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GESTION ESTRATEGICA EN CADENAS DE SUMINISTRO, REDES Y MEDIO AMBIENTE

PID2022-137211NB-I00

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Nombre agencia financiadora Agencia Estatal de Investigación
Acrónimo agencia financiadora AEI
Programa Programa Estatal para Impulsar la Investigación Científico-Técnica y su Transferencia
Subprograma Subprograma Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento
Convocatoria Proyectos de I+D+i (Generación de Conocimiento y Retos Investigación)
Año convocatoria 2022
Plan Estatal 2021-2023 Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación
Centro beneficiario UNIVERSIDAD MIGUEL HERNANDEZ DE ELCHE

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Resultados totales (Incluyendo duplicados): 10
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RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Profit allocation in agricultural supply chains: exploring the nexus of cooperation and compensation

  • Bekolli, Anjeza
  • Guardiola, Luis A.
  • Meca, Ana
  • Guardiola, Luis A.|||/items/e3a552b3-d66c-4863-b8c2-28bf05e1078d
In this paper, we focus on decentralized agricultural supply chains consisting of multiple non-competing distributors satisfying the demand of their respective markets. These distributors source a single product from a farmer through an agricultural cooperative, operating in a single period. The agents have the ability to coordinate their actions to maximize their profits, and we use cooperative game theory to analyze cooperation among them. The distributors can engage in joint ordering, increasing their order size, which leads to a decrease in the price per kilogram. Additionally, distributors have the opportunity to cooperate with the farmer, securing a reduced price per kilogram at the cost price, while compensating the farmer for any kilograms not acquired in the cooperation agreement. We introduce multidistributor-farmer games and we prove that all the agents have incentives to cooperate. We demonstrate the existence of stable allocations, where no subgroup of agents can be better off by separating. Moreover, we propose and characterize a distribution of the total profit that justly compensates the contribution of the farmer in any group of distributors. We also explore the conditions under which the farmer can be compensated to maximize their revenues when cooperating with all players. Finally, we include a case study demonstrating the application of the model using data gathered from local distributors and farmers.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Algorithms for traceability adoption in complex supply chain networks

  • Guardiola, Luis A.
  • Meca, Ana
  • Sošić, Greys
  • Guardiola, Luis A.|||/items/e3a552b3-d66c-4863-b8c2-28bf05e1078d
Today’s supply chains are increasingly complex, creating challenges in achieving transparency and leading to issues such as recalls, reputational risks, susceptibility to disruptions, and compliance difficulties. Legislative measures like the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act and the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act require companies to disclose efforts addressing human trafficking, slavery, and the use of conflict minerals within their supply chains. Emerging technologies such as blockchain and artificial intelligence offer promising solutions for enhancing supply chain traceability and transparency. However, achieving comprehensive traceability requires participation from most, if not all, supply chain members to avoid undetected irregularities. While the benefits of traceability are clear, implementation entails costs. Some participants may find the benefits outweigh these costs, but to encourage broader adoption, downstream firms might consider subsidizing upstream partners. Supply chain leaders, such as Inditex, are often assumed to pursue traceability to enhance transparency and reduce risk, and may take on a leadership role in promoting and implementing such a subsidization model. This paper employs a cooperative game framework to explore scenarios within supply chain networks, aiming to distribute the benefits of technology implementation and foster widespread adoption. Starting with a basic supply chain modeled as a tree graph, we propose an algorithm to identify allocations that promote technology adoption. The analysis then extends to broader supply chain networks, introducing an algorithm that simplifies the problem and reduces dimensionality for efficient analysis. When the full network is not immediately solvable, we propose two complementary interventions: game reduction, for which the exact optimization problem is NP-hard and for which we provide both an exact algorithm and a polynomial-time min-cut heuristic, and benefit augmentation, which we formulate as a polynomial-time linear program that identifies the minimum additional benefit or cost reduction required for full adoption. We conclude with a simulation that applies the proposed framework to a larger, hypothetical apparel supply chain inspired by Inditex.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

The Shapley value and the strength of weak players in big boss games

  • Guardiola, Luis A.
  • Meca, Ana
  • Guardiola, Luis A.|||/items/e3a552b3-d66c-4863-b8c2-28bf05e1078d
Big Boss Games represent a specific class of cooperative games where a single veto player, known as the Big Boss, plays a central role in determining resource allocation and maintaining coalition stability. In this paper, we introduce a novel allocation scheme for Big Boss games, based on two classical solution concepts: the Shapley value and the ꓔ-value. This scheme generates a coalitionally stable allocation that effectively accounts for the contributions of weaker players. Specifically, we consider a diagonal of the core that includes the Big Boss’s maximum aspirations, the ꓔ-value, and those of the weaker players. From these allocations, we select the one that is closest to the Shapley value, referred to as the Projected Shapley Value allocation (PSV allocation). Through our analysis, we identify a new property of Big Boss games, particularly the relationship between the allocation discrepancies assigned by the ꓔ-value and the Shapley value, with a particular focus on the Big Boss and the other players. Additionally, we provide a new characterization of convexity within this context. Finally, we conduct a statistical analysis to assess the position of the PSV allocation within the core, especially in cases where computing the Shapley value is computationally challenging.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Allocating the surplus induced by cooperation in distribution chains with multiple suppliers and retailers

  • Guardiola, Luis A.
  • Meca, Ana
  • Puerto, Justo
  • Guardiola, Luis A.|||/items/e3a552b3-d66c-4863-b8c2-28bf05e1078d
The coordination of actions and the allocation of profit in supply chains under decentralized control plays an important role in improving the profits of retailers and suppliers in the supply chain. We focus on supply chains under decentralized control in which noncompeting retailers can order from multiple suppliers to replenish their stocks. The goal of the firms in the chain is to maximize their individual profits. As the outcome under decentralized control is inefficient, coordination of actions between cooperating agents can improve individual profits. Cooperative game theory is used to analyze cooperation between agents. We introduce multi-retailer-supplier games and show that agents can always achieve an optimal profit by cooperating and forming the grand coalition. Moreover, we show that there will always be stable allocations of total profit among the firms which cannot be improved by any coalition. In addition, we propose and characterize a stable allocation of the total surplus induced by cooperation.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

May a greener technology mix mitigate market power? Mixed vs private competition in the EU electric power market

  • Escrihuela Villar, Marc
  • Gutiérrez-Hita, Carlos
  • Vicente-Pérez, José
  • Vicente-Pérez, José|||/items/7fad998a-2853-4a32-852d-d0c16df35750
We investigate the extent to which a greener-oriented technology mix may affect collusion incentives among private electric power generators (PEGs). In our model, the government decides whether to privatize the state-owned electric power generator (SOG) or keep it under public hands. Overall, even though collusion is easier to sustain when the state maintains the SOG, the extra benefits from collusion and the negative effects on consumer surplus are lower. This effect is reinforced when greener inputs attain a higher share in the technology mix. Moreover, when the number of PEGs is low, keeping the SOG under public hands mitigates the negative effects of collusion. We run simulations with data from the electric power market of several EU country members to study the effect that rocketing prices of fossil inputs and the composition of the technology mix have in the ability to collude, and how consumer surplus is affected. Our findings suggest that the SOG and the presence of green energy inputs may protect consumers in two ways: () the SOG acts as an output expanding agent enhancing consumer surplus, which decreases less when PEGs collude, and () these effects are larger as the share of greener energy inputs increase in the technology mix.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

HarvestTech agriculture cooperatives: A game-theoretic approach

  • Bekolli, Anjeza
  • Guardiola, Luis A.
  • Meca, Ana
  • Guardiola, Luis A.|||/items/e3a552b3-d66c-4863-b8c2-28bf05e1078d
Agricultural industries are facing increasing pressure to optimize efficiency and reduce costs in a competitive and resource-constrained global market. As firms seek innovative ways to enhance productivity, cooperative strategies have emerged as a promising solution to address these challenges. This study applies cooperative game theory to agricultural crop processing, enabling coalitions of firms to share resources, technologies, and processing capacities, thereby optimizing costs and ensuring equitable profit distribution. We introduce a new class of totally balanced games, which model the strategic interactions among companies processing agricultural products. The objective is to identify profit allocations that fairly compensate firms contributing to cost reduction and surplus processing for others. To achieve this, we propose three compensation mechanisms, ensuring fair compensation for contributions such as cost reduction and surplus processing. Additionally, we introduce a new allocation procedure, the HarvestTech Reward allocation (HTR), which integrates the aforementioned mechanisms to achieve core-stable profit distributions. Finally, we present a simulated case study on apple farming that illustrates the application of the model, demonstrating its ability to reduce costs, prevent surplus losses, and encourage long-term collaboration among firms.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Measuring productivity in networks: A game-theoretic approach

  • Allouch, Nizar
  • Guardiola, Luis A.
  • Meca, Ana
  • Guardiola, Luis A.|||/items/e3a552b3-d66c-4863-b8c2-28bf05e1078d
Measuring individual productivity (or equivalently distributing the overall productivity) in a network structure of workers displaying peer effects has been a subject of ongoing interest in many areas ranging from academia to industry. In this paper, we propose a novel approach based on cooperative game theory that takes into account the peer effects of worker productivity represented by a complete bipartite network of interactions. More specifically, we construct a series of cooperative games where the characteristic function of each coalition of workers is equal to the sum of each worker intrinsic productivity as well as the productivity of other workers within a distance discounted by an attenuation factor. We show that these (truncated) games are balanced and converge to a balanced game when the distance of influence grows large. We then provide an explicit formula for the Shapley value and propose an alternative coalitionally stable distribution of productivity which is computationally much more tractable than the Shapley value. Lastly, we characterize this alternative distribution based on three sensible properties of a logistic network. This analysis enhances our understanding of game-theoretic analysis within logistics networks, offering valuable insights into the peer effects’ impact when assessing the overall productivity and its distribution among workers.
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Publicación Otros (Other)

Cooperative agri-food export under minimum quantity commitments

  • Guardiola, Luis A.
  • Hezarkhani, Behzad
  • Meca, Ana
  • Guardiola, Luis A.|||/items/e3a552b3-d66c-4863-b8c2-28bf05e1078d
International trade presents significant opportunities for agri-food communities. However, accessing these markets can be prohibitively costly, particularly for smallholder farmers and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Trade policies that enforce minimum quantity commitments (MQCs) on export volumes, such as licensing under tariff-rate quota (TRQ) mechanisms, further exacerbate these challenges. We demonstrate how cooperation among small-holder agri-food exporters can help overcome these barriers and enhance market access. By formulating a framework of cooperative games, we identify a gain-sharing mechanism that produces allocations within the corresponding cores, enabling stable grand coalitions of exporters. Our base allocation rule exclusively benefits “essential” exporters—those with sufficient cost efficiency. As a result, less cost-efficient “complementary” players, necessary for meeting MQCs, receive no direct benefits from collaboration and must participate altruistically. To address this, we propose two modifications: one based on egalitarian principles and the other on revenue-based rates, both of which allocate a portion of the export surplus to complementary players through taxes on essential exporters. We evaluate these modifications through a case study and discuss their practical implications.
RUC. Repositorio da Universidade da Coruña
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Sustainability, externalities and ocean grabbing: Pressing challenges for maritime transport

  • García-Alonso, Lorena
  • González-Laxe, Fernando
  • Sanchez, Ricardo J.
[Abstract]: Due to the strategic role of the maritime sector in the world economy, attention should be paid to the changing context in which its activity is carried out. Global shocks, such as COVID-19, or those more specific, such as Brexit, the recent armed conflicts in Ukraine or the Middle East, the growing insecurity in the Red Sea, or extreme natural phenomena resulting from climate change, add to new trends related to the transition towards environmental concerns, the technological revolution, financial swings, trade wars, changes in consumer behaviour or migration processes. All of this, in a simultaneous and interconnected way, is altering economic patterns and consequently having an impact on logistics and maritime transport. New circumstances pose new challenges, and the success of strategies designed to meet them requires a correct diagnosis of the problems to be solved. This work aims to contribute to the analysis of what, in the opinion of the authors, are three major challenges for maritime transport which, moreover, transcend the sector itself: the sustainability of the economic growth model, the privatisation of the use of maritime resources and the absence of a clear alternative fuel to deal with the decarbonisation of the fleet. The identification of these three major challenges resulted from an exhaustive review of the literature, which shifted away from the focus on maritime transport itself to the evolution of its economic, social and environmental context., This work is part of the R+D+I project grant PID2022–137211NB-I00, financed by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/ 501100011033/ and by “ERDF A way of making Europe”/EU. This research received additional support from the French National Research Agency (ANR) Project "MAGNETICS" No. ANR-22-CE22–0002.
RUC. Repositorio da Universidade da Coruña
Publicación Artículo científico (JournalArticle)

Evaluating the impact of items and cooperation in inventory models with exemptable ordering costs

  • Fiestras Janeiro, María Gloria
  • García-Jurado, Ignacio
  • Meca Martínez, Ana
  • Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo
[Absctract]: In this paper we introduce and analyse, from a game theoretical perspective, several multi-agent or multi-item continuous review inventory models in which the buyers are exempted from ordering costs if the price of their orders is greater than or equal to a certain amount. For all models we obtain the optimal ordering policy. We first analyse a simple model with one firm and one item. Then, we study a model with one firm and several items, for which we design a procedure based on cooperative game theory to evaluate the impact of each item on the total cost. Then, we deal with a model with several firms and one item for each firm, for which we characterise a rule to allocate the total cost among the firms in a coalitionally stable way. Finally, we discuss a model with several firms and several items, for which we characterise a rule to allocate the total cost among the firms in a coalitionally stable way and to evaluate the impact of each item on the cost that would be payable to each firm when using the allocation rule. All the concepts and results of this article are illustrated using data from a case study., This work is part of the R+D+I project grants MTM2017-87197-C3-1-P, MTM2017-87197-C3-2-P, PGC2018-097965-B-I00, PID2021-124030NB-C31, PID2021-124030NB-C33 and PID2022-137211NB-100, that were funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/ and by “ERDF A way of making Europe”/EU. This research was also funded by project PROMETEO/2021/063 from the Comunidad Valenciana, and by Grupos de Referencia Competitiva ED431C-2020/03 and ED431C-2020/14 from the Consellería de Cultura, Educación e Universidades, Xunta de Galicia. Funding for open access charge: Universidade da Coruña/CISUG . The authors would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments, which have contributed to the improvement of this article., Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2020/03, Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2020/14, Generalitat Valenciana; PROMETEO/2021/063