG
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Tesis doctoral (DoctoralThesis)

Computation and comparison of division rules to adjudicate conflicting claims, Cálculo y comparación de reglas de reparto para adjudicar reclamaciones en conflicto, Cálculo e comparación de regras de repartición para adxudicar reclamacións en conflicto

  • Núñez Lugilde, Iago
The general objective of this thesis project is to compare different division rules in claims problems (applicable also to tax distribution and rationing problems), using two main approaches: through the properties that verify the different rules (with their axiomatic characterisations) and with newer methods, by means of centrality or discrepancy measures. The core-center (centroid of the core of a cooperative game), a solution concept that treats all the stable distributions of the problem equally, will be studied in detail. Computational algorithms for this new solution will be provided and it will be justified that it satisfies a considerable number of properties that make it suitable for inclusion in the inventory of rules. This new rule and those already existing in the literature will be programmed in a package in R developing computationally efficient methods for the computation. In addition, the package will include the methodological advances developed in the theoretical work that will allow comparisons to be made between the different rules. Situations in which certain agents have priority over the rest, in the context of cooperative games in general, will also be studied using claims problems as a tool., El objetivo general de este proyecto de tesis es comparar distintos métodos de reparto en problemas de demandas (aplicable también a problemas de reparto de impuestos y de racionamiento), utilizando dos enfoques principalmente: a través de las propiedades que verifican las distintas reglas (con sus caracterizaciones axiomáticas) y con métodos más nuevos, por medio de medidas de centralidad o discrepancia. Se estudiará en detalle el core-center (centroide del núcleo de un juego cooperativo), concepto de solución que trata de forma ecuánime a todas los repartos estables del problema. Se proporcionarán algoritmos de cálculo para esta nueva solución y se justificará que cumple un considerable número de propiedades que hacen que pueda ser incluida en el inventario de reglas. En un paquete de R se programará esta nueva regla y las ya existentes en la literatura, desarrollando métodos computacionales eficientes para el cálculo. Además, el paquete incluirá los avances metodológicos desarrollados en los trabajos teóricos que permitirán establecer comparaciones entre las distintas reglas. Se estudiarán también situaciones, en el contexto de juegos cooperativos en general, en las que ciertos agentes tienen prioridad sobre el resto, utilizando los problemas de demandas como herramienta., O obxectivo xeral deste proxecto de tese é comparar distintos métodos de repartición en problemas de demandas (aplicable tamén a problemas de repartición de impostos e de racionamento), utilizando dous enfoques principalmente: a través das propiedades que verifican as distintas regras (coas súas caracterizacións axiomáticas) e con métodos máis novos, por medio de medidas de centralidade ou discrepancia. Estudarase en detalle o core-center (centroide do núcleo dun xogo cooperativo), concepto de solución que trata de forma ecuánime a todas as reparticións estables do problema. Propocionaranse algoritmos de cálculo para esta nova solución e xustificarase que cumpre un considerable número de propiedades que fan que poda ser incluida no inventario de regras. Nun paquete de R programarase esta nova regra e as xa existentes na literatura, desenvolvendo métodos computacionais eficientes para o cálculo. Ademáis, o paquete incluirá os avances metodolóxicos desenrolados nos traballos teóricos que permitirán establecer comparacions entre as distintas regras. Estudaranse tamén situacións, no contexto de xogos cooperativos en xeral, nas que certos axentes teñen prioridade sobre o resto, utilizando os problemas de demandas como ferramenta., Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED481A 2021/325, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431 C2016-040, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C 2020/03, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2019-106281GB-I00, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C33
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

A sampling approach for the approximation of the Deegan-Packel index

  • Armijos Toro, L.M.
  • Alonso Meijide, J.M.
  • Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
  • Saavedra Nieves, A.
In this paper, we address a sampling procedure for approximating the Deegan-Packel index, which is particularly advantageous when tackling with large-scale problems. It is based on the estimation of an expectation in a subdomain. Its performance is analyzed in terms of statistical properties and of bounds for the incurred absolute error. The effectiveness of this tool is demonstrated through a real-world example where this power index can be exactly computed. Finally, we use it to determine a new power distribution for two compositions of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The resulting distributions of the power are compared with the ones prescribed by the Shapley and the Banzhaf values., Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C-2020/03, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C-2021/24, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C33, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C32
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Priority coalitional games and claims problems

  • Núñez Lugilde, Iago
  • Estévez Fernández, Arantza
  • Sánchez Rodríguez, María Estela
In this paper, we analyze priority coalitional games as an extension of balanced games with transferable utility. Here, conditions imposed by a stable allocation used in the past need to be respected when deciding on a new allocation of the revenues obtained by the grand coalition. Using claims problems as a tool, we define weak and strong priority games with respect to a given allocation and a priority coalition, and study their properties and core. In the weak priority game, the value of a coalition reflects that coalitional members with priority should not be harmed, i.e., the coalitional value should never be below their total benefits according to the initial allocation. In the strong priority game, in addition to the previous condition, players outside the coalition that are not in the priority group should not harbour aspirations exceeding those benefits given by the initial allocation. Priority games are also extended to analyze cooperation restricted by a hierarchical structure. These games restrict the core so that desirable monotonicity properties are satisfied when there is a hierarchy. This allows for reconciling core selection and monotonicity over a hierarchy., Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED481A 2021/325, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C33
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Two families of values for global cooperative games

  • Alonso Meijide, J.M.
  • Álvarez-Mozos, M.
  • Fiestras Janeiro, Maria Gloria
  • Jiménez-Losada, A.
A global (cooperative) game describes the utility that the whole set of players generates depending on the coalition structure they form. These games were introduced by Gilboa and Lehrer (Int J Game Theory 20:129–147, 1991) who proposed and characterized a generalization of the Shapley value. We introduce two families of point valued solutions that contain the Gilboa–Lehrer value. We characterize each family by means of reasonable properties, which are related to the ones used by Gilboa and Lehrer., Agència de Gestió d’Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca | Ref. 2021-SGR-00306, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2020- 113110GB-I00, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C32, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C33, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2022- 138956NB-100, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C-2020/03, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C-2021/24, Generalitat de Catalunya | Ref. 2021-SGR-00306
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On the computation of the shapley value and the random arrival rule

  • Mirás Calvo, Miguel Ángel
  • Núñez Lugilde, Iago
  • Quinteiro Sandomingo, Maria Del Carmen
  • Sánchez Rodríguez, María Estela
The Shapley value is one of the most important solution concept in game theory. Since its formulation involves an exponentially large number of terms, computing the exact Shapley value for large-scale games is computationally intractable. Based on the linearity of the Shapley value, we present an algorithm to calculate this value and we applied it to obtain the random arrival rule for a claims problem., Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C33, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2019-106281GB-I00, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED481A 2021/325
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Sequencing situations with position‐dependent effects under cooperation

  • Saavedra Nieves, Alejandro
  • Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
  • Fiestras Janeiro, Maria Gloria
This paper innovatively addresses the effect of cooperation on sequencing situations with position-dependent effects. Specifically, we ensure the convexity of the associated sequencing games under the fulfillment of certain conditions related to the neighbor switching gains. Additionally, we propose two families of allocation rules based on sharing the neighbor switching gains under two distinct procedures, each providing a path from the initial order to an optimal order. From a theoretical point of view, an axiomatization of both families of allocations is provided, and their stability is also ensured under the conditions related to convexity., Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C32, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C33, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C 2021/24, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C 2020/03
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Mergeable weighted majority games and characterizations of some power indices

  • Armijos Toro, Livino M.
  • Alonso Meijide, José M.
  • Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
In this paper, we introduce a notion of mergeable weighted majority games with the aim of providing the first characterization of the Colomer–Martínez power index (Colomer and Martínez in J Theor Polit 7(1):41–63, 1995). Furthermore, we define and characterize a new power index for the family of weighted majority games that combines ideas of the Public Good (Holler in Polit Stud 30(2):262–271, 1982) and Colomer–Martínez power indices. Finally, we analyze the National Assembly of Ecuador using these and some other well-known power indices, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. MTM2017-87197-C3-2-P, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. MTM2017-87197-C3-3-P, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C32, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C33, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C 2020/03, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431C 2021/24
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Coalition-weighted Shapley values

  • Sánchez Rodríguez, María Estela
  • Mirás Calvo, Miguel Ángel
  • Quinteiro Sandomingo, Maria Del Carmen
  • Núñez Lugilde, Iago
We introduce a new class of values for coalitional games: the coalition-weighted Shapley values. Weights can be assigned to coalitions, not just to players, and zero-weights are admissible. The Shapley value belongs to this class. Coalition-weighted Shapley values recommend for each game the allocation defined by the Shapley value of a weighted game obtained as a linear convex combination of the associated marginal games. Coalition-weighted Shapley values are random order values and Harsanyi values. Positively weighted Shapley values and weighted Shapley values can be seen as the limit of a sequence of iterated coalition-weighted Shapley values. We provide axiomatic characterizations of coalition-weighted Shapley values through properties that do not involve the weights. Finally, we discuss how to extend our model to include exogenous coalition structures as in the hierarchical and Owen values., Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C33, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED481A 2021/325
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On properties of the set of awards vectors for a claims problem

  • Mirás Calvo, Miguel Ángel
  • Núñez Lugilde, Iago
  • Quinteiro Sandomingo, Maria Del Carmen
  • Sánchez Rodríguez, María Estela
We study the geometric structure of a particular type of nonempty convex polytopes that are the intersection of an n-rectangle with a hyperplane x1 +⋯+ xn = E , E > 0 . This type of polytopes arise naturally when studying, for instance, the set of awards vectors for a claims problem, the core of the game associated with a bankruptcy problem, the core-cover set of a game, or the class of two-bound core games. We explore in detail the geometry of such a polytope and provide explicit expressions to compute its volume and its centroid. In particular, we describe a procedure to compute the average-of-awards rule for a claims problem directly from the parameters of the problem. We show that computing the average-of-awards rule is #P-complete., Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED481A 2021/325, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021-124030NB-C33
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Refining the Lorenz‐ranking of rules for claims problems on restricted domains

  • Mirás Calvo, Miguel Ángel
  • Núñez Lugilde, Iago
  • Quinteiro Sandomingo, Maria Del Carmen
  • Sánchez Rodríguez, María Estela
The comparison of the central rules for claims problems, according to the Lorenz order, has been studied not only on the entire set of problems but also on some restricted domains. We provide new characterizations of the adjusted proportional rule as being Lorenz‐maximal or Lorenz‐minimal within a class of rules on the half‐domains. Using this result, we rank the adjusted proportional, the minimal overlap, and the average‐of‐awards rules by analyzing whether or not these rules satisfy progressivity and regressivity on the half‐domains. We also find that the adjusted proportional rule violates two well‐known claim monotonicity properties., Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2019‐106281GB‐I00, Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. PID2021‐124030NB‐C33, Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED481A 2021/325, Universidade de Vigo/CISUG
RUC. Repositorio da Universidade da Coruña
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

On how the Rules that Extend the Concede-and-Divide Principle Differ for Pairs of Claimants

  • Mirás Calvo, Miguel Ángel
  • Núñez Lugilde, Iago
  • Quinteiro Sandomingo, Carmen
  • Sánchez-Rodríguez, Estela
Financiado para publicación en acceso aberto: Universidade de Vigo/CISUG, [Abstract]: In the context of conflicting claims problems, the Talmud, adjusted proportional, random arrival, minimal overlap, and average-of-awards rules are well-known extensions of the two-claimant concede-and-divide rule to larger populations. We analyze how the awards recommended by these rules for each couple of claimants differ from what they would receive if the concede-and-divide principle were applied to distribute among them their joint payoff. To compare the behavior of these rules for pairs of claimants, we rely on geometric features of the corresponding two-dimensional paths of awards. We study properties pertaining to the impact, in absolute and relative terms, that one claimant leaving the problem has on the awards of the remaining claimants., Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature. Funding for open access charge: Universidade de Vigo/CISUG. This work was supported by projects PID2021-124030NB-C31 and PID2021-124030NB-C33, funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/ 501100011033/ and by “ERDF A way of making Europe”/EU.
RUC. Repositorio da Universidade da Coruña
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Evaluating the impact of items and cooperation in inventory models with exemptable ordering costs

  • Fiestras Janeiro, María Gloria
  • García-Jurado, Ignacio
  • Meca Martínez, Ana
  • Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
[Absctract]: In this paper we introduce and analyse, from a game theoretical perspective, several multi-agent or multi-item continuous review inventory models in which the buyers are exempted from ordering costs if the price of their orders is greater than or equal to a certain amount. For all models we obtain the optimal ordering policy. We first analyse a simple model with one firm and one item. Then, we study a model with one firm and several items, for which we design a procedure based on cooperative game theory to evaluate the impact of each item on the total cost. Then, we deal with a model with several firms and one item for each firm, for which we characterise a rule to allocate the total cost among the firms in a coalitionally stable way. Finally, we discuss a model with several firms and several items, for which we characterise a rule to allocate the total cost among the firms in a coalitionally stable way and to evaluate the impact of each item on the cost that would be payable to each firm when using the allocation rule. All the concepts and results of this article are illustrated using data from a case study., This work is part of the R+D+I project grants MTM2017-87197-C3-1-P, MTM2017-87197-C3-2-P, PGC2018-097965-B-I00, PID2021-124030NB-C31, PID2021-124030NB-C33 and PID2022-137211NB-100, that were funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/ and by “ERDF A way of making Europe”/EU. This research was also funded by project PROMETEO/2021/063 from the Comunidad Valenciana, and by Grupos de Referencia Competitiva ED431C-2020/03 and ED431C-2020/14 from the Consellería de Cultura, Educación e Universidades, Xunta de Galicia. Funding for open access charge: Universidade da Coruña/CISUG . The authors would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments, which have contributed to the improvement of this article., Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2020/03, Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2020/14, Generalitat Valenciana; PROMETEO/2021/063